TUCK IN YOUR SHIRT APPROPRIATELY--OR FIND ANOTHER JOB

A MESSAGE TO THE EMPLOYEES OF THE COCKLAND GROUP LLC

By : Mr. Ronald F. Daggett, Assistant Deputy Vice President for Human Resources, The Cockland Group LLC, an Investment House specializing in service to the mortgage industry.

Cockland Group LLC is growing at a rapid pace. Since our founding in 2003, we have secured firm accounts with the Nation's largest mortgage sellers, including HSBC, Citigroup and Coldwell Banker. Our commitment to Absolute Client Satisfaction (ACS)™ is unparalleled. Our earnings have steadily risen in every consecutive quarter since our founding, even during some of the most challenging economic times in our Nation's history. We are proud of our accomplishments and we remain focused on our overriding goal: To deliver timely, effective, reasonable mortgage reinvestment services across the entire financial industry.

We could not have achieved these results without you, our employees. Here at Cockland management, we salute your dedication, hard work and passion for mortgage reinvestment services. At Cockland, it is not just about mortgages. It is about people™. Our people are the best. We know you know that, too. And we are thankful that you share our zeal for boundless client satisfaction. Because when great people serve great clients, everyone wins™.

We owe our success to our unique corporate culture. Cockland drives hard and plays hard. When we enter a market, we aim to penetrate and win. But when we relax, we relax with the same fervor we display when servicing an account. Cockland employees know how to please clients. And that is why clients keep coming back for more. Cockland delivers solid performance: Any time, anywhere--and for the best price™.

Nonetheless, not everyone can be a Cockland employee. We expect the best and we demand a lot. Sometimes it is difficult to overcome stiff competition in the mortgage client service market. We do not tolerate droopers or flaccid account service. Only the firmest survive at Cockland. Our employees don't back down. They stay on top of accounts until they are closed. Cockland employees are not timid. When we service accounts, we never pull out. We do not stop until our clients are completely satisfied™.

We also demand complete devotion to The Cockland Mission (TCM)™ (see employee manual, Chapter 2 for details). Being part of a winning team means the ability to play your position and to cheerfully receive instructions. Knowing your job is only half the battle; the other half is knowing how you fit on the ball club.

Attire is an important part of Cockland's success. Since our founding, we have insisted that every team member in the Cockland family wear either a white or blue button-down shirt at work. Button-down shirts show good taste and respect for client expectations. Clients in the mortgage industry wear button-down shirts. Typically, those shirts are white or blue. It only makes sense that we--as dedicated client service professionals--mirror their expectations. That is why we have always required our employees to wear white or blue button-down shirts. Sometimes conventions are essential. And this is one such instance.

Button-down shirts are vital to Cockland's special place in the mortgage service market. Yet the company has never endorsed an official policy expressing unconditional support for button-down shirts. We believe we have a duty as a company to reverse that trend. It is time for Cockland to recognize button-down shirts. And it is time for Cockland to make button-down shirts mandatory for all employees at the company. It is time to formalize.

From this day forward, every Cockland employee will be required to wear only blue or white button-down shirts while on company business. We refuse to acknowledge any exceptions to this policy. Every Cockland employee must certify that he or she will comply with this policy. He or she must further certify that failure to comply will result in immediate disciplinary action, up to and including docked pay and termination. Cockland must preserve its team spirit. And it must also maintain its winning attire-related traditions. That is why we hereby officially make blue and white button-down shirts a core element of Cockland culture. If Cockland employees cannot accept this, they can find employment elsewhere.

But this does not end Cockland's determination to inculcate attire discipline. In addition to requiring all Cockland employees to wear white or blue button-down shirts, all employees must also appropriately tuck their shirts into their pants.

Without appropriate tucking, blue and white button-down shirts mean nothing. Only a tucked-in button-down shirt can accomplish the goals Cockland expects. A tucked-in button-down shirt is absolutely vital to continued employment at Cockland. Inappropriately tucked and untucked button-down shirts reveal an inattention to personal excellence that is fundamentally inconsistent with Cockland's overriding commitment to unparalleled mortgage service. Our clients tuck in their shirts. All people worth anything in the world tuck in their shirts, too.

It would contravene our most basic company values to tolerate anything less than fully tucked-in shirts among our employees. For that reason, Cockland hereby requires all employees to certify not only that they will wear a blue or white button-down shirt every day at work, but that they will also appropriately tuck in their shirts. Failure to tuck in a shirt will result in immediate disciplinary action, up to and including docked pay and termination. Additionally, inappropriately tucked-in shirts will lead to the same consequences. Cockland simply cannot risk disappointing its clients by allowing employees to appear without immaculately tucked-in blue or white button-down shirts.

We recognize that these policy changes may appear harsh. We also recognize that employees may be confused about what it means to "tuck in" a button-down shirt or to "appropriately" tuck in a button-down shirt. In fairness to our employees, we wish to clarify these matters.

First, a "tucked-in button down shirt" means any button-down shirt the shirttails of which rest against the upper thighs, yet which are concealed and circumscribed at the top by a belt and trousers. As such, if a shirttail at any time appears outside the pants, the shirt is considered "not tucked-in" and will accordingly subject the offending employee to discipline.

Second, an "inappropriately tucked-in button down shirt" means a tucked-in button down shirt the tucking of which is not appropriate. "Appropriate tucking," in turn, means a tuck that does not result in ruffles, creases or otherwise slovenly shirt characteristics above the beltline. A tuck is only appropriate when the shirttails remain at all times below the beltline without bulging out, creasing or otherwise creating an unsavory appearance. The mere fact that an employee experiences "inappropriate tucking" because he or she sat down at a desk for too long does not cure the offense. An inappropriate tuck is an inappropriate tuck. Our clients expect the best from Cockland; and they do not forgive inappropriate tucking.

Neither do we. Inappropriately tucked-in button-down shirts will immediately subject the offending employee to discipline, up to an including docked pay and termination. We realize that compliance with appropriate tucking requirements may at times prove difficult. For that reason, management has decided to allow employees to cure inappropriate tucking by expeditiously removing all inappropriateness from their tucking within 30 seconds after discovering that their button-down shirts are inappropriately tucked. We believe that this rule both fairly allows for conscientious compliance at the same time it justly punishes flagrantly inappropriate tucking.

Cockland management is determined to realize excellence in all employee endeavors. That is why it has decided to implement these new rules concerning mandatory button-down shirt wearing and appropriate tucking effective immediately. Details may be found in the employee manual, Chapter 45, subsection 7(b).

Anyone who is anyone wears a blue or white button-down shirt every day. And anyone who is anyone appropriately tucks that shirt in; or at least corrects inappropriate tucking the moment it appears. At Cockland, we are committed to bringing maximal satisfaction to everyone who is anyone. That is why we must lead by example. That is why we must tuck in our shirts--appropriately.

If you don't like the rule, you shouldn't be on this team. So tuck in your shirt and start penetrating those accounts like a real Cocklander.

HOW TO BE A GOOD PERSON : IN A LANDLORD'S EYES

OESTERHOUDT STRIKES

At some point in our lives, we all wonder whether we are "good people." We live with others. We know how "good people" act. We have an intuitive sense about what makes a person "good." We even hear things about what makes a person "good:" They are friendly, kind, forbearing, compassionate, ethical, honest, caring, loving, trustworthy, gracious, forgiving and generous. "Good people" do not hurt you. They do what they say; and they apologize if they do not. They consider you at the same time they consider themselves. Aristotle and many other philosophers have written tomes about what it takes to be "good." It is an age-old question.

Of course, not everyone can agree on what is "good." You can't know you are a good person until you know what is good in the first place. What is good in one person's eyes may be bad in another. It is easy to lay down absolute standards for goodness. Yet like all ethical dilemmas, only we can say whether we subjectively feel that we have done right. Nonetheless, we can generally all agree that being "good" involves living without intent to injure other people. In that sense, being a "good person" essentially depends on positive motivation. And that positive motivation shines through in good actions toward others. Good people think selflessly; they refuse to hurt others to advance their interests. Bad people do the opposite; they are willing to hurt others to help themselves.

Being a good person is an individual lifestyle. It does not depend on how much money you make or what you do for a living. While it is possible to identify "objective" factors that hint whether a person is "good," true goodness comes from the heart, not from action alone. Enron fraud artists probably donated some money to charity the same year they robbed millions; that donation did not make them good people. No, being good is internal; and good shines through in external action. It is hard to verify. But everyone knows it when they see it.

It is refreshing to know a truly good person because they are rare. In our world, it is hard to be selfless and honorable. There are so many impulsions to discard goodness toward others in order to advance yourself. By the same token, it is hard to be patient. No one wants to wait or understand others' problems. Nor do they want to waste their time on others without reward. After all, people need to fend for themselves. They only have a limited time to get the job done. If they waste their time being nice to others, they might injure their own fortunes. And no one likes to do that. Put simply, we expect most people not to be good; our society frustrates goodness. That is why it is a welcome relief to meet a good person.

There is no formula to being a good person. Yet people throw the term around far more than they should. In many cases, they say someone is "good" solely because they act in a way that enriches them. That misunderstands what it means to be good. A truly good person acts with malice toward no one. The fact that a person acts the way another person wants them to does not make him good. To the contrary, expecting a person to act in a way that is beneficial to you undermines their value as an individual. It "instrumentalizes" them; it makes them pawns in a game you want to win. Just because someone pays you according to a contract does not make them "good." Merely fulfilling an external legal obligation is no shortcut to goodness. A good person holds to his word because it is his word, not because the law threatens him to do so.

Yet many people think that observing external obligations makes you "good." It is easy to make this mistake. After all, complying with the law seems like a "good" thing to do. But the law is indifferent to intention. And intention is the only thing that determines whether a person is good. In that sense, it is possible to seem good by fulfilling every imaginable legal standard. Yet it is also possible to have only bad intentions while complying with the law. You can be a total scoundrel yet do nothing illegal. If a person did not know you, they might say: "Well, he is law-abiding. So he must be a good person." To that extent, fulfilling external obligations can disguise ethical flaws.

I encountered an example to illustrate this easily confused distinction in the New York Post a few days ago. I read an article about some poor web designer who got run over in a Brooklyn street. See N.Y. Post, Horror hit-run in B'klyn, April 19, 2010 at p. 9. The article quoted his landlord. She spoke about his character: "He works. He comes home. He's a very good person (emphasis added)."

What did the landlord know about this guy? How did she know he was a "very good person?" She based her assessment on the fact that he works and comes home. What does that have to do with ethical goodness or pure intention? Nothing. If anything, it reveals that the landlord thinks the web designer was a "good person" solely because he went to his job, came home every night and ostensibly paid the rent. He might have been an utter scoundrel who doublecrossed his friends and broke women's hearts. Yet as far as the landlord was concerned, he was a "good person" because he adhered to his contractual obligations to pay rent. He also was a "good person" because he quietly went to his job and caused no disturbances.

I suppose this is what it takes to be a "good person" in a landlord's eyes. Landlord apply a "formula" for goodness: Have good credit; make an income; cause no trouble; pay your rent; keep your mouth shut; pay next month's rent; pay a late fee after the first. Your intentions do not matter. And "being a good person" means acting exactly the way the landlord wants. In this case, the landlord happened to like the way her tenant behaved because he did what enriched her. She morally approved him because his behavior coincided with her interests. His own ethical qualities did not influence her appraisal. It was "all about her." And that determined whether he was "good."

This gravely misunderstands what it means to be a "good person." A person is not "good" simply because he acts in a way that enriches another. Nor is he "good" simply because he adheres to contractual obligations under law. Rather, goodness is more subtle than that. There is no checklist. Action is not enough. It takes real reflection to see whether someone is good. Getting a rent check in the mail every month does not suffice to prove goodness.

Criminals and scallywags can mail rent checks, too. That does not make them good people.

But who has time to sit down and really think about character in our society? It seems we only care about character when we want to damage a foe with some embarrassing "flaw." And once again, we do that to merely to advance ourselves at their expense. By hurting them, we help ourselves. And hurting others is rarely good.

FAIR LABOR CONTRACTS? WHAT ARE THOSE?

THE MYTH OF EMPLOYMENT IN AMERICA

PART 3 - CONTRACTS

Commerce would not work without contracts. Contracts provide legal assurance that people will adhere to their commitments. Both commerce and the law presume that men do not naturally hold to their word. But no one would take financial risks if they knew their fellow man would not fulfill his promises. So the law supports commerce by forcing men to do what they say. If they don't, they must face dire economic consequences. Men don't like dire economic consequences, so they adjust their behavior to avoid them.

In theory, contracts reflect a perfectly equal bargain between two perfectly equal commercial parties. One party wants something the other has. Each parts with something in order to gain something from the other. It is not gratuitous; it is methodical. One party suffers detriment in the precise proportion that the other obtains benefit. And there are no flaws in the bargaining process: The law presumes that both parties are rational, shrewd, cynical businessmen who know all the risks before committing to do something. Thus, neither can complain when something goes awry: After all, when two rational, equal adults bargain for something, they have a right to delineate who bears the risk if it does not work out.

But does this sound like commercial reality? Certainly not. In most commercial exchanges, parties are not equal. One party inevitably has more money and power than the other. As a result, the stronger party can leverage his strength to foist more risk and burden on the weaker party. After all, the weaker party needs what the stronger party has. So what authority does the weak party have to influence the bargain? He can take it or leave it. If he leaves it, he does not get what he needs. That is commercial reality: A perennial Hobson's choice. The legal myth of "equal exchange between equal bargainers" is a tiny exception to the rule: Unequal, unfair exchange between parties with gross disparities in power.

I always marvel at inconsistencies between legal myths and practical realities. They always reveal a tension between theoretical aspirations and cruel commerce. After all, theory and reality follow different paths. Just because something exists in theory--as it may in legal doctrine--does not mean that it exists in reality. Theory is just an overlay. Theory concerns objective abstractions; as long as a situation exhibits a few technical requirements, it is "so." But practice is more fluid. It does not restrict itself to formulae or aspirations. In practice, the only inquiry is: "Does it work?" If it works in accordance with principle, fine. If not, no big deal.

In most cases, people just want things to work. That is certainly true in commerce. It is one thing to strike a technically enforceable contract. It is quite another to strike a just one. After all, practical realities reflect existing power structures. Things "work" when they please those who have power. Contracts are usually unfair because they work best when they are unfair. The strong offer terms to the weak in a manner that satisfies legal requirements. As a practical matter, they maintain the unequal relationship. The law has nothing to say about that. And that suits the strong just fine.

On some level, everyone knows this. Everyone suspects that contracts somehow "screw them over." They do not exactly know how. They just know that if the other guy does not deliver, they will have no recourse against him. But if you do something wrong--or if something unforeseeable happens--he will have recourse against you. This is why everyone fears "fine print." It is as if everyone who signs a contract resigns himself to the idea that the bargain is one-sided. They know the "fine print" will work against them when push comes to shove. They just hope it doesn't come to that.

So much for equality in bargaining: Everyone who signs a contract knows that he is subjecting himself to the other's unlimited authority. He doesn't even know how much power he's giving the other guy. He just knows the "fine print" gives the other guy license to do almost anything to him.

I see support for my analysis everywhere. Just yesterday, for instance, I watched a clip from the 1998 movie "Player's Club." In it, Bernie Mac plays a sleazy strip club owner named Dollar Bill. In one scene, his DJ (Jamie Foxx) enters his office to complain about how much money he has to forfeit from his paycheck every week. Bernie Mac looks him straight in the eye and says: "I got a contract between me and you that says you do what I tell you to do. Therefore, shut the fuck up. Don't say nothing, don't speak to me, don't look at me."

That concludes the negotiation. Bernie Mac is the employer with power. Jamie Foxx is the employee without it. The contract symbolizes their unequal relationship. It embodies a fundamental disparity in power. By law, it allows the strong party to tyrannize the weak one; it even allows him to silence the weak one when he complains about the terms. True, the weak party can walk away from the deal. But what if he has mouths to feed? Another Hobson's choice.

These are the practical realities. There is no "equal exchange" between "equal partners" in most commercial relationships. Rather, in most cases, the result is more like the exchange in "Player's Club": One party needs a job and a paycheck; another offers a job and paycheck in return for the power to dictate all the terms and control the employee's conduct. As a practical matter, contracts grant power to one party while subjecting the other to the same power. They generally operate in one direction. And if the weak party complains, the strong party just has to whip out the contract and explain why he has the legal authority to do what he is doing. If there's a dispute, the strong party wins. That's practical reality.

I mention all this because it coincides with my weekly motif concerning employment in the United States. Contracts perpetuate the "Myth of Employment in America" by granting legal authority to strong parties to dominate weak ones. Employment "terms" in America are rarely equal. And they certainly do not reflect full and fair bargaining between two evenly-matched commercial entities. Rather, a weak party needs a paycheck. A strong party offers one; and that gives him the right to dominate the weak party's life in exchange for almost nothing.

According to the law, contracts reflect equality. But practical realities paint a vastly different picture. When it comes to contracts, there is a disparity between law and reality. The real questions are: Who wants what; who's giving it; and who gets to say who does what in exchange for it. Those questions are invitations to tyranny. And when private employers operate under the "profit principle," do you really think they will treat employees in a way that threatens their bottom lines? Certainly not: And that is exactly why contract law allows them to function as they do.

So to all the employees out there who are disgruntled with their lot: "Shut the fuck up, don't say nothing. Don't speak to me, don't look at me."

You signed it. You wanted it (kind of). So live with it.

Go ahead and leave. Think you'll be able to pay your rent if you do? It's your choice.

That's not just practical reality. That's commercial reality, too. It's not a fair game.

A LAWYER'S VALENTINE (SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED THEREIN)

PLAINMAN, SCHNORRING & DRYE, LLP

Attorneys at Law Specializing in Mergers & Acquisitions

"We Help You Combine. Every Time."™

DATE : February 15, 2010

TO: Ms. Gabriella D. Purdy, B.A. (no relevant accolades) ("VALENTINEE")

FROM : Mr. Herbert J. Plainman, Esq., Senior Partner (Top 100, American Lawyer P.P.D. (Profit-Per-Deal List)); Silver Medal Winner, Monopoly Advocates of America, LLC (2008)("VALENTINOR").

RE : Valentine's Day

Ms. Purdy,

Pursuant to applicable law, rules and any provision of the Civil Procedure Law and Rules of the State of New York (NYCPL), please accept this Expression of Valentinary Intent (hereinafter "Valentine") done on or before February 15, 2010, in the City of New York, County of New York, State of New York, Country of the United States of America, from aforementioned attorney Mr. Herbert J. Plainman, Esq. (hereinafter the "Valentinor")(State Bar No. 987125).

ARGUMENT

Now, therefore, comes VALENTINOR, and in recognition of certain amorous feelings, having arisen in aforementioned Valentinor, and subject to all limitations applicable under any relevant law, ethical guideline, handbook, employee manual, offer, contract, pamphlet or written item having direct pertinence hereon, and giving due deference thereto (and disclaiming any intent to violate any such limitations, liability wherefor is hereby expressly disclaimed), Valentinor hereby presents this certain "Valentine" to and for aforementioned Valentinee.

It is expressly and unequivocally understood that Valentinor finds certain bodily and psychical characteristics in aforementioned Valentinee "appealing," both as a matter of taste and as a matter of law. Those characteristics include--but are in no wise limited to--her lips, hips, chest, legs, eyes, face, stomach, voice, charm and fashion choices. According to the Court of Appeals, "appealing" means "objectively pleasant to the satisfaction of any office or officer duly appointed under law to judge pleasantness, be that pleasantness aesthetic, erotic, artistic, intellectual or otherwise bearing upon the human senses." See, e.g., Quaker v. Booty-Licious Bumshakers Dance Hall Ltd., 4 N.Y.3d 165,190 (2005)(Kaye, C.J.).

In view thereof, and in view of Valentinor's express finding (under all relevant State evidence rules) that Valentinee is "appealing," Valentinor hereby concludes that it is both reasonable and prudent to present this Valentine, unless Valentinor in any way concludes that Valentinee is not appealing, either in body or spirit, in his sole and unreviewable discretion. Valentinee's expression of affection for any persons--or animals--other than aforementioned Valentinor shall result in the immediate rescission of this Valentine in toto, with treble damages not to exceed $400,000, U.S. currency, to be assessed against Valentinee as liquidated compensation therefor.

This Valentine serves as a symbol of Valentinary Intent and no more. This Valentine is not a contract. It creates no legal duty or obligation in Valentinor. Valentinor's failure to perform according to this Valentine creates no claim whatsoever in Valentinee. Valentinor is under no obligation whatsoever to show good faith in the performance of this Valentine, nor must Valentinor continue to show affection in any appreciable way beyond a time reasonable for showing affection consistent with office protocols or any other applicable decency standards, including the criminal law. (Valentinee is hereby advised that Failure to Appreciate Your Employer is a crime under New York Law.) But upon acceptance of this Valentine, Valentinee assumes an absolute and nondelegable duty to show Unlimited Affection (hereinafter "UA")--in both mind and body--to Valentinor, in excess of the customary employer-employee affection expected in the course of office service. UA includes, but is not limited to: Making remarks as to Valentinor's good looks; praising Valentinor's masculinity; rubbing Valentinor's body in all places directed by Valentinor; dressing in an appropriately alluring way as directed by Valentinor (subject to Valentinor's rejection and imposing a duty to cure such rejection upon Valentiee); removing aforesaid clothing at any time (and at any place) directed by Valentinor; shaking any body parts in any manner directed by Valentinor (in this context, "shaking" includes erotically oscillating movement both in contact with Valentinor's body and outside Valentinor's body), and delivering various gifts to Valentinor subject to decency and Valetinor's request. Valentinee's failure to perform any of above-mentioned duties under this Valentine shall result in immediate termination, negative reporting to all major credit bureaus and referral to police authorities for disorderly conduct.

Valentinor herewith acknowledges that this Valentine comes one day late. In view of the fact that the Holiday commonly known as "Valentine's Day" fell upon February 14 in this calendar year, and in view of the fact that February 14 fell upon a Sunday in this calendar year, Valentinor hereby submits that it was legally impossible to deliver this certain Valentine on a Legal Workday (see, i.a., 5 U.S.C. § 6103). Legal Impossibility is a defense to any action based in contract. See., e.g., Combs v. Work-It Records, Co., Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 143, 150 (1994). Pursuant to law, Valentinor had no duty to deliver this Valentine to Valentinee on Valentine's Day; and Valentinee hereby waives any cause of action for Valentinor's failure to deliver this Valentine on February 14, 2010, any exception in the common law of the State of New York, the law of the United States or the Constitutions of the United States and the State of New York absolutely notwithstanding.

In the alternative, Valentinor asserts that this Valentine is purely gratuitous and may not be enforced against Valentinor in any way whatsoever. But because Valentinor is Valentinee's employer, Valentinor reserves the right to enforce this Valentine against Valentinee to the full extent of law, morality, decency, justice, right and any other authority deemed controlling hereon, including Valentinor's subjective jealousy and envy.

Valentinee is under no obligation to accept this Valentine. According to law, acceptance is only valid if it is free and voluntary. See, e.g., Morris Carburetor Repair of Queens Boulevard v. Fuggett Supply House, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 363, 370 (2004). But if Valentinee does not accept this Valentine, Valentinor cannot warrant Valentinee's future employment at this firm, nor can Valentinor warrant Valentinee's future employability or income. Valentinor further promises that he will make best efforts to torpedo Valentinee's career if Valentiee does not freely and voluntarily accept this Valentine without qualification. Valentinor therefore must advise Valentinee to accept this Valentine and all duties appurtenant thereto, it being a relatively small price to pay for incumbent benefits.

Valetinee has no right to bargain for or alter the terms of this Valentine. This Valentine represents the full and final agreement of the parties hereto, any prior or contemporaneous oral declarations thereagainst notwithstanding. It is offered solely on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing, would you please by my Valentine, subject in all events to controlling legal authorities, limitations and exclusions, unless those authorities be held invalid prior to acceptance?

I have hereby set my hand hereunto, this 15th Day of February, 2010,

__________________________
Mr. Herbert J. Plainman, Esq.

SOME PEOPLE ARE MORE VALUABLE THAN THINGS THEY DROP ON THE TRACKS

A LETTER FROM A CONCERNED CITIZEN TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (MTA)

By : Mrs. Zelda B. Wertheimer, Wife of Joseph G. Wertheimer, Founder, Wertheimer Industrial Plastics & Enamels Co., Inc. Owner, 2500 Acres assorted real estate in four countries; Resident, 237 Park Avenue, New York, NY; Member, Director's Guild, Metropolitan Museum of Art.

February 1, 2010

Dear Sir,

As a New Yorker and a humanitarian, I wish to complain about several new print advertisements you recently published around the metropolitan area. Although your safety advisements and commercial messages rarely arouse my indignation, your recent admonishment to subway riders: "Whatever falls on the tracks is not as valuable as you" is simply shocking. I speak for all New Yorkers when I say that your message is offensive.

I understand that the MTA wishes to protect its customers from train accidents. I also understand that train accidents are more likely when customers step off the platform onto the tracks. Further, I understand that some customers might disregard their own safety if they drop something onto the tracks, such as an iPod or other relatively expensive object. The MTA has a right to warn people not to risk their lives to save a piece of personal property. Additionally, the MTA has an interest in avoiding litigation arising from train/customer collisions.

I do not dispute the MTA's financial reasoning in this matter: No one likes lawsuits and no one likes paying money when they don't have to. But there are other considerations in the world. It might be prudent and even financially advisable to publish a poster warning people not to enter the subway tracks. Still, the MTA's message in this case is both philosophically unsound and in poor taste. In the name of decency and community values, I insist that the MTA remove these posters at once.

It is wrong for the MTA to suggest that "whatever falls on the tracks is not as valuable" as the person who dropped it. Although the MTA might think that its message esteems human equality and the importance of life over property, it is philosophically unsound because there are so many applications in which the message is not true. Popularly, people might believe that no object is worth more than a human life. But experience reveals that this is rubbish. Put simply, value depends on a comparison between how much the object is worth and how much the person is worth. No matter what our mothers told us when we were children, people's value can be expressed in dollar amounts. Insurance companies tell us how much we are worth all the time. Our portfolios define our monetary values. Courts tell loved ones how much their deceased family members "would have made" if they had lived. In a word, people are worth a number: And if the object they drop on the tracks is worth more than that number, then the MTA's "human value" message is totally untrue.

Consider the principle in action. Let us say that an impecunious, smelly beggar has a $40 faux diamond ring in his pocket. Let us further say that this beggar has no money, no savings, no real estate, no bonds, no stocks, no accounts, no chattel paper and no right to receive payment from any investment. He has no job; no one wants to be in a room with him, let alone hire him. In a word, this hideous, stinking beggar is literally not worth a cent. His "value" is zero. In these circumstances, if he drops the $40 ring on the tracks, he is actually less valuable than the object he dropped. If a train runs him over as he scampers to recover the ring, the MTA's "message" does not apply: The object he dropped was actually more valuable than he was: A $40 faux diamond ring is worth more than a $0 beggar. A third-grader could do the math on it.

Of course, that is a simple example. Most people are worth more than a beggar. But again, it is difficult to calculate human value. After all, a fresh-faced 30-year-old graduate with $150,000 in education debt is actually worth less than a $0 beggar even if the graduate has $4000 in the bank and a $10,000 stock fund. In that situation, appearances are misleading. Debt negatively impacts worth. Thus, the graduate is actually worth -$136,000. In this situation, if the graduate dropped even a quarter on the tracks, he would be worth $135,999.25 less than the object he dropped. Once again, the MTA's reasoning fails completely: A debt-riddled person is worth much less than even a modest object on the tracks. Any "positive" value is greater than any "negative" value: And debtors are "negative values."

I find it tasteless for the MTA to suggest that human beings are intrinsically more valuable than property. As the above examples illustrate, property is in many cases much more valuable than people. Many people will disagree with that assertion. But experience proves it true. A beggar's life is nothing compared to a $4,000,000 townhome, just as a debt-riddled graduate is nothing compared to a custom car. And what about criminals? Does the MTA suggest that a convicted rapist is somehow more valuable than an original Van Gogh? If a criminal dropped a Van Gogh on the tracks, does it honestly contend that the criminal is "more valuable" than this classic object of Western Art? I should certainly hope not. The bottom line is: Property is worth more than individual human beings.

But not always. When wealthy people hold comparatively less valuable objects, then people are more valuable than property. For example, if I were standing on a subway platform and I dropped my iPod on the tracks, I should refrain from scurrying after it because I am worth much, much more than the $250 iPod. I have extensive savings, accounts, real estate holdings and cash. My assets greatly exceed my debts. My net worth, therefore, is considerably higher than the object I dropped, so in this case the MTA's message is true: I am worth more than my iPod, so why risk myself to fetch it?

Still, these inconsistent results provide further proof that the MTA's message is incorrect. Messages must be philosophically sound. They must apply consistently no matter the subject matter. Yet even a cursory glance at the MTA's message here shows that it does not apply in many situations.

Finally, I find it utterly tasteless that the MTA believes in life over property. It is hypocritical for any governmental institution in this country to assert that human beings are worth more than valuable objects or land. We do not live in this country to spiritually enrich our fellow men; we live in this country to amass more property. There is simply no merit to the contention that life is about human worth. Simple commercial experience contradicts that contention at every turn. Men only have "worth" to the extent that they can expend labor and capital to amass even more property. Beyond that, there is no "intrinsic worth" in men worth protecting.

Legal doctrines and public messages that advocate life over property are indefensible. It makes no sense to sing odes to human life, as the common law does when it says that it is never permissible to kill someone to guard property. This is just ludicrous. If a person worth $0 tries to steal my art collection worth $45,000, there is no debate about which one is more valuable. What incentive would enterprising people have to amass property if they could not defend it against those without it?

Additionally, the law sends completely mixed messages in this regard. If it is so wrong to kill someone to protect property, why does the law not hesitate to heap supplementary punishments on thieves depending on the value of the objects they steal? Does that not show that our society finds it more wrong to steal something worth more than to steal something worth little?

Put simply, we put dollar amounts on both people and things in our society. Some things--and some people--are worth more than others. In that sense, the MTA grossly misunderstands what is really important in life. It is both philosophically unsound and tasteless for the MTA to suggest that all life is more valuable than all property.

Mr. Commissioner, I demand that you remove these hypocritical messages from our streets. It is time to educate our citizens about real worth, not delude them with foolishness about equality.

Yours very sincerely and truly,

Mrs. Zelda B. Wertheimer

LAW OR MORALITY? THE PROBLEM WITH UNDERAGE DRINKING LAWS

OESTERHOUDT STRIKES

Several days ago, I saw a curious poster alongside the usual commercial garbage on 22nd Street. Next to a print ad for Lady Gaga's new album and a placard about McDonald's meal deals stood this message: "The Legal Drinking Age is 21. Do Your Part This Christmas. Don't Give Alcohol to Teens." The poster showed a wine glass with a Ghostbusters-style red circle around it; a red diagonal line crossed out the glass. On the bottom appeared the following slogan in stern capital letters: "Serving Alcohol to Teens : It's Unsafe. It's Illegal. It's Irresponsible."

What made this "ad" so curious? Several things. First, it was not a commercial message. Most "ads" are crass commercial messages that aim to excite an urge to buy in the viewer. They communicate selective information intended to entice a person to spend money and enrich the speaker. In short, advertising is about making money. It is morally indifferent. In fact, it is morally destitute. Morality and commerce have little to do with one another. A dirty dollar is still a dollar. And people with more dollars are stronger than those with fewer dollars, dirty or not.

In traditional terms, then, this message against underage drinking was not an "ad" at all. It did not aim to excite an urge to buy in the passing viewer. No, it aimed to evoke a moral impulse; it beseeched people not to buy alcohol for people under 21. It asked people to refrain from commercial activity. If an advertising firm came up with a campaign that asked people to refrain from buying the product, it would go out of business faster than you can say: "Madison Avenue." In that sense, this message to stop underage drinking was not an "ad." It was an anti-ad.

But what good is an "ad" if it does not propose a commercial transaction? Can "ads" also promote morality? This one certainly tried. As long as an organization coughs up cash to buy posters or airtime, they can say basically whatever they want. It is their choice whether to say something that will generate no profit. Advertisers generally only advertise commercial stuff because it has the potential to create profits. And no one does anything in business that does not attempt to make money. Morality does not create profits. You can't buy it and it's not very exciting. Face it: It's easier to sell Dewar's than chastity.

In this light, we can conclude that some nonprofit organization paid for this message. It did not intend to make money with its speech. Rather, it aimed to foster public morality. Of course, the poster never uses the word "morality." In fact, everyone who supports underage drinking laws rarely speaks the word. Rather, they couch the issue in legal terms. The poster, for example, references the law twice: "The legal drinking age is 21;" "It's illegal to give alcohol to teens." It is easy to make a law; you just need a majority vote at the State house. But the underlying message here is moral, not legal. And it plays upon the popular confusion between law and morality.

People always mistake the law for morality. Morality existed among human beings before law. Morality refers to the average man's sense that something is disgusting or intuitively objectionable. It has more to do with popular social values than reason or abstract truth. Men created laws to embody their moral judgments, but law never could--and never will--supplant morality. In fact, the law is supposed to be morally neutral. It is supposed to operate according to pure reason and extrinsic evidence. Morality, by contrast, appeals to deep-seated intuitive prejudice against particular conduct within the dominant value system. When enough people in a society think something is disgusting, they call it "immoral." And that judgment passes down across generations. They don't need to verify it. They just need to feel it.

Still, people have more outward respect for the law than morality. It sounds more official. After all, the law has sovereign power behind it. It can attach bank accounts, imprison bodies and garnish wages. People fear those consequences. Morality, by contrast, is more basic than that. Morality informs almost everything a society does. Law simply represents the society's effort to assure a minimum baseline of behavior consistent with the dominant moral code.

Law enforces morality. The sovereign enforces the law with penalties on the body and property. But unlike morality, there are practical problems associated with enforcing the law. The sovereign cannot punish everyone for every illegal or immoral act that occurs. And there are some immoral acts that are not even illegal. The law must verify acts before it can punish them. That is not always easy.

Why, then, did the underage drinking poster harp on "illegality" in connection with serving alcohol to teens? After all, the overall message was a moral one. On a basic level, Americans have a troubled--and borderline schizophrenic--relationship with alcohol due to their cultural and religious heritage. The same cultural forces that culminated in Prohibition remain at work today in American society. Hostility toward alcohol is a moral judgment; it has to do with social values and disgust, not reason. Americans have always embodied their moral judgments about alcohol in law. The law gives official expression to their traditional moral queasiness on the subject. But to be abundantly clear, hostility toward alcohol--especially when coupled with children--is a uniquely American moral judgment.

Consider the interplay between law and morality in the poster. Even without understanding America's long history with regard to morally-nuanced alcohol regulations, the poster's own language reveals the connection. It says: " Serving Alcohol to Teens : It's Unsafe. It's Illegal. It's Irresponsible." It draws a linguistic connection between "illegality" and "irresponsibility." Strictly speaking, it is not "illegal" to be irresponsible. In American cultural parlance, however, "responsibility" is a sweeping moral judgment. It refers to "proper living" according to dominant social morals. That means acting and thinking in a certain way, especially when it comes to recognizing obligations and power relationships.

But "legality" is a technical inquiry. Unlike morality, the law must be specific in its prohibitions. Any aggrieved mother can complain that her child is "irresponsible" because he is not "living correctly." Yet that does not mean the child is acting "illegally." Legal violations must match specific language. They must be investigated and proved according to objective procedures. Yes, it might be irresponsible to violate the law. But not all "irresponsibility" is illegal. If it were, virtually everyone would be a criminal.

It is significant that the poster equated legality with responsibility. It forges a direct thematic connection between law and morality. In most cases, the average viewer has no idea that the two concepts are distinct. He simply assumes that all laws are moral, and that moral people are responsible. That assumption is false. Yet the law benefits from the false assumption because morality acts as a sort of "self-executing enforcement mechanism." After all, people stop themselves from acting in a particular fashion when they think it is "immoral." No law constrains them. Rather, innate cultural conditioning influences their decisions. If the law can harness that innate cultural conditioning, it can successfully thwart certain behavior before it happens. And from the law's perspective, whenever someone refrains from prohibited behavior, it has done its job. If morality helps enforcement, then the law will appeal to morality. It does not matter that the law has no power to shape individual morals.

At this point, however, a substantial problem arises: What is so immoral about serving alcohol to a 20-year-old? Or even a 14-year-old? This suggestion might arouse revulsion in the typical American listener. But that shows once again that underage drinking is essentially a moral issue. After all, Americans somehow feel queasy when they think that children are drinking alcohol. That reaction is a cultural. It has survived for generations.

And it is not a universal reaction. People in European Nations, for instance, do not flinch to serve alcohol to teenagers. There is no dominant public rhetoric that equates underage drinking with illegality, irresponsibility and "evil." Quite the contrary, life goes on in Germany, France, England and Holland quite well, even when 16-year-olds sip beer--even in public. Society does not collapse. The sky does not fall. And religious leaders do not spread hellfire for it.

In my mind, this illustrates the point that American concerns over underage drinking are essentially moral concerns. No matter how much public rhetoric couches the debate in legal terms, the fact remains that Americans just don't feel culturally comfortable with the idea that teenagers are drinking. It is a question of cultural heritage, not wise policy.

Of course, those who support widespread bans on underage drinking will never say that morality motivates them. In fact, they probably do not even realize that it does. Instead, they point to safety statistics and other supposedly "neutral" indicia to show a "practical" reason why teenagers should not drink. Because fewer teens die in alcohol-related accidents, they say, underage drinking bans are good laws.

I think this is a dishonest argument. If safety were really the main objection to alcohol, Prohibition should still be in effect. Alcohol causes untold damage to countless lives every year, not just among teenagers. It causes thousands of accidents. It ruins families. It leads to violence, disruption and turmoil. Why protect only children from those hazards? If a legislator identifies negative social consequences that flow from a particular behavior, he should ban that behavior in toto. Only a fool would argue that alcohol does not cause myriad social problems. Yet for some reason Americans tolerate those consequences among adults, but refuse to tolerate them among children.

At this juncture, it is hard to escape identifying some hypocrisy in the clamor over underage drinking. After all, the essential argument against underage drinking is to ensure safety. But if safety were the ultimate goal, then all alcohol should be banned, not just some. Yet despite Americans' moral qualms about underage drinking, they sure love to drink. So all their talk about safety goes out the window because they want to keep drinking. They can be "responsible" with their drinking, even though experience shows that alcohol continues to ruin lives on a daily basis. Yet they have the gall to label underage drinking "immoral." Immoral for some, but not for them? This is deeply problematic. And it renders all opposition to underage drinking disingenuous.

Let's be honest about alcohol. Everyone likes it. But there is a cultural tradition in America that teaches against it. That tradition forms a moral baseline that enables Americans to say with a straight face that underage drinking is bad, while "legal" drinking is good. All drinking creates pernicious social consequences. Yet legislators--and popular moralists--only ban it among children. In my view, this makes little sense. If you identify a social problem, you should root it out wherever it appears, not just in a subset.

But I ask too much. American morality is a complicated thing; there's no sense applying logic to sort it out. Let's just try to separate it from law. No matter how much we hear about "legal" drinking in America, the whole debate is really just a moral battle. And moral battles are never logical.

ANIMALS CANNOT BE CRIMINALS

AN ESSAY

Several months ago, I wrote an essay outlining the relationship between moral choice and the criminal law. http://reasoncommercejustice.blogspot.com/2009/03/good-bad-or-just-sick-why-we-punish.html. I concluded that the criminal law implicates public morality in a way that other legal doctrines do not. Specifically, I pointed out that our society relishes the opportunity to pronounce both legal and moral judgment on "deviants" who make "bad choices." Finally, I noted that in some cases, it is impossible to channel moral outrage against certain trespassers--particularly the mentally ill--because they do not possess the capacity to rationally make "good" or "bad" choices.

Yet our society enjoys criminalizing things. It is an easy way to express condemnation for shocking outrages, even if it is not the most effective response. When we pursue someone as a "criminal," we collectively say that the he "broke from the moral norm." We justify his punishment by referencing his bad moral choice. Then we feel good about ourselves when he suffers for daring to violate the moral standard. Choice is the touchstone: Criminals know the behavior that society expects, yet they knowingly choose to violate it. In this sense, the criminal law acutely relates to popular morality.

Criminal sanctions make rational sense in two cases. First, there is the moral function. Under the "morality" theory for punishment (originally championed by Immanuel Kant), the criminal law prescribes exactly enough punishment to match the moral guilt in the actor's choice. The more shocking the choice, the worse the punishment. The morality theory focuses on individual choices; it envisions a direct confrontation between the law and the criminal. Punishment in this case does not aim to intimidate others; it is a discreet affair between the sovereign and the trespasser. True, society looks on and judges the moral deviant. But it serves no utilitarian purpose beyond venting moral outrage against the individual criminal. The "morality theory" has a significant role in the American justice system, but it is even more prevalent in civil law countries like Germany and France.

In the second case, the criminal law performs a strictly utilitarian function. Under the utilitarian theory, criminal law uses punishment against one man in order to frighten others from committing the same infraction. This is called "deterrence." Its focus is not moral; it is practical. Society does not like criminal choices because they disrupt the social order and cause damage to others. Society would simply like to see fewer criminal choices, regardless of whether the criminal acknowledges his moral failing. Deterrence is all about numbers: The criminal law performs a "practical" function if it reduces the number of robberies each year. Morality is not the issue; the criminal law just wants people to refrain from making choices that hurt others. In this sense, it is "useful" for everyone in society.

So how does the criminal law induce autonomous individuals to refrain from making certain choices? Simple: It threatens punishment to anyone who dares to make the choice. It assumes that people are rational actors. It assumes that they will engage in a cost-benefit analysis before making any choice. It also assumes that they do not like punishment, so they will not make choices they know will lead to it. When the criminal law aims to fulfill a deterrence function, it is not so much concerned with the individual criminal who suffers. Rather, it is much more concerned with all the potential criminals who watch the condemned man suffer, then say to themselves: "I do not want to meet the same fate." If the punishment inspires fear in those who otherwise might have committed the same crime, it serves its purpose.

Deterrence has always been an overt goal in the Anglo-American criminal law tradition. But it has fallen into disfavor in civil law systems. The German system specifically disavows any intention to deter future criminals by punishing present ones. Kant said that using one man as an instrument to frighten others demeaned human dignity and autonomy. That sentiment has found traction in Western Europe.

But no matter what punishment system a country adopts, the criminal law still assumes that people will act rationally. If a person cannot make rational choices, he cannot know whether his choice will violate an "intuitive moral standard." He also cannot make a cost-benefit analysis before deciding whether to commit an act that will injure another. And most of all, the criminal law only works on human beings.

This is not a facetious observation. Just this week, prosecutors in Connecticut actually deliberated whether they should bring charges against a chimpanzee that brutally mauled a woman last year. They also deliberated whether they should charge the chimp's owner.

What foolishness. The fact that prosecutors even entertained the proposition to charge an animal with a crime reveals a gross misunderstanding of the criminal law's basic functions. It would serve neither a moral nor a utilitarian purpose to punish an animal. After all, animals do not make rational choices; they know only instinct. They cannot grasp intuitive human moral teachings, nor can they feel fear when they see a fellow animal punished for making a "choice." Indeed, we might even wonder whether animals make "choices" at all in the way humans understand the word. Animals do not assimilate information as humans do. Nor can they learn to adapt their behavior to meet accepted "social norms." How can the law serve a purpose when the subject cannot even use language? Law must communicate before it can have any beneficial effect on society. Animals do not communicate with language. Thus, it is absurd to even consider using criminal penalties against them when they do something outrageous.

Still, Connecticut's debate about prosecuting a chimpanzee reveals a bothersome issue. Specifically, it reveals our society's reflexive--and ridiculous--propensity to use the criminal law to address any conduct we find abhorrent. In recent decades, States have greatly expanded their criminal codes. When there is a new social issue that arouses people's anger or disgust, there is an immediate push to criminalize it. Someone doesn't wear a seatbelt? Make it a crime. Someone texts while driving? Make it a crime. Someone doesn't inspect a restaurant every two weeks? Make it a crime. Someone forgets to feed their child lunch? Make it a crime. Someone did not clean their apartment? Make it a crime. Someone puts recyclables in the trash? Make it a crime.

In short, by making all objectionable conduct potentially criminal, States have diluted what it means to make "criminal choices." They have also shown that people just like taking revenge on things, even if it does not seem reasonable.

This explains why Connecticut prosecutors thought about prosecuting the chimpanzee. When something outrageous happens--like a chimpanzee chewing off a woman's face--people in our society rush to assign blame and take revenge on the culprit. This makes sense from a human perspective; human beings naturally thirst for revenge when injured. Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in The Common Law (1881) that both criminal law and compensation law flow from the natural human anger that arises when people get hurt: When a person accidentally slams his hand in a door, he kicks the door. Or when a branch falls on a man, he burns the tree. People want to take revenge against things that hurt them, even if they are inanimate, and even if it would serve no useful or moral purpose.

Criminal law is not the same thing as natural human revenge. It is a human invention with a human focus. It enforces human norms and aims to influence rational human choices. It makes no sense to apply it to anyone--or anything--that cannot make rational choices. If the criminal law cannot either: (1) Express moral outrage against a person who knew or should have known he made an intuitively "bad choice;" or (2) Realistically frighten potential criminals by punishing a convicted criminal, then it makes no sense to apply it. Animals cannot know they make "bad choices." They do not have the capacity to grasp complex verbal communication, let alone subtle moral principles. They also cannot be frightened from acting in ways that injure humans. This is why it is utterly pointless to prosecute an animal.

Now, that does not mean humans do not feel a natural desire to take revenge against an animal that hurts them. Just as people burn trees that fall on them, they can kill animals that pose a danger. But taking bald revenge on an animal is very different from prosecuting it, then punishing it consistent with law.

For better or worse, the criminal law has come to signify "revenge" in our society. True, the criminal law undoubtedly sates the natural human craving for revenge in many situations. But it would behoove us to remember that the two concepts are not entirely coextensive. Understanding the difference saves us from embarrassing spectacles, like seriously debating whether to hale a chimp into court to stand trial.

YOUR ENTIRE LIFE IS AN EXTERNALITY

AN ESSAY

When I studied property law, I learned the word "externality." Before law school, I understood the word to mean what it says: "external to something else." But I soon found out that in the law, words do not always mean what they say in plain English. No, they function as shorthand for other concepts. And sometimes those concepts bear no relationship at all to the word that signifies them.

In both legal and economic terms, an "externality" refers to the effect on others when two people conduct a lawful transaction. It also refers to the effect on others when one person lawfully uses his land. To be blunt, "externalities" mean the shit everyone else has to endure because others act within their legal rights. After all, the law empowers certain people to act in more sweeping ways than others. An oil company has much more power to act in sweeping ways than some private farmer next door. And when more powerful people act within their rights, they can produce an enormous--though not intentional--effect on others' lives.

In property law, "externalities" are both obvious and subtle. As a general rule, our society holds up land ownership as a talisman. Everyone strives to own his own patch of earth to do as he wills with it. Yet by "doing what he wills" with his own land, our archetypal landowner may unintentionally injure someone else. How can this be? Well, what if he wants to open an industrial tannery on his land? He's master of his land, right? He wants to make money on his land, right? Isn't that what we're supposed to do in America, make as much money as possible from our land?

If he opens a tannery, he exercises his rights as a property owner. Yet he makes noise, produces foul odors and makes life miserable for everyone else around him. Those are externalities that flow from his lawful land use.

He's not breaking the law; he's living the American dream. Problem is, when some people live their American dream, they give people around them nightmares. That's what externalities are all about.

But I'm not writing today to put down property owners. As a cynic, I am prepared to believe that most people will use their land only to enrich themselves. If they make everyone else's life difficult in the process, they could care less. As long as they don't face a nuisance suit for using their land as they wish (ie, that would cost more money than merely continuing the objectionable land use), they will keep on using it in a way that brings in the most cash. That's American life: Cost-benefit analysis. Effects on others rarely come into the equation unless those effects would result in greater costs than benefits. Even courts subscribe to this view. They won't let a few poor neighbors complain about pollution from a nearby auto plant because the auto plant keeps people employed. Sure, the land use might be horrible--and it might make the neighbors' existence miserable--but their suffering is a "bearable cost" given the "ultimate benefits" that flow from it. Shutting down the auto plant might solve the neighbors' ills, but it would cost hundreds more their jobs. So the law lets the more powerful landowner use his land as he pleases, externalities or not. That's just the way our society values things.

But externalities do not just exist in property law. They are all over our lives. After all, we are consuming animals. There are not enough resources to go around. By living well for ourselves--even innocently--we might deny others the chance to live well. For example, if a person gets sick, he becomes an externality on everyone who must care for him. His life drags others down with it. It imposes costs. It strains emotions. By living his life, he makes it difficult for others to live theirs.

In essence, sometimes just staying alive on this planet produces a burdensome effect on others. Every time one person enjoys a meal, he eats food that will not go to someone else who needs it. Every time one person falls in love with another, he denies that person's love to someone else who wants it. Every time one person gets a job offer, someone else had to get a rejection letter. Every time a corporate board awards bonuses to its members, it reduces the available funds for employee raises. Whenever a child is born, it imposes a staggering financial, emotional and social burden on the family.

These are all perfectly lawful things to do. Yet they produce negative effects on others' lives. People don't mean to produce these effects on others. People are simply trying to survive in a world that requires consumption. But these effects are inevitable because resources are limited. When one person succeeds, another must fail. When one person relaxes, another must toil.

Yet where would we be if we constantly worried about externalities? I think we must merely accept the fact that our continued existence will impose substantial difficulty on many people, both far and wide. To some extent, we must resort to selfishness in order to feed ourselves and to secure our bodily health. This may sound bleak. But if you think about it, human bodily existence is quite bleak. There is nothing grandiose about our biological processes: We eat, excrete, grow hair, breathe, make money, buy things, strive to experience positive emotions, have sex, groom ourselves and do our best to avoid pain. These are our "goals" as living creatures. And when we fulfill them, we necessarily impose costs on others. For every goal we reach, someone else did not make it.

True, we rarely want to make others suffer by pleasing ourselves. But that is the price of survival in a world of limited resources. We must simply accept the fact that our own quest for comfort and happiness in life impacts many other people.

CONTRACTS ARE CONTRACTS, SUPREME COURT RULES

NEWS FLASH

WASHINGTON, D.C.--Reason, Commerce, Justice & Free Beer has just learned that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "a contract is a contract" in the much-followed case Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP v. Marquez, No. 08-9851. Scholars and lawyers alike have reacted with surprise to the Court's decision. "We expected a narrower ruling," said Mr. Thomas J. Knickerbocker, Esq., partner at New York's Knickerbocker, Chance & Willoughby LLC, a prominent Wall Street law firm. "We thought the Court would be more straightforward. But it simply said 'a contract is a contract.' This is a complicated idea. It is hard for both lawyers and the public to understand."

Today's ruling has broad implications for the business community. It also represents a milestone in legal reasoning and rhetoric. The case arises from a dispute between a janitor, Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez, of Grand Concourse, The Bronx, and Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners, a large Wall Street investment house handling more than $45,000,000,000 in assets.

According to filings and the Court's decision, Mr. Marquez orally agreed to "use best efforts" to "satisfactorily" clean every toilet located at Gaffello's office building in downtown Manhattan. In return, an unnamed agent acting for the investment house promised to pay Mr. Marquez $40 per day "until told otherwise" and "subject to all reasonable alterations by promisor." The agent allegedly also told Mr. Marquez that he had "to supply his own materials" and he had to "wipe all shit and piss from all affected toilet facilities to the satisfaction of any Gaffaello director to the extent permitted by applicable law." Mr. Marquez allegedly acquiesced to Gaffaello's terms. He further acquiesced to Gaffaello's demand that he "waive all remedies, at law or equity, or at common justice, for any alleged breach of aforesaid agreement, be it oral or in writing."

Mr. Marquez immediately went to work. Both employees and officers found Mr. Marquez' work excellent. According to one Vice President in the Appropriations Department: "I've never seen a cleaner shitter. That muchacho sure knows what the fuck he's doing." Around the same time, an authorized Gaffaello budget deputy presented a written contract to Mr. Marquez. The written contract included all the terms to which he orally agreed, as well as a clause that imposed a duty on Mr. Marquez to "act in good faith in the performance hereof; but such duty shall not extend to promisor, Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP; and it is further agreed, covenanted and promised that promisee , Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez, shall have no right of action, cause of action or any other legal, equitable, natural or other remedy, either now or hereafter, today or tomorrow--or forever--for promisor's wanton or negligent failure, refusal, or decision not to use good faith in the execution, performance, observation or fulfillment of the mutual covenants set forth in this, the Master Contract for the Performance of Toilet Cleaning Services, notwithstanding all oral assertions to the contrary hereof, so help him God."

Mr. Marquez signed the contract, even though he did not read English. According to a Gaffaello witness, he said: "I understand it."

For two months, Mr. Marquez dutifully upheld his end of the bargain. He cleaned 4000 toilets, scrubbed 50,000 square feet of tile bathroom flooring every night and purified 4000 toilet stalls. In the process, he overcame horrific sights and odors. He worked at least 12 hours each day. He received $31.02 for his first day's work less taxes, fees and Social Security contributions. Although he was not eligible for Gaffaello's health coverage plan, he nevertheless paid toward it because he could not understand his paycheck statement. Over the next week, Gaffaello began paying Mr. Marquez a dollar less each day. Beginning the second week, it began subtracting two dollars per day from his daily check. After reducing his daily wage to $3.29, Gaffaello stopped paying Mr. Marquez at all. Instead, it sent a junior supply clerk to inform him that "he would be paid later."

Trusting that Gaffaello would honor the contract they signed, Mr. Marquez continued working. Eventually, however, Mr. Marquez gave up. He allegedly told a Gaffaello employee that he "could not continue working without pay" and that he "had a family to feed." In response, the employee said: "You can't leave. You promised to use best efforts and to act in good faith under this contract until told otherwise." Mr. Marquez said "they could sue him." With that, he walked off the job.

Gaffaello did sue him. Within two days, it served papers on Mr. Marquez and haled him into the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for breach of contract. Although the trial judge wondered why the dispute fell under Federal jurisdiction, Gaffaello's legal team presented evidence to show that Gaffaello was a Delaware limited liability partnership, while Mr. Marquez was a New York resident. It also showed that the contract between Gaffaello and Mr. Marquez "represented a lucrative business relationship implicating more than $75,000 in janitorial services." These facts, according to established Federal law, warranted Federal court jurisdiction. Mr. Marquez, who could barely speak English, let alone understand an argument involving Federal diversity jurisdiction, said nothing in response.

Gaffaello demanded a fast track trial. The trial judge--A. Harry Peters--had no sympathy for a recent immigrant like Mr. Marquez because President George H.W. Bush appointed him to the bench. He quickly surveyed the evidence and found that Mr. Marquez breached the contract. In a detailed opinion, the trial judge wrote: "Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed the obligations set forth in the contract he signed with Gaffaello. It is not for courts to pass upon the providence or fairness of written agreements between mature business actors. Rather, we must merely apply relevant law to resolve any allegation that one party breached the terms upon which they mutually agreed. Under law, we assume all terms to be valid and voluntary. In this case, Mr. Marquez has no answer to contradict the assertion that he walked off a job he contractually agreed to perform. He says he left because Gaffaello did not pay him, but that is not technically true. Gaffaello said it would 'pay him later.' This does not mean it 'did not pay' him. Gaffaello never breached the contract. Only Mr. Marquez did. Furthermore, Mr. Marquez promised to use best efforts and to comply with the contract in good faith. By walking off the job without notice or cause, he violated both obligations. In sum, Mr. Marquez breached the contract. I order him to return to work immediately, or to pay Gaffaello the reasonable value of his lost services, in an amount not less than $75,000.01."

Mr. Marquez appealed the trial court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. His case attracted notice from the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, and their lawyers hastened to his cause. They argued that the contract was invalid because it was "unconscionable" and because no contract may bind a man to work in the United States. The three-judge panel--including two Clinton appointees--agreed. They said: "We find the contract by and between Gaffaello Mutual Equity Partners LLP and Mr. Rodolfo G. Marquez unconscionable as a matter of law. We find every argument to the contrary unconvincing. No matter what anyone says about our country or its free enterprise spirit, we refuse to entertain appellees' contention that the United States Constitution guarantees the 'unlimited freedom to bargain for employment terms.' This agreement verifiably 'shocks the conscience.' We cannot permit the contract to stand, no matter how 'voluntary' it may have been at signing. Appellees' conduct in this case borders on the sadistic. Judgment reversed."

Judge Ferguson H. Klosterbach, George W. Bush's lone appointee on the appellate panel, dissented. He wrote: "I think the trial judge was right. A contract is a contract. Mr. Marquez breached it. He is also an immigrant."

Dissatisfied with the Second Circuit's reasoning, Gaffaello applied to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. In its brief, Gaffaello phrased the case as follows: "This is a case about the freedom to contract. It is not about fairness. It is about a willful contract breacher who did not do what he promised to do." In response, Mr. Marquez' lawyers said: "This is not a case about the freedom to contract. This is a case about unfairness and injustice. This is a case about a powerful company forcing one-sided terms upon a powerless immigrant. If this Court has a shred of decency and compassion, it will affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit."

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the Court's opinion to a packed house. In a calm, steady voice, he began: "Our free market economy values fairness. But it values contracts more. In our view, contracts are contracts. Promises are promises. When commercial actors make promises, we do not excuse them lightly for failing to adhere to their commitments. This case involves promises and contracts. No matter how 'unfair' or 'unjust' those promises may seem in hindsight, we refuse to second-guess reasonable commercial actors who voluntarily make commitments. Contrary to Respondents' contention, this Court has no power to rule on 'elementary justice.' This Court applies the law. And the law in this case has a simple answer: Contracts are contracts.

"Our common law values contracts. Commerce prospers when commercial men feel assured that others will fulfill their commitments. That is why courts in our system rarely allow litigants to escape voluntary contractual obligations. True, contractual obligations only arise to the extent that parties make them freely. But there is no evidence in this case that Mr. Marquez faced 'coercion' to bargain with Gaffaello. He agreed to act in good faith, to waive his remedies and to use 'best efforts' while cleaning every toilet at Gaffaello's downtown facility 'until told otherwise.' At the same time, Gaffaello freely and voluntarily agreed to pay Mr. Marquez $40 per day 'subject to all reasonable alterations.' Mr. Marquez says that Gaffaello did not pay him. But the record clearly shows that it did. The fact that Gaffaello slowly decreased Mr. Marquez' daily wage did not change the contract. In fact, Gaffaello had every right to make 'reasonable alterations' to Mr. Marquez' pay. Mr. Marquez acquiesced to this term when he signed the contract. And--unlike Mr. Marquez--Gaffaello had no obligation to perform the contract in good faith. If Gaffaello somehow acted in bad faith, that was a risk Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed when he signed the contract. It is not for us to question these private contractual relations.

"We hold as a matter of constitutional law that contracts are contracts. Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature has power to retroactively invalidate private contractual terms concerning legal subject matter. We are neither philosophers nor moralists. We are legal technicians. We do not interfere with private bargains, nor do we save private individuals from their improvident business decisions. No matter how 'shocking' the terms may have been in Mr. Marquez' case, we are not fairness referees. We simply look to the contract and the circumstances to determine whether both parties freely and voluntarily assumed their duties. If we determine that they did, our inquiry ends. If we scrutinized every private bargain for terms we considered 'unfair' or 'oppressive,' we would undermine the spirit of private enterprise that drives our free market system. We are not paternalistic. We trust the market. We do not second-guess it.

"This is not new law. Our courts have held that 'contracts are contracts' for centuries. Even our English forebears so held. In the case Coxwell v. Bainbridge (King's Bench 1612), Lord Chief Justice Coke stated the basic principle that we continue to follow today: "Hath the yeoman signed the Pact of Free Wille as aforesaid? Say he the Parchmente be void for offending that Certaine Spiritte or Ghoste of Justice that doth dwell at the Hearte of all the dealings of Menne? What of it? This Courte judgeth not for Justice nor Rightte, but for Lawe. Promise a Manne he shall builde a Bridge o'er the Thames for a threepence in Two Days' Tyme, so he must, so long he have said so of Free Minde. I be of mind that pacta sunt servanda. It be of no Moment what the bound Manne saith. The Lawe doth presume a Manne do a Thinge with Free Minde. Comes now no Evidence or Witnesse thereagainst, it being a Cleare Thinge, et.c., what be left for a Court to say? Let Menne bargainne as they please. What they say be no Matter for the Lawe, but that the Lawe allow it.'

"We could not agree more. We find that Mr. Marquez knowingly and voluntarily assumed the obligations set forth in his contract with Gaffaello. We express no judgment on the 'fairness' or 'equity' of that contract. We refuse to entertain the Respondents' invitation to sit as a permanent referee for contractual fairness. Such a role would contravene our duty to apply the law and to defend private autonomy in a free market system. Judgment REVERSED. This case is REMANDED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with an order to issue judgment against Respondent consistent with this opinion.

"It is so ordered."

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent. In it, he blamed the majority for "enshrining unfairness" and "exulting the powerful over the powerless." He concluded as follows: "The Constitution imposes limits upon the freedom to contract when contract terms offend our most basic sense of justice."

In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens' dissent: "Justice Stevens once again proves his unrivaled ability to put his head up his dumb wrinkled ass. L0s3r, pwned!!!!"

Reason, Commerce, Justice & Free Beer is pleased to see that both collegiality and prudence are alive and well at the Supreme Court as it begins its new session.

A LEASE EVERYONE CAN UNDERSTAND

REAL ESTATE TIPS FROM THE PROS

By : Mr. Gabriel F. Ziegenbaum, Senior Partner, The Equity Family LLC (A Real Estate Holding Company Specializing in Must-Do Sales); Licensed Market Broker; Licensed Fisherman, Town of Poughkeepsie, New York.

At The Equity Family LLC, we sell and lease attractive properties throughout the New York metropolitan area. We are committed to providing quality services to our customers. That means dealing fairly, fully and honestly. When our agents show properties, we tell the whole story. And when deal time comes, we make sure that our customers know everything they need to know.

We believe that fairness is the best way to do business. We understand that buying or leasing a home can be stressful. That is why we strive to make the experience as easy as possible with our "Fair Shake Guarantee™." We guarantee our customers that they will get the fairest possible deal and price allowable under applicable New York State law. We understand that many people are cynical about property sales. But we buck the trend: We are proud to make a commitment to fairness.

We think that customers should know what they are signing. All too often, buyers and renters hastily read 45-page leases or sale contracts without really looking at what they say. After all, who knows what the "Parol Evidence Rule notwithstanding applicable New York exclusions, et seq." means, or even "the right to quiet enjoyment having been waived, it being the intention of Lessor to obviate all Rights appurtenant hereto, there shall be no cause of action, in either law or equity, as against that certain Lessor as hereinabove named and described." We do not believe that sellers should confuse customers with legal gobbeldeygook. Rather, we think that buyers and renters should know exactly what the contract says.

Our lawyers do not like our "Fair Shake Guarantee™." They say it leaves open too many liabilities. They even say that it is much more profitable to write contracts inscrutably than clearly. Although we agree that profits are important, we think integrity is more important. We want our customers to know exactly what they are signing, even if that scares them away from a deal. For us, honesty is the best policy. And contrary to our lawyers' admonishments, we have stayed profitable every year since we opened our doors. In our view, honesty is its own reward.

To demonstrate our commitment to fair dealing and transparency in property sales and rentals, we would like to share our standard lease format with the public. This lease tells potential renters everything they need to know about their obligations, rights and powers in a property relationship. It also tells them what their landlords can and cannot do under law. We believe that the key to economic prosperity is knowledge. That is why we want to tell the public about our standard-form lease. Our economy grows when everyone does business with confidence. When customers see that The Equity Family guarantees fairness, every customer will feel confident. Nothing hurts business more than a suspicious client base. Here at the Equity Family, we make sure that no one stays suspicious. We tell everyone exactly what the contract says in plain, layman's English. You don't need a lawyer to understand our lease. You won't find any "pursuant" or "notwithstanding same" in our lease. It won't even take you 10 minutes to read.

Do business with confidence. Read this lease. You will never have to read another one; every lease says exactly what this lease says. Know your rights. Know your responsibilities. And understand your place in every commercial relationship. Because confident customers are good customers (R).

LEASE

1. The Equity Family LLC ("Lessor") promises to allow You ("Lessee") to remain on a property it owns, namely: 12 Church Avenue, Apartment 4C, New York, New York ("Property"), from January 1, 2010 until December 31, 2010.

2. In return for Lessor's promise to allow Lessee to remain on Property, Lessee promises to pay four thousand three hundred dollars ($4300) on the first of every month, beginning January 1, 2010, until December 1, 2010.

3. Lessor has almost all advantages under this Lease.

4. Whenever unexpected expenses arise, chances are Lessee will have to pay for them.

5. In case of dispute, it is presumed that Lessor will win, unless a court says otherwise.

6. Lessee has no right to sue Lessor for anything, unless a court says otherwise.

7. If a court says something against Lessor's interests, Lessee agrees to pay for all Lessor's costs.

8. Lessee agrees that there is nothing is unfair about this Lease. Lessee would not have signed it otherwise. As a result, Lessee waives any claim that this Lease is "unconscionable" or "unenforceable."

9. Lessor promises to provide a safe Property, but will contest any claim that anything about the Property is unsafe, and even blame Lessee for causing the problem in the first place.

10. Anything Lessee does to improve Property will inure to Lessor's benefit. EXAMPLE: If Lessee buys a new fridge and installs it on Property, the fridge immediately belongs to Lessor. Lessee cannot sue Lessor for this result, no matter what the law or Constitution says. It is not theft. It is a contract--and Lessee signed it. Theft is illegal. Contracts are legal.

11. If Lessee breaks this Lease, he owes Lessor every month's unpaid rent. Lessor has no obligation to honor any request for mercy or mitigation. EXAMPLE: You break the lease on September 1, 2010. That means you owe rent for September, October, November and December, each at $4300 per month: You owe $17,200. If you don't pay, Lessor will get a judgment against you and tap into your bank account to get every nickel you owe: That's the law.

12. Lessor understands that he enjoys most of the power under this Lease. Lessee understands that Lessee enjoys very little power under this Lease. In all cases not specifically addressed in this Lease, Lessor shall prevail, unless a court says otherwise.

13. Lessee may not destroy Property. If he does, he must pay for all repairs at a double rate. If Lessee refuses to pay, Lessor gets a default judgment against Lessee and can tap into his bank account to get whatever amount he wants. EXAMPLE: Your dog destroys Lessor's parquet floors with urine. Lessor's contractor charges $5400 to repair it. You owe $10,800. You don't pay. The Court enters judgment against you for $10,800. The Sheriff authorizes Lessor to garnish your bank account and transfer $10,800 to Lessor.

14. This is the final agreement. It can't be changed, unless Lessor wants to change it.


_______________________
THE EQUITY FAMILY LLC
LESSOR

________________________
WHATEVER YOUR NAME IS
LESSEE

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PERSON WATCHING YOU SIGN FOR $1.05
NOTARY