HOW TO BE A GOOD PERSON : IN A LANDLORD'S EYES

OESTERHOUDT STRIKES

At some point in our lives, we all wonder whether we are "good people." We live with others. We know how "good people" act. We have an intuitive sense about what makes a person "good." We even hear things about what makes a person "good:" They are friendly, kind, forbearing, compassionate, ethical, honest, caring, loving, trustworthy, gracious, forgiving and generous. "Good people" do not hurt you. They do what they say; and they apologize if they do not. They consider you at the same time they consider themselves. Aristotle and many other philosophers have written tomes about what it takes to be "good." It is an age-old question.

Of course, not everyone can agree on what is "good." You can't know you are a good person until you know what is good in the first place. What is good in one person's eyes may be bad in another. It is easy to lay down absolute standards for goodness. Yet like all ethical dilemmas, only we can say whether we subjectively feel that we have done right. Nonetheless, we can generally all agree that being "good" involves living without intent to injure other people. In that sense, being a "good person" essentially depends on positive motivation. And that positive motivation shines through in good actions toward others. Good people think selflessly; they refuse to hurt others to advance their interests. Bad people do the opposite; they are willing to hurt others to help themselves.

Being a good person is an individual lifestyle. It does not depend on how much money you make or what you do for a living. While it is possible to identify "objective" factors that hint whether a person is "good," true goodness comes from the heart, not from action alone. Enron fraud artists probably donated some money to charity the same year they robbed millions; that donation did not make them good people. No, being good is internal; and good shines through in external action. It is hard to verify. But everyone knows it when they see it.

It is refreshing to know a truly good person because they are rare. In our world, it is hard to be selfless and honorable. There are so many impulsions to discard goodness toward others in order to advance yourself. By the same token, it is hard to be patient. No one wants to wait or understand others' problems. Nor do they want to waste their time on others without reward. After all, people need to fend for themselves. They only have a limited time to get the job done. If they waste their time being nice to others, they might injure their own fortunes. And no one likes to do that. Put simply, we expect most people not to be good; our society frustrates goodness. That is why it is a welcome relief to meet a good person.

There is no formula to being a good person. Yet people throw the term around far more than they should. In many cases, they say someone is "good" solely because they act in a way that enriches them. That misunderstands what it means to be good. A truly good person acts with malice toward no one. The fact that a person acts the way another person wants them to does not make him good. To the contrary, expecting a person to act in a way that is beneficial to you undermines their value as an individual. It "instrumentalizes" them; it makes them pawns in a game you want to win. Just because someone pays you according to a contract does not make them "good." Merely fulfilling an external legal obligation is no shortcut to goodness. A good person holds to his word because it is his word, not because the law threatens him to do so.

Yet many people think that observing external obligations makes you "good." It is easy to make this mistake. After all, complying with the law seems like a "good" thing to do. But the law is indifferent to intention. And intention is the only thing that determines whether a person is good. In that sense, it is possible to seem good by fulfilling every imaginable legal standard. Yet it is also possible to have only bad intentions while complying with the law. You can be a total scoundrel yet do nothing illegal. If a person did not know you, they might say: "Well, he is law-abiding. So he must be a good person." To that extent, fulfilling external obligations can disguise ethical flaws.

I encountered an example to illustrate this easily confused distinction in the New York Post a few days ago. I read an article about some poor web designer who got run over in a Brooklyn street. See N.Y. Post, Horror hit-run in B'klyn, April 19, 2010 at p. 9. The article quoted his landlord. She spoke about his character: "He works. He comes home. He's a very good person (emphasis added)."

What did the landlord know about this guy? How did she know he was a "very good person?" She based her assessment on the fact that he works and comes home. What does that have to do with ethical goodness or pure intention? Nothing. If anything, it reveals that the landlord thinks the web designer was a "good person" solely because he went to his job, came home every night and ostensibly paid the rent. He might have been an utter scoundrel who doublecrossed his friends and broke women's hearts. Yet as far as the landlord was concerned, he was a "good person" because he adhered to his contractual obligations to pay rent. He also was a "good person" because he quietly went to his job and caused no disturbances.

I suppose this is what it takes to be a "good person" in a landlord's eyes. Landlord apply a "formula" for goodness: Have good credit; make an income; cause no trouble; pay your rent; keep your mouth shut; pay next month's rent; pay a late fee after the first. Your intentions do not matter. And "being a good person" means acting exactly the way the landlord wants. In this case, the landlord happened to like the way her tenant behaved because he did what enriched her. She morally approved him because his behavior coincided with her interests. His own ethical qualities did not influence her appraisal. It was "all about her." And that determined whether he was "good."

This gravely misunderstands what it means to be a "good person." A person is not "good" simply because he acts in a way that enriches another. Nor is he "good" simply because he adheres to contractual obligations under law. Rather, goodness is more subtle than that. There is no checklist. Action is not enough. It takes real reflection to see whether someone is good. Getting a rent check in the mail every month does not suffice to prove goodness.

Criminals and scallywags can mail rent checks, too. That does not make them good people.

But who has time to sit down and really think about character in our society? It seems we only care about character when we want to damage a foe with some embarrassing "flaw." And once again, we do that to merely to advance ourselves at their expense. By hurting them, we help ourselves. And hurting others is rarely good.

SHAME OR GUILT : WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

AN ESSAY

I tried to answer this question during a conversation I had with one of my best friends. We often talk about philosophy and power, and we both agreed that "shame" and "guilt" are "kindred spirits." They are both strongly negative words. No one likes to feel guilty or shameful. They both imply that you have done "wrong." But are they really the same? That's the question.

Both "shame" and "guilt" flow from an acknowledgment of power. We only feel shameful or guilty when we recognize that we have failed to conform to a standard that we probably did not make. Someone else made the standard, someone we recognize as "superior" to us. In this sense, both guilt and shame emanate from below; the person who makes the rules that induce guilt or shame at most feels "disappointed" that his "subject" broke a rule. Shame and guilt, then, are for those who occupy an inferior power position. This is why Nietzsche called shame and guilt Sklavenmoral--Slaves' Morality. The rule-maker (or "master") does not feel them. Rather, he causes others to feel them because they do not adhere to his standards. They solidify his grasp over them.

But this does not mean that a single "superior person" causes others to feel guilt or shame. While a "superior person" may have originally laid down external standards, in most cases today external standards proceed from institutions. After all, power is deeply entrenched. It emanates from manifold places. It operates in virtually every conceivable manner, whether subtle or overt. Power radiates in families, in schools, in laws, in social settings and in professional relationships. It exists in commerce and in property. Most relationships involve a party with advantages and a party without them. That disparity provides an opportunity for dominance by one party over the other. And this is the setting in which guilt and shame flourish.

Guilt is more extrinsic that shame. Although both guilt and shame flow from an acknowledgment of power, the power that induces guilt is predominantly external. When we feel guilty, we feel bad because we know we have transgressed against some common rule or understanding. Our negative emotion springs from our awareness that we have violated an external expectation. This includes everything from the criminal law (an external authority about which we are conscious) to our parents (an external authority whose commands we respect). A person feels guilty when he steals or when he knowingly fails to attend a dinner he promised his parents he would attend. In both cases, the person knew he was obligated to do something by some external authority, yet he failed to adhere to the obligation. That conscious failure creates guilt.

With guilt, then, the inquiry is external. We feel guilty only when we acknowledge that some external authority holds power over us. When we break its rules, we feel guilt to the extent that we deviate from the "expected standard." Guilt requires an acquiescence to "superior" people or ideas. It necessarily makes the subject "inferior" to the standard he violates. And unlike shame, it can be objectively measured: The "superior" party can declare a subject "guilty" because the subject verifiably deviated from an external standard. This is why the law uses the term "guilt" rather than "shame." Guilt is a conclusion as well as an emotion. You just need to see whether a person met the standard.

Not so with shame. Although shame might feel similar to guilt, it flows from an entirely different conceptual source. Shame has internal origins. A person feels ashamed when he fails to meet a standard that he expects from himself, not a standard some external authority set for him. An external authority might encourage a person to expect certain behavior from himself. But in the final analysis, only an individual can decide whether to adhere to certain principles or beliefs. In this sense, shame intertwines with honor. An honorable person swears to himself that he will not act in a certain way to achieve certain results. He expects certain behavior from himself. He commits himself to certain principles and beliefs. When he fails to act in the way he expects, he feels shame, not guilt. He failed to meet his own standard, not an external one.

Consider a man who commits himself to respecting others and telling the truth. He makes these commitments because he personally believes that respect and truth are honorable principles. If one day he lies and disrespects a competitor to win a job, he deviates from his own standard. If he truly has honor, he would feel ashamed for breaking his own commitments to good principles. He might also be guilty of violating some external standard against perjury or untruthfulness, but that has nothing to do with his own internal transgression. And that internal violation creates shame. In short, shame is ethical (internal), while guilt is legal (external).

But shame still requires an "inferior" mental outlook. Although an honorable person decides for himself whether to believe in certain principles, in many cases he does not decide freely. The decision whether to believe certain things often depends on social circumstance and expectation. An external rulemaker has as great an interest in creating strong internal shame in his subjects as he does in crushing them under external guilt. A rulemaker wants his subjects to decide to believe in principles that could induce individual shame. All this inures to his benefit. For example, a person learns to believe that "it is good to respect private property." He also learns that it is "illegal to steal." If he steals something, he suffers both shame and guilt: On the one hand, he failed to meet his own internal standard about respecting private property; on the other, he knowingly violated the external command not to steal others' property.

Both emotions are negative. They flow from different sources. But in the end, they both serve to reinforce the "superior rulemaker's" control over his subjects. Guilty and shameful people are easier to manage than willful ones.

Shame seems purer than guilt. It is more individual than guilt because it depends on the individual's own moral ordering. But if a person's own moral ordering is not voluntary--and if individual moral ordering merely substitutes for external rulemaking--then the net effect of shame is no different than guilt: They both reinforce dominant values by inducing negative emotions in those bold enough to "transgress."

CONTRACTS ARE CONTRACTS, SUPREME COURT RULES

NEWS FLASH

WASHINGTON, D.C.--Reason, Commerce, Justice & Free Beer has just learned that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "a contract is a contract" in the much-followed case Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP v. Marquez, No. 08-9851. Scholars and lawyers alike have reacted with surprise to the Court's decision. "We expected a narrower ruling," said Mr. Thomas J. Knickerbocker, Esq., partner at New York's Knickerbocker, Chance & Willoughby LLC, a prominent Wall Street law firm. "We thought the Court would be more straightforward. But it simply said 'a contract is a contract.' This is a complicated idea. It is hard for both lawyers and the public to understand."

Today's ruling has broad implications for the business community. It also represents a milestone in legal reasoning and rhetoric. The case arises from a dispute between a janitor, Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez, of Grand Concourse, The Bronx, and Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners, a large Wall Street investment house handling more than $45,000,000,000 in assets.

According to filings and the Court's decision, Mr. Marquez orally agreed to "use best efforts" to "satisfactorily" clean every toilet located at Gaffello's office building in downtown Manhattan. In return, an unnamed agent acting for the investment house promised to pay Mr. Marquez $40 per day "until told otherwise" and "subject to all reasonable alterations by promisor." The agent allegedly also told Mr. Marquez that he had "to supply his own materials" and he had to "wipe all shit and piss from all affected toilet facilities to the satisfaction of any Gaffaello director to the extent permitted by applicable law." Mr. Marquez allegedly acquiesced to Gaffaello's terms. He further acquiesced to Gaffaello's demand that he "waive all remedies, at law or equity, or at common justice, for any alleged breach of aforesaid agreement, be it oral or in writing."

Mr. Marquez immediately went to work. Both employees and officers found Mr. Marquez' work excellent. According to one Vice President in the Appropriations Department: "I've never seen a cleaner shitter. That muchacho sure knows what the fuck he's doing." Around the same time, an authorized Gaffaello budget deputy presented a written contract to Mr. Marquez. The written contract included all the terms to which he orally agreed, as well as a clause that imposed a duty on Mr. Marquez to "act in good faith in the performance hereof; but such duty shall not extend to promisor, Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP; and it is further agreed, covenanted and promised that promisee , Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez, shall have no right of action, cause of action or any other legal, equitable, natural or other remedy, either now or hereafter, today or tomorrow--or forever--for promisor's wanton or negligent failure, refusal, or decision not to use good faith in the execution, performance, observation or fulfillment of the mutual covenants set forth in this, the Master Contract for the Performance of Toilet Cleaning Services, notwithstanding all oral assertions to the contrary hereof, so help him God."

Mr. Marquez signed the contract, even though he did not read English. According to a Gaffaello witness, he said: "I understand it."

For two months, Mr. Marquez dutifully upheld his end of the bargain. He cleaned 4000 toilets, scrubbed 50,000 square feet of tile bathroom flooring every night and purified 4000 toilet stalls. In the process, he overcame horrific sights and odors. He worked at least 12 hours each day. He received $31.02 for his first day's work less taxes, fees and Social Security contributions. Although he was not eligible for Gaffaello's health coverage plan, he nevertheless paid toward it because he could not understand his paycheck statement. Over the next week, Gaffaello began paying Mr. Marquez a dollar less each day. Beginning the second week, it began subtracting two dollars per day from his daily check. After reducing his daily wage to $3.29, Gaffaello stopped paying Mr. Marquez at all. Instead, it sent a junior supply clerk to inform him that "he would be paid later."

Trusting that Gaffaello would honor the contract they signed, Mr. Marquez continued working. Eventually, however, Mr. Marquez gave up. He allegedly told a Gaffaello employee that he "could not continue working without pay" and that he "had a family to feed." In response, the employee said: "You can't leave. You promised to use best efforts and to act in good faith under this contract until told otherwise." Mr. Marquez said "they could sue him." With that, he walked off the job.

Gaffaello did sue him. Within two days, it served papers on Mr. Marquez and haled him into the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for breach of contract. Although the trial judge wondered why the dispute fell under Federal jurisdiction, Gaffaello's legal team presented evidence to show that Gaffaello was a Delaware limited liability partnership, while Mr. Marquez was a New York resident. It also showed that the contract between Gaffaello and Mr. Marquez "represented a lucrative business relationship implicating more than $75,000 in janitorial services." These facts, according to established Federal law, warranted Federal court jurisdiction. Mr. Marquez, who could barely speak English, let alone understand an argument involving Federal diversity jurisdiction, said nothing in response.

Gaffaello demanded a fast track trial. The trial judge--A. Harry Peters--had no sympathy for a recent immigrant like Mr. Marquez because President George H.W. Bush appointed him to the bench. He quickly surveyed the evidence and found that Mr. Marquez breached the contract. In a detailed opinion, the trial judge wrote: "Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed the obligations set forth in the contract he signed with Gaffaello. It is not for courts to pass upon the providence or fairness of written agreements between mature business actors. Rather, we must merely apply relevant law to resolve any allegation that one party breached the terms upon which they mutually agreed. Under law, we assume all terms to be valid and voluntary. In this case, Mr. Marquez has no answer to contradict the assertion that he walked off a job he contractually agreed to perform. He says he left because Gaffaello did not pay him, but that is not technically true. Gaffaello said it would 'pay him later.' This does not mean it 'did not pay' him. Gaffaello never breached the contract. Only Mr. Marquez did. Furthermore, Mr. Marquez promised to use best efforts and to comply with the contract in good faith. By walking off the job without notice or cause, he violated both obligations. In sum, Mr. Marquez breached the contract. I order him to return to work immediately, or to pay Gaffaello the reasonable value of his lost services, in an amount not less than $75,000.01."

Mr. Marquez appealed the trial court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. His case attracted notice from the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, and their lawyers hastened to his cause. They argued that the contract was invalid because it was "unconscionable" and because no contract may bind a man to work in the United States. The three-judge panel--including two Clinton appointees--agreed. They said: "We find the contract by and between Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP and Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez unconscionable as a matter of law. We find every argument to the contrary unconvincing. No matter what anyone says about our country or its free enterprise spirit, we refuse to entertain appellees' contention that the United States Constitution guarantees the 'unlimited freedom to bargain for employment terms.' This agreement verifiably 'shocks the conscience.' We cannot permit the contract to stand, no matter how 'voluntary' it may have been at signing. Appellees' conduct in this case borders on the sadistic. Judgment reversed."

Judge Ferguson H. Klosterbach, George W. Bush's lone appointee on the appellate panel, dissented. He wrote: "I think the trial judge was right. A contract is a contract. Mr. Marquez breached it. He is also an immigrant."

Dissatisfied with the Second Circuit's reasoning, Gaffaello applied to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. In its brief, Gaffaello phrased the case as follows: "This is a case about the freedom to contract. It is not about fairness. It is about a willful contract breacher who did not do what he promised to do." In response, Mr. Marquez' lawyers said: "This is not a case about the freedom to contract. This is a case about unfairness and injustice. This is a case about a powerful company forcing one-sided terms upon a powerless immigrant. If this Court has a shred of decency and compassion, it will affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the Court's opinion to a packed house. In a calm, steady voice, he began: "Our free market economy values fairness. But it values contracts more. In our view, contracts are contracts. Promises are promises. When commercial actors make promises, we do not excuse them lightly for failing to adhere to their commitments. This case involves promises and contracts. No matter how 'unfair' or 'unjust' those promises may seem in hindsight, we refuse to second-guess reasonable commercial actors who voluntarily make commitments. Contrary to Respondents' contention, this Court has no power to rule on 'elementary justice.' This Court applies the law. And the law in this case has a simple answer: Contracts are contracts.

"Our common law values contracts. Commerce prospers when commercial men feel assured that others will fulfill their commitments. That is why courts in our system rarely allow litigants to escape voluntary contractual obligations. True, contractual obligations only arise to the extent that parties make them freely. But there is no evidence in this case that Mr. Marquez faced 'coercion' to bargain with Gaffaello. He agreed to act in good faith, to waive his remedies and to use 'best efforts' while cleaning every toilet at Gaffaello's downtown facility 'until told otherwise.' At the same time, Gaffaello freely and voluntarily agreed to pay Mr. Marquez $40 per day 'subject to all reasonable alterations.' Mr. Marquez says that Gaffaello did not pay him. But the record clearly shows that it did. The fact that Gaffaello slowly decreased Mr. Marquez' daily wage did not change the contract. In fact, Gaffaello had every right to make 'reasonable alterations' to Mr. Marquez' pay. Mr. Marquez acquiesced to this term when he signed the contract. And--unlike Mr. Marquez--Gaffaello had no obligation to perform the contract in good faith. If Gaffaello somehow acted in bad faith, that was a risk Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed when he signed the contract. It is not for us to question these private contractual relations.

"We hold as a matter of constitutional law that contracts are contracts. Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature has power to retroactively invalidate private contractual terms concerning legal subject matter. We are neither philosophers nor moralists. We are legal technicians. We do not interfere with private bargains, nor do we save private individuals from their improvident business decisions. No matter how 'shocking' the terms may have been in Mr. Marquez' case, we are not fairness referees. We simply look to the contract and the circumstances to determine whether both parties freely and voluntarily assumed their duties. If we determine that they did, our inquiry ends. If we scrutinized every private bargain for terms we considered 'unfair' or 'oppressive,' we would undermine the spirit of private enterprise that drives our free market system. We are not paternalistic. We trust the market. We do not second-guess it.

"This is not new law. Our courts have held that 'contracts are contracts' for centuries. Even our English forebears so held. In the case Coxwell v. Bainbridge (King's Bench 1612), Lord Chief Justice Coke stated the basic principle that we continue to follow today: "Hath the yeoman signed the Pact of Free Wille as aforesaid? Say he the Parchmente be void for offending that Certaine Spiritte or Ghoste of Justice that doth dwell at the Hearte of all the dealings of Menne? What of it? This Courte judgeth not for Justice nor Rightte, but for Lawe. Promise a Manne he shall builde a Bridge o'er the Thames for a threepence in Two Days' Tyme, so he must, so long he have said so of Free Minde. I be of mind that pacta sunt servanda. It be of no Moment what the bound Manne saith. The Lawe doth presume a Manne do a Thinge with Free Minde. Comes now no Evidence or Witnesse thereagainst, it being a Cleare Thinge, et.c., what be left for a Court to say? Let Menne bargainne as they please. What they say be no Matter for the Lawe, but that the Lawe allow it.'

"We could not agree more. We find that Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed the obligations set forth in his contract with Gaffaello. We express no judgment on the 'fairness' or 'equity' of that contract. We refuse to entertain the Respondents' invitation to sit as a permanent referee for contractual fairness. Such a role would contravene our duty to apply the law and to defend private autonomy in a free market system. Judgment REVERSED. This case is REMANDED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with an order to issue judgment against Respondent consistent with this opinion.

"It is so ordered."

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent. In it, he blamed the majority for "enshrining unfairness" and "exulting the powerful over the powerless." He concluded as follows: "The Constitution imposes limits upon the freedom to contract when contract terms offend our most basic sense of justice."

In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens' dissent: "Justice Stevens once again proves his unrivaled ability to put his head up his dumb wrinkled ass. L0s3r, pwned!!!!"

Reason, Commerce, Justice & Free Beer is pleased to see that both collegiality and prudence are alive and well at the Supreme Court as it begins its new session.

QUICK WORD ON VACATIONS : EUROPE V. AMERICA

AN ESSAY

I have many European friends. We communicate all the time on a forum. During the summer, they always write about this and that journey they plan to take. They call them "summer holidays." They talk about traveling far and wide. They talk about taking four weeks off--with pay--to wander around Eastern Europe or France. Some even talk about going to China or India. In short, they talk about vacations with true relish. When they get home, they talk about how refreshed they are. They even say they do not mind going back to work after so much enjoyable time on vacation. They don't feel guilty about forcing their bosses to find replacements while they're gone, nor do they check email or phone messages while sprawled on Brazilian beaches. Put simply, Europeans know how to relax.

I can't resist contrasting these idyllic reports with horror stories about vacation time in the United States. This morning, for instance, I read about a friend who plans to take several weeks to travel through Germany and Bulgaria. He will receive pay during his trip; his boss actually encouraged him "because it's important for you to relax" and "see the world."

In response, I described the typical working American's vacation plans:

If only Americans understood the value of real vacation time. Over here, people hem and haw about taking 5 days off, compromise and wind up taking a "monumental excursion" to a water park in some god-forsaken suburb.

What's the difference, then? For starters, there's the obvious temporal difference. Europeans just get a lot more paid vacation time than Americans. Americans are lucky to get a week off with pay per year (including sick days), while most Europeans--even entry-level twentysomethings--get five paid weeks minimum. But the real difference is about power. Europeans get so much vacation time because they have relatively more power over their work lives than Americans. Over here, people feel obsequiously honored to have jobs. Like good fawns, they are prepared to sacrifice everything to keep them. It is a hopelessly servile approach; it puts full power in the employer's hands. Employers take full advantage; they dole out one week's vacation, no more. All the while, they cultivate a belief that "taking time off is bad," causing workers to feel guilty about leaving the office.

In Europe, by contrast, employers do not dominate workers as much as they do in the United States. Additionally, workers in Europe keep both government and private industry honest through spirited political engagement. When governments in Europe deliberate measures that award more power to employers, workers revolt. When Congress does the same thing in America, workers meekly stay at home and watch Monday Night Football. Given such political apathy, it's no wonder American workers have virtually nothing by comparison to their European counterparts.

Europeans do not seem guilty about taking time off, either. I think this reflects another important difference between Europeans and Americans: The mental relationship to work. In America, workers tend to revere their jobs. They want to impress their bosses, advance and succeed. To do so, they want to make the best showing they possibly can. That means doing work at all times, even on weekends and holidays. This is the attitude that resists vacations: After all, how can you impress your boss in Toledo, Ohio if you are tanning on a beach in Brazil? You're not making the company any money tanning. Americans debate with themselves about taking any time off at all. They worry about making the wrong impression. They feel guilty about foisting their job duties on some poor sot who's stuck in the office. To assuage their guilt, they simply decide not to enjoy themselves when they ultimately go on vacation. They bring laptops and BlackBerries with them to theme parks, casinos and spas. They stay in touch with work when they are supposed to be relaxing. They even try to show their loyalty by agreeing to take off fewer days than the number to which they are entitled. They travel locally, not over long distances, "just in case they need to come back in an emergency."

In short, Americans don't escape their mental relationship to work, even when they are supposed to be on vacation. It's about work, not life. And people wonder why they are unhappy.

But Europeans forget work when they go on vacation. They don't take guilt-ridden 4-day "long weekends;" they take month-long sojourns. If someone has to pick up the slack at the office, so what? That guy will get his time off sooner or later, too. They do not bring office email accounts with them. They do not return work phone calls while drinking or dancing with friends in a Warsaw discotheque. More importantly, they actually have time to unwind, "switch from work mode," reflect and experience the world. At the same time, they are not worried about their bills, nor do they worry about the boss' wrath. Their bosses actually encourage them. This is the European approach to vacations. It is about life, not work.

Americans criticize Europeans for precisely that reason: They don't care about working enough. But what has America's dedication to work really won? Americans are generally more unhappy than their European counterparts. They face more anxiety and stress because they do not have a safety net. They face more workplace guilt and obligation. True, Americans keep more of their income than Europeans. If they're lucky, they can even own more property than Europeans. But what Europeans pay in higher tax they receive in a more compassionate existence. Their high taxes finance their month-long vacations and free medical care. And in some sense, their high taxes provide them more happiness. An existence with less guilt and less obligation is a happier existence.

But America won't change its mind about vacations any time soon. Employers hold far too much power here. It is not just economic power; it is psychological power. It is deeply entrenched, too. Until Americans stop feeling guilty about abandoning their poor-paying posts for more than two days at a time, employers will continue to hold their psychological edge. That pyschological edge maintains political apathy; and political apathy keeps employers strong.

In an abstract sense, vacation time is just a proxy for the much more significant difference between Europe and America: Who really holds the power? If you feel guilty about failing to serve your economic master even though you are entitled to take time off, are you really in control of your life?

Employers in America do not just control time. They control emotions, too. That is power.

TRAGIC NEWS FROM IRAQ

NEWS FLASH

BAGHDAD--Reason, Commerce, Justice & Free Beer regrets to report that an American soldier has died in Iraq. At 5:30 AM EST, the Pentagon confirmed that Private First Class John C. Earl of the Army’s First Division (The Big Red One) succumbed in a hospital after suffering injuries in a vicious firefight with Sunni insurgents near Baghdad. Pfc. Earl was 23 years old. We express our deepest sympathies to Pfc. Earl’s family and loved ones. When American heroes fall, we all feel pain.

Pfc. Earl was a model soldier and citizen. He hailed from Mansfield, Ohio, where he worked at a local car insurance company as an assistant claims representative prior to joining the Army in February 2008. Earl explained to his parents that he joined the army “because al-Qaeda [was] a real threat to all Ohioans.” According to friends, Earl also said that “Osama bin Laden knew Saddam Hussein” and that “Saddam [had] to be stopped,” even though Saddam had been hanged in January 2007. Risking all for his beliefs and his country, Earl left behind a promising insurance career and young wife to protect Ohio from international terror in Iraq.

Pfc. Earl conducted himself with great dignity and responsibility during civilian life. As a teenager, he financed his own high school education by taking out private loans (at 9% APR) from a local Ohio bank. He took out loans from another bank (at 7.6% APR) in order to purchase a 2005 Chevrolet automobile. Despite his early age, Earl worked hard to fulfill his financial obligations to his creditors. He studied full-time and held down three jobs at the same time, including a job at the local ice cream parlor. He never failed to make timely payments on his loans. Upon graduation from high school in 2004, Earl married his sweetheart, Joanna C. Edwards. Earl took out another loan (at 6.9% APR) to purchase a home for his new family. He never missed a mortgage payment, even when he needed to work seven days a week to satisfy his debt responsibilities.

Earl was just as responsible a husband as he was a debtor. He never cheated on his wife. In fact, he accompanied her to the Third Mansfield Methodist Church every Sunday at 10 AM. For Earl, fidelity was a virtue. He honored both the wife to whom he owed faithfulness and the banks to whom he owed money. Most importantly, Earl never even entertained bad thoughts. He took the Bible’s teachings to heart. According to acquaintances, Earl always said: “A sin in the mind is just as bad as a sin in deed.” Despite pressures, temptations and difficulties, Earl never shirked his responsibilities. He understood his place in society. And he worked hard to fulfill his obligations every single day.

Earl believed that military service was the best way to give back for his rewarding life in America. Earl was proud of his job at the Mansfield Property & Casualty Insurance Company, where he earned $23,300 per year with limited co-pay medical insurance (with in-network providers and subject to the company’s right of refusal). He was proud of his wife, mortgage, car and church. Earl was happy in his civilian life. But he understood that al-Qaeda could take it all away unless he stood up to protect it. He volunteered for active duty in Iraq, determined to stop the terrorists bent on taking away his job, church, wife and obligations. Over his wife’s desperate pleas to stay home to raise their child, Earl went off to war.

Not surprisingly, Earl lived military life with the same spirit of duty and responsibility that blessed him in civilian life. He manned a 50-caliber machine gun atop an armored vehicle assigned to protect a fortified compound in Iraq that housed important American energy industry contractors. Within weeks, Earl had his first taste of battle. In a violent engagement known as Operation Purple Anaconda, Earl’s unit preemptively attacked an insurgent base in Baghdad, inflicting 5,612 enemy casualties without losing a single American soldier. Earl personally killed 672 insurgents, none of whom went to church, paid rent, filed income tax returns, owned automobiles, owed interest on back loans or held down responsible jobs. In fact, each insurgent Earl killed had sworn a vow to murder American children, disrupt American commerce, refuse to pay bills and kill American pets. Worse, every insurgent Earl killed had cheated on his wife, inhabited several addresses over the past six years and failed to return phone calls from prospective employers. In Earl’s words: “They weren’t just terrorists. They were irresponsible, too.” In that first battle, Earl served his country well.

Following his baptism by fire, Earl quickly became a veteran. In battle after battle, he showed outstanding valor by gunning down both actual and suspected terrorists, including veiled men masquerading as women. In each case, he showed great responsibility. Although he grieved when comrades died, he took solace in the knowledge that roughly 4,012 Iraqis died for every American who fell. And he took added consolation in the fact that every single Iraqi he killed was an irresponsible terrorist who threatened American jobs and investment ventures. If he could not save his buddies, at least he could kill thousands more insurgents to protect America.

Earl saw his final battle on July 10. While protecting a convoy of American natural gas excavators on a foray to locate fossil fuel deposits south of Baghdad, an enormous insurgent force—including terrorist raiders on camelback—swooped in from the desert hills. Earl laid down a curtain of fire with his 50-caliber machine gun, mowing down 982 insurgents and camels. His comrades called for air support. A-10 ground attack planes raked the terrorists with 30-millimeter cannon fire and deluged them with napalm. A-64 Apache attack helicopters hammered them with missiles. Over ten thousand extremists perished under the withering American fire, but they just kept coming. Like obsessed banshees from Muslim Hell, they charged Earl’s brave defenders, shouting: “Allah, ackbar!”

At some point, Earl ran out of ammunition. According to eyewitnesses, a cowardly insurgent fired a rocket-propelled grenade into the side of Earl’s armored vehicle, catapulting him from his position. He suffered injuries in the fall but kept fighting. He drew his sidearm and shot four camels, then killed their riders with his standard-issue knife. But there were too many insurgents. Taking meticulous aim, Earl fired his last shot into an insurgent’s head. Like all the others, Earl’s final victim—an Iraqi terrorist insurgent bomber named Ibrahim al-Khalifi, age 19—was a perennial marital cheater, credit dodger and deadbeat tenant who never paid rent or went to church. With his last bullet gone, Earl valiantly tried to fight his oppressors with his bare hands. Although he strangled six irresponsible terrorists, a cowardly insurgent blew himself up with a grenade less than 5 feet from Earl, sending lethal shrapnel into his chest. He collapsed to the ground. Minutes later, M1A1 tanks from the 1st Armored Division arrived, killed the remaining 75,000 insurgents and saved the natural gas excavators from certain death. Medics carried Earl from the field and transported him to a military hospital in Baghdad.

Earl put up a brave fight for survival. He endured for ten days before finally slipping into a coma. Immediately before his death, Earl told his commanding officer: “At least I took a few thousand of those deadbeat terrorist bastards with me. They might have taken my life, but they’ll never lay a hand on my wife or steal my job. And I made all my payments, too. I never missed one. I don’t regret anything. I made all the right decisions. I never cheated. I never asked anyone for help. Please make sure someone sends in the checks for July to GMAC and the bank. They’re in my knapsack. I even put stamps on the envelopes. I am proud to have given my life for a country where I could take out loans for my necessities.” In short, in his last moments on earth, Earl was thinking responsibly.

Back in Mansfield, George G. Custice, Earl’s former employer, reacted to news of his employee’s death with great emotion. Starting next week, however, he plans to honor Earl as an American hero by offering special “Hero’s Insurance Rates” for Mansfield residents. Those rates offer a 15% discount on collision policies purchased before August 31, 2009 (subject to special limitations; see store for details). “It’s the least we can do to salute a great American,” Custice said.

Earl’s wife said: “I’m sad. But I’m glad my husband protected Ohio against Saddam Hussein.”

FINANCIAL UNION OF PEOPLE WHO GET TO DO WHATEVER THEY WANT ALL THE TIME AND WHO COULD GIVE A SHIT WHAT ANYONE ELSE THINKS EVERYWHERE AND FOR ALL TIME

POLITICAL PARTIES FOR A CHANGING WORLD

By : Mr. M. Myron Bird, Jr., Ph.D. (Leisure Studies), M.B.A. (Account Management); Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Short Hills Federal Savings & Loan Society; Avid Water Polo Connoisseur; Beachgoer; Honorary Chairperson, The American Relaxation Society, Age 27.

Many Americans face difficult times today. They worry about their jobs, finances, and even relationships. In challenging economic times like these, they wonder whether they will ever find happiness amid so much worry. After all, it is hard to be happy when banks threaten foreclosure, savings accounts dwindle and you lose your health insurance. Basically, many Americans face insurmountable problems. For these Americans, life is a wrenching struggle fraught with worry, pain, inconvenience, frustration, anxiety, uncertainty, heartache and indignity. For these Americans, joy is fleeting, if they ever experience it at all. They never get to do anything they enjoy because there are too many obligations. There is too much to do. There are too many people who expect them to get things done. There is never enough money to pay everyone who demands it. Who can feel joy under such pressure? Who can feel joy when so many other people dictate how you must act in life?

We can because nobody tells us what to do. We don’t feel pressure at all. We are the Financial Union of People Who Get to Do Whatever They Want All the Time and Who Could Give a Shit What Anyone Else Thinks Everywhere and For All Time. Put simply, we are the guys who make life hard on everyone else. We impose obligations; we don’t live under them. Our fathers own massive banks, investment houses, insurance conglomerates and pharmaceutical companies. We employ people; we don’t work. We wear T-shirts and flip-flops. We stay at home. We hire and fire. We collect fees. We divide up partnership profits. We buy eighth houses and jets. We swim on Tuesday afternoons in beautiful pools. We drink pina coladas with topless blond models while Americans worry about health insurance premiums. People give us money, not the other way around. We own so much property we don’t know what to do with it. You don’t hear about us much, but we’re out there. And we’re having a fantastic time, too.

We find it strange to hear about all these Americans who suffer hardship. After all, we have it good. Every time we turn on the news, we hear about “problems” that Americans face. We hear about low-income women who abandon their children because they can’t afford to care for them. We hear about middle-class families that descend into chaos because they can’t afford an unexpected carburetor repair. We even hear about struggling young professionals who complain they have “no work-life balance” because they never leave their offices. Basically, it seems that every American is worried to death as they struggle to cope with obligations from all sides.

Sucks to be them: Too bad they don’t own banks and pharmaceutical factories. We are the guys who impose obligations; we don’t face them. The only obligation we have is not to murder the gardener or rape those hot Polish cleaning ladies. Even if we did that, I’m sure we could pin it on someone else; hell, we own law firms and our dads know all the judges. Some say that we don’t understand the term “consequences.” But “consequences” are for people with problems and obligations. We are the guys who give other people problems and obligations; we make others suffer “consequences” when they fail to adhere to obligations. So how can we suffer “consequences?” That’s like telling the king to punish himself; the king punishes, not the other way around. In a word, we shit on “consequences.” When you own banks and control currencies, you don’t worry about “consequences.” In fact, you don’t really worry at all.

That’s why we can’t understand why people whine so much about life being “hard.” For us, life couldn’t be better. We get up when we want, stay out all night, have sex with models whenever we want, drive cars, go on luxury vacation cruises at our sixth family beach resorts, drink specialty mixed drinks with friends and buy any car we see. We have fun from morning to night, 365 days a year. We never have to do anything; we only do what we want. Sure, we might defer to a friend’s suggestion to fly to Aruba instead of Monaco, but that’s just courtesy. We’re never bound to do one thing or another. Still, we are courteous people. We listen to our friends. After all, we all just want to have a good time. There’s no need to squabble when you already own everything. When you get to do whatever you want all the time, life is beautiful. That’s why we don’t really grasp all this talk about “hardship” and “difficulty.” If you were in our loafers, you would say: “I love my life!”

We recognize that many people don’t like us. They say we don’t belong in a society committed to equality for all. They say we should face the same challenges as everyone else. We disagree with these criticisms for two main reasons. First, our society is not committed to equality for all. Rather, our society is committed to rewarding those who provide value to society. Our families provide real value to society, and our reward has been to live happy lives without obligation. Additionally, it would difficult to imagine a society in which both “equality” and “obligation” could coexist, for obligations always involve a superior and an inferior party.

Second, even if “equality” really were a social aim, it would not include the requirement to “subject everyone to the same challenges.” Some people have tough luck. Others get good breaks. That’s life. Some people get chronic skin diseases and look like walking corpses. Others are born mentally defective. Surely these “equality critics” do not think everyone in society has to endure these challenges? Hey, it would be great if everyone were beautiful, well-formed and wealthy like us. But that just can’t happen. Some have it better, namely, us. Not everyone can be both beautiful and own JP Morgan Chase.

Still, most people fail to comprehend our responses to their objections. They say it’s “just not fair” that we get to sit poolside all day having sex with models while they have to trudge into an office tower and move paper boxes from one corner to another for $28,250 annually (less taxes). To this we merely point to our party name: “We are the Financial Union of People Who…Could Give a Shit What Anyone Else Thinks Anywhere and For all Time.” You see, we really don’t give a rat’s ass that people are jealous of the way we live. You have your lot; we have ours. We are the ones who make your life difficult; we get to enjoy ourselves while you work. There’s nothing you can do to change the way we live, so there’s no point complaining about it. If you cared enough about yourself, you would stop complaining and work a little harder. This is America, after all. You can try to change your circumstances. Yeah, yeah, yeah, you say you can’t get anywhere because you’re injured, you have debt, you have a family to feed, no one’s hiring, no one pays overtime, blah blah, blah. Excuses, excuses. Face it, you are who you are: A Loser. If you just tried a little harder you could make the next pay grade. You might never get to our level, but you could at least make a few more dollars if you just grit your teeth and worked until 7 each night instead of 5:45. But you’ll never get anywhere if you cross your arms and pout about us. No matter how much you complain, we don’t give a shit. You see, when you have as much property as we do, you have the freedom not to care. And let me tell you something: We don’t.

To be clear, we do care about some things, just not you. Specifically, we care about whether we have to wait for a runway to clear before our jets can take off. Or if we’ve planned an outdoor dinner bash at the Hampton House, we care about whether it rains.

Despite these occasional challenges, we can’t say we’re unhappy. Our life is good. It is hard to explain just how good to someone who wakes up every morning to face pressing obligations. We wake up any time we want. We get breakfast served. We can choose to drive the Aston Martin or the custom Maybach. We can party or we can stay home and watch a first-run movie in our personal movie theater. We never see a bill, let alone pay them. Basically, every day we can choose the best way to amuse and delight ourselves. We don’t have to think about anyone but ourselves. We don’t have bosses; we are the bosses’ bosses. Believe me, it is a great way to live. We don’t think about bank balances, child support payments, car notes, interviews, denied medical coverage, standardized test scores or school deadlines. If someone denies us something, we just make a phone call and it’s solved. We don’t worry because there is no one who has anything we don’t. In a word, we think differently because we own everything. When you own everything, you don’t stress.

We fought to get where we are. We are happy to be here. There is no way in hell we are going to share it with anyone else. We are the Financial Union of People Who Get to Do Whatever They Want All the Time and Who Could Give a Shit What Anyone Else Thinks Everywhere and For All Time. Our membership is strictly limited. We control money; we don’t worry about it. We play by a different rulebook than the rest. You can’t join us unless you kill us and take our spots. If you try to do that, you’ve got a fight on your hands, because everyone works for us. And they don’t even know it. Everyone works and suffers so that we get to keep doing whatever we want, every day. It’s amazing what owning banks can do. Just ask us.

Problems and “consequences” are for little people. We love this country.

DELINQUENCY : A POWERFUL WORD

AN ESSAY

Power interests me because it pervades our lives. In many cases, we do not even perceive oppressive power relationships because they are everywhere. We accustom ourselves to them. We subject ourselves to them, even unconsciously. Most conspicuously, we live under certain public powers. There is overt public power, as when government cracks down on protests or visibly executes a condemned man. There is also subtle public power, as when tax collectors privately pursue individuals who do not have money to pay their tax bill. Government holds its power over us by threatening legal compulsion: Either we obey rules or it inflicts pain on our bodies and property. This is how public power operates.

But all exercises in public power pale in comparison to the ingenious methods designed to serve private power. As pervasive as government power may be, it still knows boundaries. Despite some glaring exceptions throughout our history, government must always act according to some legal authority that derives from a written, public source. Furthermore, government agents must abide by certain constitutional restrictions when impacting citizens’ bodies, liberty and property. These constitutional restrictions incidentally enforce “governmental decency” on State actors. In short, there are certain things that government simply cannot do. Not so with private actors.

Private power is far more pervasive than public power. The law cannot be everywhere all the time. In fact, the Constitution expressly and impliedly keeps government out of certain spaces and decisions. See, e.g., U.S. Const., Amendments III (no soldiers in private homes), IV (no unreasonable searches or seizures), V (no compelled self-incrimination or land seizures without just compensation), IX (unenumerated rights), XIV ("Due Process liberty," including freedom from "arbitrary government action"). The Constitution also prohibits government from directly regulating men’s minds, thoughts, opinions, beliefs or conscience. See, e.g., U.S. Const. Amendment I. But private power knows no such restrictions. It can freely enter men’s homes, appeal to their conscience and affect their decisions, no matter how intimate. While private power does not always carry legal force, it can deploy the law when it must. It is no exaggeration to say that the law serves private power, not the other way around.

What is private power? Power itself is a nebulous concept. Generally, it refers to one man’s or group’s authority over another man or another group. This, in turn, does not necessarily mean legal authority. It is much broader than that. Power includes the power to impinge on a person’s conscience, to make him feel guilty, to make him change his behavior or to make him feel obligated in any sense. In essence, power subjects: It impresses the object with a sense of “smallness” compared to the person who applies the power. It enforces obedience, as the employer cows the employee. Power is multifaceted. It appears in every context. But there is one prominent commonality in all this variety: Power always involves inequality. Without inequality in advantage, wealth, money or even sexual appeal, power could not break its objects into submission. When it comes to power, there are strong parties and weak parties. The weak party needs something the strong party has. As such, he must modify his behavior to adhere to the strong party’s requirements.

Yet power operates in far subtler ways than naked oppression. After all, if power is too oppressive, its subjects revolt, just as a dog will abandon its master if he is too heavy-handed. Power does not just dominate in a petty or brutish way; it also pervades lives. Consider the employee who awakes every morning knowing that he must appear at his job. Power pervades his life; he needs the paycheck to feed himself and his family. He does not question how he gets it; he surrenders to power and follows its commands. It is unconscious. He does not revolt against it; it is not petty. Power might inspire resentment, but not enough to make him question its basic authority. Resentment or not, power pervades his life and channels his decisions. Or consider the debtor who struggles to pay back his creditor. He lives his economic life knowing that he must fork over a good amount of his earnings to a stronger party who can hurt him if he does not. Power overshadows the debtor’s life as it did the employee’s. It constrains his thoughts and actions. It makes decisions for him. It impacts his freedom. It weakens his will. It subjects him to a “more powerful” decisionmaker. Why? Because he needed something he did not have before. To get it, he surrenders to private power. He pays as much with his soul as he does with his money.

Debt interests me for the same reason that power does. After all, debt relationships express power. Debt is incident to power. If power expresses a relationship between strong and weak parties that includes subtle mental controls, debt is a perfect example. Creditors are strong; they have something the debtor needs. Debtors, by contrast, are weak. They surrender both their souls and their money to get what the creditor has. Even if the debtor takes something worth comparatively little, the creditor relishes his power over the debtor by demanding far more in return. For example, creditors might loan $25,000 to a debtor. In return, the debtor must pay back $37,500 in two years. If he does not, the creditors have a legal right to seize anything the debtor owns to make good the debt. If the debtor succeeds in paying back the creditor, he gets nothing; he merely eludes the pain the creditor might have inflicted had he defaulted. And he actually enriches the creditor in the process. For creditors, it is a win-win situation: If they do not make a profit on the debtor, they can take what they want from him. If they do make a profit, well, who can argue with success? Yet the debtor lives under pressure. He either must enrich the creditor or lose everything. In this sense, we see classic inequality at work: Debtors and creditors face unequal burdens and owe unequal obligations to each other. And only the debtor lives in fear of legal compulsion. The creditor is the one with the real power—the power to force another to give him something or suffer for failing to deliver.

How does power describe its subjects? Language expresses power in an extremely subtle way, for only the powerful have the authority to choose prevailing words. They have the authority to label their subjects with concepts and epithets. They have the authority to channel both meaning and morality against those who defy them. On this point, consider the word creditors use to describe debtors who neglect their obligations: Delinquents. Creditors use the word in a very matter-of-fact way. They send a letter: “The balance due on this account is now delinquent.” The debtor feels morally bad about this result. He feels scolded. And he knows that the creditor now has power to do even more harm. Power functions best when it constrains its subjects’ minds with guilt, shame and obligation. Power uses the word “delinquent” to evoke these negative moral feelings in the “bad” debtor.

But why exactly “delinquent?” What does “delinquency” have to do with repaying money used for some forgotten commercial purchase? After all, etymologically speaking, “delinquency” delivers a strong moral rebuke. According to Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th Ed.), “delinquency” stems from the Latin word “delinquentia,” meaning “to leave undone or to commit a fault.” True, the concept involves “leaving something off” or “omitting to do something.” But it also includes a strong moral element. It does not just mean neglect; it means neglect that makes the person morally blameworthy. The definitions bear out this interpretation. “Delinquency,” according to Webster, means not just “1. failure or neglect to do what the law or duty requires,” but also “3. a fault or misdeed.” More to the point, “delinquency” broadly refers to “thorough badness” or even “outlawry,” as we hear in terms such as “perpetual delinquent” or “juvenile delinquent.” Referring to this definition, Webster says that “delinquency” can also mean “behavior…that is antisocial or in violation of the law.” Id. at Definition 4.

In this grammatical light, we see that a “delinquent” is unsalvageable. When we label someone a “delinquent,” we condemn in strong moral terms. A “delinquent” is not just someone who forgets to pay something once in a while. He is a brigand, an outlaw, an irretrievable criminal. He is not just a person who forgets to send in a check for $45.12 every month; he is by nature “antisocial,” commits “faults or misdeeds” and invariably acts “in violation of the law.”

Power consciously controls language in these circumstances. It consciously chooses the word “delinquency” to apply to debt because it wants debtors to feel bad about neglecting their obligations to their superiors. But does failing to pay a bill really render the debtor an “outlaw?” Isn’t this going a bit too far? We all neglect things from time to time. Life submerges us with picayune tasks every day. It is understandable that we might pass one over now and then. From power’s perspective, it is all right to pass over some tasks, but not tasks in which power has an interest, such as a loan payment. You are not an outlaw if you forget to pick up your daughter at school one day, but you are an outlaw if you miss your car payment. Power wants debtors to feel bad about neglecting particular obligations, not all obligations. Specifically, power appeals to the debtor’s conscience when it stands to gain from the debtor. Thus, power cares only for itself; it uses morality and language to enforce obligations that provide benefit. In the abstract, it does not care about “obligation.” It cares only about obligations from which it can derive personal enrichment.

I do not like this at all. We all have a right to use language to express ourselves. No one has authority to selectively alter a word’s meaning to assert his own material dominance over another person. Yet this is precisely what private power does with the word “delinquency;” and no one really seems to notice. Private power has hijacked this word in order to crush its subjects into moral dejection. Why? Because it knows that morally guilty and shameful people are more likely to be obedient and to hand over what it wants. Although morality has very little to do with private commercial dealing, private power injects morality into commercial dealing because it provides additional assurance that it will make a profit. In a strange way, too, it uses morality to remind its subjects who is boss. After all, bosses don’t feel guilt or shame; they are the ones who inflict those feelings on their underlings. Guilt and shame—along with all moral feelings—flow downward. People feel guilty and shameful when they fail to adhere to a standard imposed from above. There is nothing "above" power; power is “the above.” Only those under power can feel guilt and shame. And they are effective weapons to compel allegiance.

Private power is “above” us everywhere. When we actually feel morally bad when we receive “delinquency” letters, we know we’re subjects. Unlike public power, private power does not just impact our bodies and property. It also impacts our deepest moral feelings. That is real, abiding power. That is the kind of power against which revolt is impossible. By comparison, public power and the law are clumsy, imperfect weapons. Private power, on the other hand, is so pervasive and so subtle that is virtually invisible. It influences minds and emotions, not just pocketbooks. And private power prefers it that way: Private. Why attract attention when you don’t need to?

COMMITMENTS ARE UNREALISTIC AND USUALLY UNREASONABLE

AN ESSAY

We hear about “commitments” all the time. When we hear that a person has “commitments,” we tend to admire him. In the abstract, we link commitments with positive ideas, such as “a commitment to justice” or “a commitment to goodness.” But we make and break commitments all the time. They do not typically involve lofty ideals or premises. Rather, they concern the forgettable grist of life: Commerce, fleeting relationships, petty plans, timing, instrumental networking—stuff that ultimately no one remembers. Generally, there is nothing intrinsically special about commitments. Rather, they force human beings into a losing game, because commitments try to buck natural changes in life. Just live a few years to learn nothing stays the same for long in this world. That’s why it’s unrealistic—and usually unreasonable—to commit to anything. And in most cases there is nothing we can do about it.

So why do we admire commitments in the abstract? Let us start with the word. “To commit” has many meanings in English. For our purposes, the word’s most relevant meaning involves “pledging, obligation and assurance” to undertake future action or believe future thoughts. Dictionary.com specifies: “4. To bind or obligate, as by pledge or assurance.” A commitment, then, is a statement or promise to do or believe something long in advance. It obligates the speaker to do what he says, even if future events turn out in a completely unexpected way. It forces him into a dilemma between “his word” and the pressures of unforeseen reality. By making a “commitment,” the speaker takes a huge gamble that life will not twist away from him in the time it takes to keep his promise. If he loses the gamble and reneges on his commitment, others label him “dishonorable” and “unreliable.” If he wins the gamble and fulfills his word before circumstances turn on him, others label him “honorable,” “steadfast” and “resolute.” In both events, commitments are risky. If a commitment is long-term, there is a greater chance that intervening reality will undermine the circumstances necessary to fulfill it. But if it is short-term, life has a smaller window in which to unravel it.

Yet our society encourages us to make commitments all the time. In so doing, it leads us into dangerous territory. It insists that we “honor our word” to do things. But if life gets away from us and makes it impossible—or at least extremely difficult—to honor our word, we suffer excoriation for failure. The law adds more thematic baggage to the unofficial “dishonor” stigma that accompanies failure to fulfill commitments. In “regular life,” we make “unofficial” commitments. The law, however, recognizes special “official” commitments called “contracts.” While “regular life” penalizes our failure to adhere to commitments with social stigma and derision for “dishonor,” the law penalizes us in a highly technical way. In so doing, it gives official approval to the prevailing social convention that “commitments are good,” and “word-breaking is bad.” If a commitment fits the legal requirements of “contract,” it is more than just a commitment. It becomes a “cause of action” for money damages when some unlucky soul does not fulfill his word. Fault and circumstance have nothing to do with it. If a person does not do what he promised, the law penalizes him, no matter what the situation may be.

Whether in life or in law, commitments are troublesome. They ask us to ignore and defy inevitable changes that pursue us. In my view, it is not only unrealistic to make certain commitments, but also unfair. This is not to say that it is not admirable to make long-term commitments. It is merely to say that life changes far too much—and men are far too weak—to realistically deliver on many promises. In this sense, life and law overlap. Consider long-term mortgage contracts. Generally speaking, mortgage customers commit—both legally and grammatically—to pay a bank a certain amount every month for 30 years or more. Consider what can happen in one year, let alone thirty. Someone could get sick. Someone could get run over by a train. Someone could suffer crippling depression and lose their job. The economy could tank, causing widespread unemployment. A disaster could strike, destroying the house. Someone could get laid off. Someone could take a pay cut. Someone could have a crisis of conscience and refuse to take a paycheck from a corrupt organization. Someone could lose a limb. Someone could commit a crime and go to prison. Someone could cheat on a spouse, leading to marital strife, divorce, acrimony and reduced income. Someone could lose their parents, causing emotional turmoil. Or someone could just lose interest in life and commit suicide.

All this could happen in one year. Think about what can happen in thirty. Life whips us with unrelenting pressure, from both inside our souls and from the outside world. Yet the bank could care less: You made a commitment. You must pony up the payment every month—like you said you would—no matter what dramatic, unforeseen circumstances you might face. It doesn’t matter that you did not foresee trouble 15 years down the road. You made a commitment. The fact that both popular judgment and the law favor the bank’s position in this situation strikes me as fundamentally unfair—and unrealistic in the extreme. Realistically speaking, we cannot adhere to commitments. Life changes too much. What was normal on the day we signed the contract may no longer be normal five years later. But commitments bind us to our word even when it would be painful or absurd to continue following it. All this ensues because we “pledged ourselves” to an action. When we make commitments, we entirely assume the risk that life will not turn against us in the time it takes to fulfill our word. That is not smart.

Commitments, then, are unrealistic because they ask us to defy inevitable, unforeseen change in life. That is unreasonable because a reasonable person does not take action that is sure to fail. Reasonable people use their sense, experience and memory to judge future actions. If sense, experience and memory reveal that a certain action will likely not yield success, a reasonable person will refrain from engaging in it. Sense, experience and memory quickly reveal to us that life is unpredictable and volatile. What appears tranquil one day may be disrupted and toxic the next. Only a naïve person could ignore that. Why, then, do we continue to make doomed commitments every day? Simple: Because in many cases power plays a role in commitment.

We do not live in an equal society. In our commercial world, we need “things” that we do not have. In order to get what we don’t have, we must deal with people who do. That means we must enter into relationships with people who hold advantages over us, whether they are lenders, merchants, schools or retailers. These people want to make a profit on us, and it is easy to make a profit when you can define the rules of the relationship. If we want money from a bank because we can’t afford a home, they give it to us only if we commit ourselves to paying them back every month with twice as much interest. If we want money from a lender to go to school because we can’t afford tuition, they give it to us only if we commit ourselves to paying them back every month with three times as much interest. When we make our commitment, we do not really think about the future. What do we know what the future holds? We just need the money now, in 2009. We hope that we will have income to pay it back in 2014, 2024 and 2034. We don’t know what disaster might strike in 2013. We don’t know if we’ll lose our job in the financial crisis of 2021. We gamble that we will have the money every month to pay the bank because we made a commitment. Yet that commitment puts the risk on us that our lives will not inalterably change at some time before we fulfill our word. That is a huge risk. And it is an unreasonable one. We take it only because we must. In that sense, our commitments may be unrealistic and unreasonable, but we have little choice in the matter. Either we make an unfair, unrealistic or unreasonable commitment, or we do not get our tuition money. We gamble that we will have a better shot at life with an education, so we take the bet. In this sense, we make commitments in many cases because the relationship is skewed: The powerful party sets the terms, and we must follow.

Not all commitments reflect unequal commercial relationships. Emotional commitments, for instance, do not strictly involve money. Nonetheless, emotional commitments are just as unrealistic and unreasonable as financial commitments. Commitments are commitments, no matter the subject matter. They ask us to defy inevitable, unforeseen changes in life. In emotional commitments, changes can strike from the outside. But more often they originate in human weakness and inconstancy. Human beings’ tastes and desires vacillate as violently as the weather. When two people commit to each other emotionally, they play a dangerous game. They gamble that one or the other will not develop affections for anyone else at any time. They gamble that one or the other will not suffer injury or lose interest in the relationship at any time. They gamble that external pressures will not cause emotional rifts between them.

As was true in financial commitments, these are losing bets. Human beings are weak. They lust for others, no matter what commitments they have made to their mates. Their circumstances change over time, altering the way they look at their partners. The same goes for the other partner. Human beings do what makes them feel happy, not what enables them to fulfill their word. Naturally, this makes emotional commitments extremely difficult to maintain. After all, if the only thing maintaining an emotional relationship is the abstract desire to “keep one’s word” at the expense of happiness, it does not take a psychiatrist to understand that the bond will soon break. The quest for happiness is individual, not joint. It changes with time and circumstances. That leaves a lot of room for mischief in a “committed relationship.” In short, a lot can go wrong over time between two individual people who each want to be happy in their own way. That is why emotional commitments are just as unrealistic and unreasonable as financial commitments. No matter the subject matter, commitments defy change and time. That is why they are losing propositions.

I am certain that readers will find my premise here too pessimistic. My rhetoric might lead readers to think that I have no faith in commitments. This is not entirely true. I think that some commitments can work, and I admire people who adhere to their word no matter what curveballs life throws at them. Honor and commitment do go hand in hand; honorable people do what they promise. But in many cases honor has less to do with it than blind fortune. Some people live relatively changeless lives. Some people do not regularly suffer terrible upheavals or reversals. Some people make plans and no intervening events foil them. They can fulfill their commitments without complaint because nothing bad happens in the meantime. Is it honorable that they fulfill their word? Certainly. Nonetheless, they benefited from stability and changelessness. They could be honorable because nothing forced their hand. We cannot all be so lucky. Our choices do not always define our path in life. Sometimes we suffer reversals and hardship even if we make all the right moves. By contrast, sometimes everything turns out well even if we repeatedly make asinine decisions. Change affects us all differently. And that is really what determines whether we can fulfill commitments.

Honor means that we adhere to principle no matter the circumstances. It means that we take our commitments seriously. I like to think that I have honor. But I won’t deny that life has its own plan. More often than not, life interrupts our plans, alters our values and forces us to change our assumptions. We see things differently from year to year. And sometimes one year will deal us a disaster that fundamentally disrupts everything we thought was true about life. Time poses these challenges to us all. Thus, while it is good to have honor and to adhere to our word, I do not think it is wrong to modify our commitments when life chops the foundations out from under us. There is nothing honorable or spectacular about adhering to commitments when the very reason for those commitments has vanished. In fact, that would be unreasonable.

Yet honor wields a bothersome mystique. It tells us to feel guilty when we must abandon our word, even if life forces our hand in the matter. But should we feel guilty about reneging on a commitment that was unfair and unrealistic in the first place? Or are we to blame for making the commitment to start? At this point, I cannot ignore power. All too often we make commitments under pressure; and powerful parties use our own honor against us to make us feel bad about failing to live up to their unfair conditions. When we give our word to do something under unfair disadvantages, I do not think it dishonorable to renege if we lose the rigged game.

Of course, the law sees it differently. And the house always wins. “You made a commitment....we don't care what happened to you. Tough luck."

But for the grace of God go we all.

LOVE, HAPPINESS AND MARRIAGE--BY CONTRACT

MARRIAGE CONTRACT

PREAMBLE

This Marriage Contract represents a Binding Agreement, Meeting of the Minds and Mutual Promise by and between Mr. Kyle G. Hurt (“Groom”) and Ms. Annabella H. Keefe (“Bride”). Hereinafter, Groom and Bride shall be known as the “Parties” for purposes of this Marriage Contract. Following execution of this Marriage Contract, Parties shall respectively be known as “The Husband” and “The Wife” unless and until this Marriage Contract be rescinded, annulled, cancelled or otherwise terminated by applicable Divorce Proceedings and Property Division Procedures pursuant to the law of the State wherein The Husband and The Wife reside at the time such proceedings are initiated. By this solemn Marriage Contract, Parties intend to be bound by the terms, provisions, obligations and promises contained herein, it being the Wish and Desire of the Parties to establish herethrough a legally-cognizable, enforceable economic relationship for the purposes of: (1) mutual enrichment; (2) tax advantage; and (3) child production and rearing (subject to exceptions, qualifications and limitations as provided herein). Although Parties profess love and understanding for one another as of the date of this Marriage Contract, Parties expressly disavow any intent to make love or understanding the basis—either in law or fact—for this Marriage Contract.

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

1. Mr. Kyle G. Hurt (“Groom”) is an unmarried male, aged 34, resident in and for the State of New York, County of New York, City of New York, Country of the United States of America, established 1776.

2. Ms. Annabella H. Keefe (“Bride”) is an unmarried female, aged 24, resident in and for the State of New York, County of New York, City of New York, Country of the United States, established 1776.

3. Groom certifies under oath and penalty of perjury that he suffers neither from debilitating mental illness, erectile dysfunction, sexually-transmitted disease, low sperm count, schizophrenia, mania, nor any other physical or mental ailment relevant to the performance of the marital promises made herein, including homosexuality or a tendency—whether real or imagined—to find males attractive. Groom further certifies that he is competent under law to make the promises set forth in this Marriage Contract.

4. Bride certifies under oath and penalty of perjury that she suffers neither from debilitating mental illness, sexually-transmitted disease, schizophrenia, Tourette’s Syndrome, mania nor any other physical or mental ailment relevant to the performance of the marital promises made herein, including lesbianism or a tendency—whether real or imagined—to find females attractive. Bride further certifies that she is competent under law to make the promises set forth in this Marriage Contract.

5. Bride certifies further that she does not watch, and has never watched, the Sex in the City television show, nor does she hold any secret aspiration to lead a life similar in substantial part to any female character in aforenamed Sex in the City television show, it being mutually understood that the values expressed in aforenamed Sex in the City television show be hostile to and inconsistent with the mutual promises made in this Marriage Contract.

6. Pursuant to full and fair bargain, Groom promises to take, have, hold and keep as his lawfully-wedded wife aforementioned Bride (see supra at ¶2).

7. In exchange for and consideration of Groom’s promise contained supra at ¶6, Bride promises to take, have, hold and keep as her lawfully-wedded husband aforementioned Groom (see supra at ¶1).

8. Parties certify under oath and penalty of perjury that the promises contained in ¶¶6-7 supra resulted from a full and fair bargaining process following full disclosure and independent legal and financial counsel, any profession of love, tenderness, understanding, joy, forgiveness or hope notwithstanding.

9. Parties mutually agree and consent that all property respectively owned by each shall remain the property of each while this Marriage Contract is valid. Parties mutually agree and consent that all property obtained while this Marriage Contract is valid shall be considered “Martial Property” owned in ½ shares by the Parties, and subject to the Marital Property Division laws in the State wherein Parties reside.

10. Parties mutually agree and consent that the Property Covenants made supra at ¶9 may be altered at any time following negotiation. In such negotiation, both Groom and Bride shall vote “Yea” or “Nay.” Groom shall have a 65% vote. Bride shall have a 35% vote. Votes are final. A simple majority shall prevail. Vote results shall not be reviewable in any court, any law, constitutional provision or principle of natural justice notwithstanding, it being understood that this paragraph is the product of full and fair bargaining between the Parties.

11. Groom promises and covenants to maintain income and employment at all times while this Marriage Contract is valid.

12. Bride promises and covenants to carry out all household duties while Groom pursues income, including, but in no wise limited to: washing floors, doing dishes, cleaning bedrooms, washing laundry, ironing shirts, obtaining groceries, cooking meals, cleaning toilets, scrubbing tiles, gardening, sending mail, receiving mail, coordinating mealtime arrangements, planning weekend activities, maintaining good physical appearance, adhering to a reasonable fitness regimen, maintaining suitable breast size, maintaining a suitable body mass (no more than 110 pounds) and any other activity deemed reasonable and advisable by Groom.

13. Bride promises to provide conjugal services on demand, pursuant to notice and opportunity to be heard; but in no event shall wife be granted an opportunity to be heard if Groom, in his sole discretion and without possibility of appeal, finds that Bride has defaulted in her obligations under ¶12, supra. Bride further promises to perform conjugal services without notice at least four (4) times per month, at times directed and approved by Groom in his sole and unreviewable discretion. Groom shall have the right to define the parameters and circumstances under which such conjugal services shall take place, including the language in which such services shall be conducted, and any other individuals who shall participate in such activities, be they male or female.

14. Groom promises to provide ample conjugal services to Wife, it being understood that the term “ample conjugal services” does not include the provision of female orgasms to Bride, such “ample conjugal services” being strictly limited to coitus no longer than 60 seconds per scheduled session, pursuant to law and notice. The Parties expressly consent and agree that Bride shall in no wise be entitled to female orgasms under this Marriage Contract. The Parties further expressly consent and agree that Bride’s failure to obtain sexual satisfaction from Groom shall not constitute grounds to rescind, modify, cancel or annul this Marriage Contract.

15. Bride promises to remain faithful to Groom, it being understood that Groom possesses a common law tenancy-by-the-entirety interest in Bride’s body, the claims of others notwithstanding. In exchange therefor, Groom promises to make best efforts to remain faithful to Bride, provided in all events that Groom shall not be obligated to maintain faithfulness to Bride following arguments, disagreements and domestic strife, as those terms may be defined in applicable State law or at Groom’s sole discretion.

16. Parties mutually agree and understand that this Marriage Contract establishes a property relationship intended to secure tax advantages and the appearance of a stable, decent lifestyle. As such, this Marriage Contract makes no provision for—and is not intended to result in— emotional satisfaction, happiness, bliss or even mild contentment. Neither unhappiness, frigidity, hatred, bitterness, frustration, dissatisfaction, gloom, depression, ennui, desperation nor any other common marital emotion shall constitute grounds to rescind, modify, cancel or annul this Marriage Contract, unless Groom deems it advisable.

17. Bride promises to conceive and bear Groom’s children pursuant to notice and regularly-scheduled marital conjugal services (see ¶13, supra). Groom shall have the sole and unimpeachable right to name any children resulting therefrom; provided in all events that Groom gives due consideration to any name suggestion made by Bride, it being understood and agreed that Bride’s suggestions carry no authority whatsoever.

18. Groom promises and covenants to treat Bride fairly subject to all reasonable rules, regulations, customs and usages as may be appropriate in the circumstances. In the event that Groom subjects Bride to physical discipline pursuant to such reasonable rules, regulations, customs and usages, Bride promises and covenants never to contact police authorities in reference thereto. Parties mutually agree and understand that Groom has the sole right to mete out family discipline, except in those cases in which Groom requests discipline incident to regularly-scheduled conjugal services (see ¶13, supra).

19. In the case of domestic disagreement between the Parties, the Parties agree that Groom shall convene a Domestic Resolution Court (DRC). Such Court shall consist of Groom presiding as Chief Justice. Such Court shall decide all cases and controversies pursuant to law without right to appeal or argument, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution notwithstanding. Bride shall not have the right to seek counsel in cases before the Domestic Resolution Court, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution notwithstanding. Bride further must bear all attorneys’ fees and costs associated with any case or controversy pending before the Domestic Resolution Court. Groom promises to publish all decisions made by the Domestic Resolution Court, except those passages that may reasonably impinge upon national security. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States, 198 D.R.C. 139, 157 (2007).

20. Parties mutually declare that they love and respect one another. But Parties further mutually declare that this Marriage Contract establishes a legal relationship governing property and allocating rights and obligations. Parties hereby mutually declare that they intend to adhere to their obligations in good faith, pursuant to law, and without waiving any right contractually guaranteed hereunder. Parties mutually declare that neither love nor respect shall influence the interpretation of any substantive or procedural provision enumerated in this Marriage Contract. Rather, Parties mutually agree that only the common law shall provide a basis to construe any ambiguities contained herein, with a presumption that all provisions contained in this Marriage Contract be reasonable and fair, unless such provisions favor Bride.

21. This Marriage Contract represents a full and final integration between the Parties. Neither prior nor contemporaneous oral statements, nor prior written statements, shall be admitted to modify, vary or negate any provision enumerated herein. But Groom may vary any provision—either orally or in writing—as he deems necessary and proper.

22. The Law of the State of Nebraska shall govern this Marriage Contract. In case of dispute involving this Marriage Contract, Bride hereby waives her right to a jury trial thereon, the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution or any comparable State constitutional guarantee notwithstanding. In all such disputes, Groom shall convene a Mandatory Arbitration Panel (MAP) consisting of himself and his mother to fully and fairly adjudicate any grievances pursuant to law and notice. But in no event shall Bride be entitled to any evidentiary presumption or procedural advantage granted by any State evidence code, the Federal Rules of Evidence or the United States Constitution. All decisions of aforesaid Mandatory Arbitration Panel (MAP) shall be final, with all costs to be borne unconditionally, and without discount, by Bride.

23. This Marriage Contract shall be read aloud in full prior to the exchange of marriage vows and rings, publicly, on June 14, 2009, in the presence of a notary public and a judge of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County.

24. The Parties may kiss only after execution of this Marriage Contract pursuant to all formalities and evidentiary procedures under State law.


DONE and EXECUTED this ____ day of ____, 2009


Witness our hands in Holy Matrimony set unto,




________________________
KYLE G. HURT
Hereafter, “MR. HURT”
Groom-Husband-Party

________________________
ANNABELLA H. KEEFE
Hereafter, “MRS. HURT”
Bride-Wife-Party

________________________
BERNABE H. RODRIGUEZ
Notary Public
Nuestro Cambio en la Grand Concourse
Bronx, NY
License No. : NY-1097F-G

At New York, New York.