UNCOMFORTABLE SUBJECTS : PRIVATE RACISM

A REFLECTION ON RACE IN AMERICA

I want to take some time to mention what I'm planning to write over the next few days. I think it's especially important to lay out my intentions this time because I am about to venture into very difficult territory.

Whenever I set out on a new intellectual endeavor, I always think of my mentor: Friedrich Nietzsche. In this instance, I think about the title to one of his aphorism collections: Uncontemporary Observations. Nietzsche did not care whether he wrote about subjects that ruffled traditional feathers. He purposely contradicted the expectations of the "the present" and "contemporary" society. His ideas at times recapitulated themes from distant history. At other times, they foretold the future. In either case, he was not "contemporary." To the contrary, he purposely defied "contemporary."

Writers face constant pressure to be contemporary. After all, you can't be successful if you don't write to meet present expectations. Yet no one ever evolves without taking daring chances; and writers are no exception. By accident, I find myself in early 21st Century America: A strange, confusing, conflicted, changing civilization. There are certain subjects that we simply do not talk about, or at least we do not voice certain sentiments about them in public. It is irrelevant what we privately think about these "taboo" subjects. We just never voice what we really believe. Sometimes our beliefs are not even conscious.

Race is among those subjects. Personally, race is an obsession of mine. It frequently inspires my writing because it is so maddeningly relevant. Yet there are certain things we simply do not say about it, no matter how often we think them.

Race has played a pivotal role in American civilization from our earliest history. Through race, we have seen just how low American civilization can fall. Through race, we see our principles challenged. All our grand rhetoric about equality, dignity and fairness falls flat when applied to the American experience with race. It is no surprise that much of my satire involves racial realities in the United States. After all, when we honestly view race in America, we see several different Nations living in one. And they aren't all equal, no matter what the law says.

But I struggle with my own conflicts about race. In my writing and in my public expressions, I vociferously advocate equality. I believe that everyone in this country--no matter their origins--should have equal legal opportunities and a fair shot at success. I truly believe that. It is only just. We cannot claim to live in a just society if some people do not have the same chances for success simply because of their ancestry in a certain country or a certain continent.

Yet even in saying this I feel myself a hypocrite. In fact, I come close to a confession when I say that I am a racist. But we all are. Americans simply do not understand that racism comes in many shades. Some are overt, but most are extraordinarily subtle. Everyone in the United States is a racist in their own fashion; you do not have to be David Duke to be a racist. Rather, every American--including declared liberals--harbors deep-rooted cultural expectations about the "ways" of different ethnic groups. Every American believes on some level that people in other ethnic groups are "different" and "act differently" than they do "because that's the way they are." They do not necessarily mean it in a malicious way; but it is ever-present. And it is racism.

We are racists the moment we say: "Two guys and a black guy entered the room." I was raised with these distinctions. I also grew up in a distinct cultural background (southeastern Connecticut; and as the biological product of hardworking Northern European Protestant descendants). Both by nature and by operation of economic forces, that cultural background was racially exclusive. For the longest time, I never thought I was racist. How could I be? After all, I always learned that it was "bad to be a racist" and that I wasn't a racist because I did not publicly say bad things about people in other ethnic groups. But my own family--the same family that taught me these abstract lessons about race with the best possible intentions--cultivated a set of cultural values in me that made me completely dissociate myself from other races. Those values also made me intuitively judgmental toward anyone who did not share them. And on a subconscious level, I began to believe that my values were normal, while others were not. That was racist.

Racism is everywhere in the United States. It is on everyone's mind all the time. And it is intensely private. When white people eat at a restaurant and a black beggar enters the restaurant, I challenge everyone sitting there to say that they do not harbor certain negative assumptions about black people: "Why doesn't he work? Why do they beg? Why are they all so poor? They're all like that..." they think. They might be ferocious liberals and believe in equality. But in that cultural situation, I challenge them all to say that they do not make immediate judgments about black people in their own private minds. And it is not their fault: It is simply a function of their own cultural backgrounds reacting to another cultural background.

America elected Barack Obama. But that does not mean we are not beyond racism. My "uncontemporary observation" on this subject is that EVERYONE IS A RACIST. It is just a question of degree. We may bear no conscious ill-will toward other ethnic groups. Yet when we make even the most subtle assumptions about them, we are racists. Even disadvantaged ethnic groups engage in racism. I challenge any black person to say he harbors no assumptions about white people when placed in a social situation with them: "He's not going to be fair with me. He's not going to treat me right. He's going to condescend to me. He's going to exploit me. He's going to disrespect me. He's going to fire me because I'm black. That's what they all do. White people are mean and will hurt me any chance they get." Racism goes in both directions--all the time.

Overcoming racism is about more than turning to the law for superficial equalization. Overcoming racism is a mammoth cultural endeavor; and we are nowhere near achieving it. Until we truly harbor no assumptions or expectations about "how other ethnic groups act," and until we truly do not think "How typical" when someone from a particular ethnic group acts in a particular way, we are racists. Yet we do these things all the time without even knowing it. We are merely giving expression to the combined weight of our respective cultural heritages. Heritage bears down upon us in America as in no other country on earth. Nowhere on earth have so many disparate cultural traditions been thrown in with one another. And nowhere else has such burning intolerance arisen when those traditions clash.

Let me be clear for the record. I live my life to avoid racism in all things. But I am still as racist as every other American because I cannot honestly say that I do not occasionally make negative assumptions about other ethnic groups in difficult situations. In this sense, we are all racists. When a black youth wearing a doo rag, low pants, a crooked hat and gangster-style sports garb acts rowdy with his friends on a subway train, I intuitively think: "He is up to no good. He's going to cause a scene." I wish I didn't. But I do. I tell myself I shouldn't think it. I challenge any white person from my cultural background to claim the very same thoughts do not flash in his mind in the same situation.

I have no solutions to the racism problem. The best we can do is to forbear as much as we possibly can in our external behavior. We must try to understand one another as best we can for the sake of order and coexistence. It is relatively easy never to "act like a racist" or "say racist things" in public. It is easy not to be David Duke. But it is not so easy to truly drive racist thoughts from our minds in pressing circumstances.

I wish we weren't all racists. I really, really do. But we would all be dishonest if we said we weren't. And I will immediately call anyone a hypocrite who denies his own racism. Racism is not just the overt hatred we hear about in groups like the KKK. Racism is also about unconscious economic segregation. Living in a part of town that no black person can afford is racist, too. Supporting an economic system that perpetuates racial inequalities is racist, too. After all, why do most wealthy white people live in areas that black people cannot afford? Because they won't have to be around black people. When black people are around, it's a "bad neighborhood." Even using the term "bad neighborhood" is racism. It is no coincidence that "bad neighborhoods" are always the poor, black areas. And it is racist to assume the poor, bad areas are always black. Yet people who claim not to be racist use the term "bad neighborhood" all the time.

Consider a white real estate broker who thinks he is not a racist. He says to his client: "You don't want to live above 96th Street. That's a bad neighborhood." Why? Because black people mostly live there. How can that not reflect deeply entrenched, racist assumptions about black people? Think about how often we use terms like "bad neighborhood." They are racist. And most barely comprehend why.

Racism in the United States is exquisitely subtle. It is the inevitable byproduct of placing so many cultural backgrounds in close proximity to one another, along with the natural human propensity to resent those who are different. As such, racism is everywhere. I know it's not popular to say. But that does not mean we cannot honestly grapple with it. Is it terrible? Of course it is. But there are lots of terrible things about American life; and in my view it makes more sense to call a spade a spade than to pretend it's not.

This is my uncontemporary observation for the day.

DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL : A BAD ARGUMENT, AND AN EMBARRASSING DOUBLE STANDARD

OESTERHOUDT STRIKES

Last week, former Supreme Allied Commander (Atlantic) General John Sheehan testified before a Senate subcommittee investigating whether it was prudent to repeal the American military's ban on openly gay soldiers. General Sheehan argued that the military should not alter its policy. He said that openly gay soldiers reduce morale, combat effectiveness and unit cohesion.

To support his assertion, General Sheehan referenced an incident in which the Dutch army failed to defend a Bosnian town against Serbian aggression during Yugoslavia's Civil War in 1995. Although he could not directly attribute the Dutch army's failure to individual gay soldiers, General Sheehan explicitly said that Holland's "socialized" and "permissive" attitude toward homosexuality in the military made its armed forces "ill-equipped" to fight battles.

Dutch officials reacted with surprise to General Sheehan's remarks. They found it bizarre that anyone could link military ineffectiveness to a policy permitting openly gay men and women to serve in the military.

I find General Sheehan's argument bizarre, too. Moreover, I also find it foolish, hypocritical and ignorant. I have long criticized the U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy as reflecting a fundamental double standard. It not only assumes that abstract homosexuality makes a person a bad soldier. It also assumes that there are no gay people in the U.S. military. Anecdotal evidence suggests that homosexuality is rife in the armed forces. It's just that no one talks about it. And yet General Sheehan does not suggest that the U.S. military is "ineffective," even though it certainly has gay people in it. Policies do not change the way people are.

But these are not the only flaws in "don't ask, don't tell." Put simply, the entire policy functions on logically untenable premises. First, the policy purports to "strengthen morale, combat effectiveness and unit cohesion" by eliminating openly gay people from service in the ranks. The argument is that openly gay men might form emotional relationships with one another that could jeopardize a particular "mission." Morale and combat effectiveness, in turn, depend on the chain of command. Morale and combat effectiveness require unswerving loyalty to the chain of command. And if men develop romantic connections to one another, then perhaps they will be loyal to one another, not the chain of command. Thus, it is proper to exclude openly gay men from military service: Gay relationships threaten the chain of command because romantic connections switch loyalties from the mission to individual men.

But what about women? The "don't ask, don't tell" policy assumes that romantic connections are only dangerous to the "mission" when they exist between two men. Yet the military allows straight women to serve alongside straight men. Human beings will develop romantic connections with anyone to whom they feel attracted, no matter the gender. Straight men fall in love with straight women just as deeply as gay men fall in love with each other. In that light, the fact that the U.S. military permits straight women to serve with straight men poses the same theoretical danger to morale as allowing openly gay men to serve. Straight people develop romantic connections just like gay people. And according to the army's rationale for "don't ask, don't tell," romantic connections are "bad" because they divide loyalties. Apparently, however, love affairs between men and women in the army do not divide loyalties as strongly as love affairs between men.

This is just ignorant: If the problem is potential romantic connections between soldiers, then neither straight women nor gay men should be allowed to serve in the military. There is no qualitative difference between romantic connections among gay people versus straight people. According to the army's logic, such connections are equally "dangerous to morale" and "unit cohesion." The fact that the U.S. military presumes that gay relationships are somehow "more dangerous to morale" is logically untenable.

I can see no good reason to keep gays from the U.S. military beyond naked prejudice. The only thing that seems to support "don't ask, don't tell" is a historical animus directed from straight men against gay men. Straight men feel "weird" when they know they are sitting next to a gay man, so the policy aims to eliminate that awkwardness. Yet there is no principled reason for this. It functions on the bare assumption that "gay people are different" and therefore must be excluded. To quote Justice Stephen Breyer's observation from the oral argument in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538 (2003)(the case striking down State gay sodomy laws), "don't ask, don't tell" invokes this reasoning: "I do not like thee, Doctor Fell; the reason why I cannot tell." Straight people in the army just plain don't like being around gay people. That's the only reason for the policy.

I also question the military's assumption that gay relationships could somehow damage unit effectiveness. Leaving to one side the consideration that thousands of gay people already serve in the military without saying so, divided loyalties dominate military service. Men (and women, too) form extraordinary bonds with one another under the stress of combat. Their camaraderie deepens from the moment they enter training to the toughest moments in battle. I have written that the military is inherently socialistic because it cares about its own people; and soldiers are also socialistic because they are all willing to die for their brothers. In fact, they are all willing to die helping to save their brothers, even if their actions "endanger the mission." Put simply, soldiers will always divide their loyalties because they care for each other, romance or not. Allowing openly gay people to serve in the army will not change all soldiers' natural commitments to each other.

Finally, General Sheehan implied that the mere presence of gay people in the Dutch army made it a poor fighting force. This is ridiculous. There is simply no historical correlation between homosexuality and military ineffectiveness. Alexander the Great, Peter the Great and Frederick the Great were all allegedly gay, yet they went down in history as model soldiers. To suggest that an aesthetic sexual taste for members of one's own sex somehow renders a person "effeminate, weak, womanly and unsoldierlike" is simply rank stereotyping. Although history has placed restrictions on the manner in which gay people express their sexuality, it is indisputable that they have served with distinction as soldiers, officers and even conquerors. In that light, General Sheehan's argument that "the presence of gay people" in the Dutch army made it "weak" ignores history.

In conclusion, there is no logical or historical reason to continue the U.S. military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. It makes pernicious assumptions about the relationship between sexuality and military competence. And it also functions on a double standard because another policy permits straight women to serve alongside straight men. The policy identifies "romantic connections between soldiers" as a reason to exclude openly gay men. Yet it allows straight women to potentially compromise straight men with "romantic connections:" "Romantic connections" are only dangerous among gay men, not straight men. The U.S. military offers no justification for the differential treatment. In that light, it is logically untenable. It simply reflects gross and outdated adolescent stereotypes. Romance is romance; it poses the same "dangers" whether it exists between boys and boys or boys and girls.

REVERSE STEREOTYPING IN ADVERTISING : MORE INSULTING THAN REGULAR STEREOTYPING?

OESTERHOUDT STRIKES

Stereotypes fascinate me because everyone taught me to revile them. It is a dirty word. You are not supposed to stereotype anymore. But what is stereotyping, actually? It means making generalizations about particular people or things, then exaggerating those generalizations in a pejorative way.

Stereotypes are pernicious when applied to "disfavored" groups. They are even worse when a person in "superior social position" directs the stereotype against a person in an "inferior social position." In other words, it is "politically incorrect" for a wealthy white man in America (i.e., a person with a historically "superior social position") to stereotype against a poor black man (i.e, a person with a historically "inferior social position"). Yet when people in traditionally inferior social positions stereotype those in superior social positions, it is somehow more forgivable. After all, who gets up in arms when black comedians say all white people are awkward? No one: Because everyone knows that white people have historically enjoyed a "superior social position" over blacks in America. In this sense, stereotypes are objectionable only in context: They are "bad" only when directed downward from a superior social position against an inferior one.

Still, it is hard to talk about stereotypes without inviting anger. Even outside the racial context, stereotypes raise emotions because they depend on uncomfortable--and sometimes remotely true--assumptions about others. No one likes to be mocked for their intrinsic characteristics, even if their intrinsic characteristics are less than praiseworthy.

It is even difficult to analyze the stereotyper. Ten years ago, I angered the American government when I applied for a Federal scholarship to study the systematic way in which American media stereotypes Germans. I did not get the grant. Apparently, the Federal government did not want to fund a paper that would tell it how shortsighted, ignorant and simplistic most Americans are when thinking about Germany. At the time, I was disappointed I did not get my grant. But it taught me a valuable lesson: Neither the proponents nor the victims of stereotypes like talking about them.

Whether or not the Federal government chooses to recognize it, stereotypes are everywhere in this country. They surround us. We even buy into them without even knowing it. To start, it is hard to watch American movies without encountering some condescending racial, sexual or national caricature. Even in a sci-fi action movie like Transformers : Revenge of the Fallen, the "hip" robots have black voices and banter in ebonics. Most gay characters are pathetically effeminate, with the lisps, hair and flamboyance to match. And people from other countries? Forget it: Germans are merciless, icy, calculating, humorless villains (Schindler's List; Hellboy II). Italians are lusty, hairy, slicked-back tough Guidos who use big hand gestures and talk about their families all the time (Saturday Night Fever). Russians are crafty, suspicious tyrants with thick accents (Rambo III; Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull). The French are perfumed, well-dressed, snotty, red-lipped, arrogantly petulant metrosexuals with perfect hair who usually wind up buying baguettes or espresso at some point in the movie (The Matrix : Reloaded, Ronin)(Jean Reno is the default American choice for a Frenchman). The British are absurdly prim, polite, insistent on protocol, silly or villainous (The Patriot). Arabs are maniacal terrorists who wear turbans, shout "Allah, Ackbar!" and blow things up (True Lies). Asians are generally kung-fu-fighting, sword-wielding comic relief with funny accents (any Jackie Chan movie).

Of course, not all American movies support racial, sexual and national stereotypes. There are exceptions in every category. But the fact that so many mainstream films thrive on stereotypes means something. It means that America has an appetite for them. They like laughing at smooth-talking black robots and silly gay men. They expect Italians to be gangsters and Germans to be killers. After all, stereotypes are easy to grasp. They distance "us" from "them." They allow "us" to feel secure in our identities by condescending toward the way "they" speak, act and move. Stereotypes unite through ignorance.

Hollywood films are not the only medium that supports rank stereotypes in the United States. Even so-called "neutral" news networks reinforce racial and national generalizations. Whenever news agencies report on street crime, they usually point out that the suspect is a "black male," or they just show his face onscreen: Just another scary-looking black guy with unkempt facial hair. Whenever news agencies report about China or Russia, they usually make ominous comments about sinister motivations and repressive governments. And when they report about destitute Third World countries, typically they focus on some ridiculous sideshow, like peasants cooking dirt shavings or worshipping a river bank.

In short, Americans get their stereotypes from multiple sources. Stereotypes help them order their world. They help them remember who "they" are. Yet no matter how much Americans love their stereotypes, and no matter how often they buy into them, they also hear a countervailing message: "Stereotyping is bad." Students learn that it is wrong to make sweeping generalizations about ethnic, national, sexual and religious groups. Even corporations instruct their employees that it is "wrong" to generalize about "others." It might not be wrong to exclude "them" from the workforce or relegate "them" to the mail room. You just can't make callous remarks about their low station.

We have lived in the era of "political correctness" for several decades now. Some people have gotten in trouble for breaking the official rules about stereotypes, like Don Imus and some other indiscreet white men. But despite the "official" stance against stereotyping, it survives. It lives on in men's hearts. People can dutifully watch what they say in public without privately abandoning stereotypical thinking. It is very easy to be "politically correct" in observance, yet politically incorrect in spirit. Even the worst bigot can navigate the sparse minefield of forbidden phrases that demarcates "politically correct speech." You just need some minimal public discretion.

But what happens when traditional stereotypers try too hard to show their political correctness? In advertising, for instance, I have noticed an increase in so-called "reverse stereotyping," namely, painfully obvious attempts to portray traditionally stereotyped roles in the opposite light.

Take these examples: A major garment company runs an ad showing a married black man in a very nice home choosing a white starched shirt from a hickory-paneled closet. In the next ad, a home security company shows an affluent black family in a very nice home being terrorized by a white burglar, then calling police. In another ad, a life insurance company hawks its wares by showing an extremely well-dressed black man behind a desk in an office building. He is an "insurance executive;" and a desperate-looking white man calls him to ask about life insurance options. In yet another ad, a trade school notes that "times are tough," then it shows an unemployed white man struggling to find a job. It suggests that he get an education in order to stop receiving public assistance.

What is significant about these ads? In my view, they are even more condescending to "disfavored political groups" in America than flat-out stereotypes. After all, pernicious stereotyping generally operates in a "downward" manner, from people in a "traditionally superior social position" against people in a "traditionally inferior social position." In all the social contexts relevant to these ads, black Americans generally occupy the inferior position: They do not have nice homes; they do not wear button-down shirts; they are not even married; they are the burglars, not the ones who call police; they do not buy life insurance, let alone run the insurance company; they are unemployed and need educations to get off welfare. A flat-out stereotype would have shown white people buying button-down shirts, calling the police on black burglars and running an insurance company. But here the ads simply reverse the stereotypes, placing black people in the traditionally superior positions, while white people fancifully occupy the traditionally inferior positions. This "racial reversal" so obviously contradicts predominant social realities that it invites scorn.

It is easy to see why the corporations did this. They did not want to "appear stereotypical" by portraying blacks in "traditionally inferior social positions." They wanted to comply with "political correctness." But in attempting to avoid stereotypes, the corporations came off as even more patronizing than they would have had they simply stuck with the generalizations everyone expects to see. Americans expect to see black burglars; that's what they see on the news all the time. Americans expect to see white insurance executives; after all, insurance executives are basically all white anyway. And Americans expect to hear about unemployed black people on welfare; laziness is a classic racial stereotype that has long fueled resentment between racial groups in America.

In sum, anyone can see that these ads do not correspond to social reality in the United States. That fact confirms that Americans like their stereotypes. It makes them uneasy--and even disbelieving--to see black people portrayed outside their traditionally inferior social positions. No one will ever believe that black people will run insurance companies. Nor will anyone believe that white Americans will commit street crime in the same proportions as black Americans. Americans are too comfortable with their stereotypes. A few advertisers will not change anyone's assumptions by reversing stereotypical roles that have existed in Americans' minds for generations.

No, Americans still have a voracious appetite for stereotypes. Just go to the movies or turn on the news. And ironically, attempting to be "political correct" only worsens stereotypical thinking. That's because telling Americans that "stereotyping is bad" is like telling a star baseball player that baseball is bad: Stereotyping is what we do--and we really like it. Telling us to stop doing what we like will result in confused, disingenuous absurdity, just as we see in these ads.

DO WE SPEAK TO UNITE OR TO DECEIVE?

AN ESSAY

As I mentioned last week, I'm re-reading Aristotle's Politics. Surprisingly, I found myself agreeing with many of his points about human beings and their motivations. That surprised me because I always took a prejudiced view against Aristotle. In college, I dismissed him because he was an "absolutist" about truth. But now that many years have passed--and now that I have read so much more--I approach Aristotle with more forgiveness. I do not read him with a smirk anymore. Rather, I read him for what he is: A classical metaphysician. I like some points; I don't like others. It's like reading anyone else.

Yet Aristotle is no average writer. He is a giant among Western philosophers. His views on virtually every subject became dogma for centuries. Men died challenging Aristotlean doctrines in the Catholic church during the Middle Ages. Others risked everything to dispute Aristotle's teachings about ethics and astronomy. As time went on, scientific advances dethroned Aristotle's pre-eminence in some areas. But in others, his influence remains strong--and still relevant. After all, Aristotle wrote about politics, ethics, human beings and beauty. These things cannot be reduced to mathematical fact. Rather, they constantly invite debate, interpretation and reassessment.

Aristotle's political work certainly has continued relevance. Like all the political philosophers who followed him, Aristotle begins by discussing human nature. Aristotle approaches the question with his usual confidence: He makes conclusions as if they were obvious, even if they are just assumptions. He also plays the biologist, constantly comparing humans to their analogues in nature.

I love any discussion about human nature. And I have always disagreed with Aristotle's view here.

Aristotle claims that men are "political animals...by nature." The Politics, Book I, ch. ii, para. 1253a1. He makes this conclusion by examining the key difference between men and beasts: Men have speech. He acknowledges that both animals and men have voice--cows can moo and dogs can bark to voice their feelings--but speech is unique to man.

This might not seem like a profound observation, but Aristotle's understanding of speech is remarkable. The consummate metaphysician, he argues that "speech has a single purpose" and no other. Namely, it enables men to "indicate what is useful and what is harmful," and "what is just or unjust." Id. at para. 1253a7. Finally, he draws the ultimate distinction between men and animals: "[H]umans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust." Id.

For Aristotle, then, speech has a justice function. It not only allows men to communicate their feelings, but it exists to help them find what is useful and just for all. This is the natural purpose of speech. It is imbued with a sensitivity for morality (good and evil), practicality (useful and not useful) as well as justice. These are profound concepts. And Aristotle speaks in absolute terms. There is one "good," one "evil," one "justice" and one "useful." In his view, speech enables man to find them all--and to organize States on that basis. Man is not only a speaking animal; his speech allows him to unite with other men to find universal justice in a useful society. What a remarkable assertion.

It is a remarkable assertion because it invites so much scorn. I naturally shy away from absolutes. Aristotle always offered me a tempting target because he reduces complex issues into absolute "sayings." His argument about speech--and human nature--strikes me as impossibly naive. Aristotle's philosophy of "specific purposes" (teleology) always leads to moments like this. After all, how can we say "speech is for justice and unity" when even brief life experience reveals that men often do not use speech for those purposes? Aristotle assumes that speech leads to cooperation and good. But life experience refutes this: Men lie. They don't cooperate. They don't tell the truth. They divide from one another and twist language to advance their narrow interests. And they certainly do not always use language to find justice. In most cases, language leads to injustice.

For his part, Aristotle would say that deceivers do "not use speech according to its purpose." This is a laughable objection, unfortunately: If language's "natural purpose" is to "find justice," then I would argue that people rarely use it "naturally."

Broadly speaking, Aristotle's theory of language reflects a good view of human nature. Aristotle believed that men naturally worked with one another to achieve a "good life." See Politics, Book I, ch. ii at para. 1252b27. He thought that speech gave them a natural tool to discover useful methods for securing a "good life," as well as to distinguish "good from evil," "right from wrong" and "just from unjust." Finally, he thought that men naturally cooperated with each other to achieve a "good life" filled with justice.

These are admirable sentiments. The problem is that Aristotle assumed everything he concluded. Every philosopher must assume certain basic principles in order to develop his theories about life. Aristotle's assumptions sound appealing, but they remain assumptions. For my part, I cannot assume that men are good by nature. And because of that, I cannot assume that men generally use speech for good purposes. Men unite with speech, but they also deceive with it. Men do good with speech; they also do bad. It is no answer to say--as Aristotle does--that they are merely "ignoring speech's natural purpose." There are no overreaching purposes. We simply attach them according to our individual sensitivities.

Aristotle thought that he could find truth by assigning specific purposes to everything open to human experience or imagination. And he assumed that one "truth" exists to be found: That was his worst assumption of all.

WHAT DRIVES PROSECUTORS?

AN ESSAY

Cynicism explains motivations. As I have pointed out in many other essays, cynicism provides a realistic method to judge people’s intentions before they hurt you. Cynicism assumes that people, groups or organizations have only selfish motives in any transaction, and those selfish motives shed light on how they will act. In most logical discourse, it is not wise to assume because assumptions are “beliefs” with no grounding in actual knowledge. In other words, a cynic assumes: “He’s only doing it for the money” without knowing whether that is actually true. On the other hand, we make assumptions all the time because it is not always possible to acquire knowledge before making a judgment. And if we do not take a guiding approach to an issue, we lose focus and cohesion when we address it. To that extent, assumptions help direct us. We cautiously approach issues under a few reasonable assumptions. Then we assemble knowledge in an effort to put sensory “meat” on the assumptions. Sometimes we confirm our assumptions. Other times, we do not.

Cynicism equips us with realistic assumptions about human behavior. In our “real world,” commerce is all. Without commerce, people could not pay their rent, feed their children or heat their homes. Additionally, human beings are naturally acquisitive creatures. They like to compete with one another for limited resources and they like to win. Sigmund Freud observed that men “are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.” Civilization and its Discontents, p. 68. Commerce provides an excellent forum in which to give vent to these competitive impulses. Freud recognized as much when he wrote: “In abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments.” Id. at 69. In this light, we understand why human beings strive, battle and jockey for money and land. They are naturally aggressive, and in the “race for success,” they have a chance to unleash their aggressions. In aggressive commerce, men have only one goal: To enrich themselves. The focus is selfish. They exploit others for personal gain. On man’s relationship with other men, Freud concurs. He says: “[Aggression] also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something alien.” Id. In short, commerce provides a “civilized substitute” for man’s natural inclination to aggressively conquer others.

Cynical values echo Freud’s assessment. When confronting any commercial situation, a cynic assumes that a person has only one motivation: To enrich himself by whatever means possible, even if it requires gross unfairness or even violence. The law exerts a partial check on commercial aggressiveness by threatening punishment for certain “excessive” measures intended to win profits. But cynics assume that commercial men will do anything that the law does not forbid. After all, it would be costlier to break the law and go to prison—even if it brings in a marginal profit—than to comply with the law and face no additional costs. After all, the focus is selfish. If violating the law results in greater loss than gain, then it makes sense to comply: You can’t enjoy your money if you are sitting in prison. In either event, cynicism explains commercial behavior. And in either event, principle has nothing to do with it: The question is merely whether an action brings maximal profit for minimal personal risk.

Cynicism applies when analyzing any commercial activity, including law practice. Even common laymen know that “lawyers are all about the money.” There is a sort of “popular cynicism” about lawyers. Colloquially, people talk about “lawyer-liars” who say anything to get paid. They call 500 lawyers on the bottom of the sea “a good start.” And they talk about getting “fucked over” by their lawyers, as if that is what lawyers naturally do. But there is nothing unique about lawyers; they are simply men in commerce venting their naturally aggressive instinct for profit. To win, they resort to any methods, as long as those methods do not greatly diminish the value of victory.

Yet there is a conceptual problem with lawyers’ commercial aspirations. After all, lawyers supposedly embody the law, which most people think should rise above mere commercial gain. In popular understanding, the law is more majestic than commerce. It stands for “justice, truth, fairness and equality” under neutral, reasonable rules that apply to everyone. This is very different from commerce, in which money and property determine status and power, not abstract rules. Theoretically, everyone is equal before the law. That is thematically appealing. And that is why there is tension between a lawyer’s craft and his commercial inclinations.

Sadly, law finds a happy place in commerce. Despite the theoretical contrast between noble legal principles and self-serving commercial hungers, law and commerce go hand in hand. Commercial men make the laws by influencing legislation. Even English common law judges gave voice to “sensible, commercial concerns” in their classic commercial rulings. Lawyers fit right into this “commercialized” legal climate. The law not only serves commerce in theory, but it is also commercially valuable to practice law. To that extent, cynicism easily unravels lawyers’ motivations. Like other commercial men, they are out for themselves. They may say that they “represent clients” in order to “solve their legal worries.” But a cynic penetrates all such pretense. He knows bullshit when he smells it. Most lawyers simply want to know how much money they have billed at month’s end, not how many “client worries” they have allayed. A cynic assumes that lawyers tailor their behavior for personal gain. And because lawyers are essentially commercial actors, this is a reasonable assumption.

But there is a perplexing exception here. While most lawyers merely ply their trade for personal profit, there are some lawyers who fanatically pursue cases for no reward at all: Prosecutors. Prosecutors are State actors. They do not bill fees, nor do they represent wealthy private clients. They defend public ideals by punishing “wrongdoing” and providing “justice” to victims. One may rightly ask: “What do they gain for themselves?” So far, we have seen that lawyers only truly act in their own interest. Do prosecutors, then, represent a “cynical exception” from the usual commercial assumptions about lawyers? What drives a prosecutor? It cannot be monetary gain. They receive a flat salary from the government no matter how many clients they handle. In many cases, they prosecute impecunious individuals for activities that have no commercial value at all. While a private personal injury attorney stands to gain from suing a person for negligently running over an old woman in a crosswalk, a public prosecutor stands to gain nothing from criminally prosecuting the same person for the same conduct. Something else motivates the prosecutor. It is not personal money profit.

Our analysis does not end here. If money does not answer a cynic’s questions, other things can. After all, a cynic assumes that all human motivations are selfish. In most cases, monetary gain is the most basic “selfish end.” But is not the only one. Sometimes people seek sexual pleasure from others. That is a selfish end even if it does not involve money. When a cynic observes a man flirting with a woman at a bar, he does not explain the behavior by reference to financial gain; he explains the behavior by reference to sex. In both cases, selfish gain motivates the behavior; the difference lies in the form of gain.

This helps us understand what motivates prosecutors. Neither money nor sexual satisfaction drives a prosecutor to zealously pursue economically worthless legal cases. What is it, then? I would venture that a heightened, judgmental moral sense drives prosecutors. By pursuing “criminals,” prosecutors feel that they are “doing right.” They have so much moral conviction that they willingly invest countless hours fighting to imprison “bad people.” This may sound noble, but I actually find it a little disturbing. After all, it implies that a prosecutor knows—with absolute certainty—what is “right;” and it also implies that he is willing to go to any legal length to prove it. That requires singular, unswerving moral focus. Prosecutors can have no doubt. They cannot equivocate. They must label their targets “wrongdoers” and muster every argument and every proof against them. While we can all agree that dangerous killers, rapists and robbers “do wrong,” what about hobos, drunkards, innocent trespassers and people who forget to pay for something in their grocery cart? How about a man who unknowingly violates the speed limit? Or some guy who gets caught playing with himself in a public toilet? Do we have the dogged moral clarity to declare that these people are “wrongdoers” who deserve criminal sanction? Do we have the courage to invest countless hours proving these “crimes” and rhetorically lambasting their “perpetrators?” I know I don’t. Yet as a cynic, I have an explanation for prosecutors who do: They get a euphoric, righteous charge from using the law to punish so-called “lawbreakers” because it vindicates hypersensitive, personal moral convictions. This is personal gain. If prosecutors feel inwardly good about sending an indiscreet masturbator to prison for 15 years, they have acted to fulfill their own personal desires. They have acted for personal gain, even if they do not receive a nickel for it.

This may seem a bit abstract. But there are other, more pragmatically cynical explanations for prosecutors’ motivations. Prosecutors are well-known public officials. They are executive officers. As such, they receive both praise and criticism for exercising their political powers. While the law embodies principles, political power knows only expediency. This places prosecutors in an awkward position. After all, they do not prosecute every single legal violation. It would be neither fair nor practical to do so. In principle, they should prosecute every violation in order to show that the law never flinches when someone violates it. But they only prosecute crimes when they feel it would have some collateral effect beyond the defendant. This lends itself to numerous selfish motivations, including: the desire to win re-election; the desire to appear “tough on crime” in order to seek higher political office; and the desire to curry favor with more influential political figures. Quite simply, prosecutors charge crimes in order to advance their own careers. Perhaps one day a prosecutor hopes to take a high-paying job as corporate counsel. To fulfill his ambition, he waits to prosecute “high-profile” cases so he can use them as bargaining tools in his employment hunt. Perhaps a prosecutor may wish to make a person’s life difficult because he does not like him. That may sound petty, but it is still a plausible, selfish motivation for selectively prosecuting a crime. If an action appears to bring some benefit to the actor, a cynic rules nothing out. Prosecutors have immense power; and they have many opportunities to benefit themselves by using it. In such circumstances, cynical analysis applies.

In sum, prosecutors appear to represent an exception to the usual cynicism surrounding lawyers’ motivations. After all, private lawyers are unashamed commercial actors who have little desire beyond winning money, while prosecutors are public officials who stand to win no money from their legal successes. But upon closer inspection, we see that prosecutors, too, have selfish motives. They prosecute crimes not just to “serve the public” or “protect justice,” but also to placate innately hypersensitive moral sensibilities and to advance their own careers. These are personal motives. As such, they fit nicely within the cynical analytic framework. Lawyers and prosecutors may truly have selfless motives. But cynicism protects us from disappointment by reference to common experience: All too often we find out that superficially noble actions are mere ploys for personal gain. That holds as much for lawyers as it does for prosecutors, even if they measure personal gain in different terms.