Showing posts with label Statutes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Statutes. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
TUCK IN YOUR SHIRT APPROPRIATELY--OR FIND ANOTHER JOB
By : Mr. Ronald F. Daggett, Assistant Deputy Vice President for Human Resources, The Cockland Group LLC, an Investment House specializing in service to the mortgage industry.
Cockland Group LLC is growing at a rapid pace. Since our founding in 2003, we have secured firm accounts with the Nation's largest mortgage sellers, including HSBC, Citigroup and Coldwell Banker. Our commitment to Absolute Client Satisfaction (ACS)™ is unparalleled. Our earnings have steadily risen in every consecutive quarter since our founding, even during some of the most challenging economic times in our Nation's history. We are proud of our accomplishments and we remain focused on our overriding goal: To deliver timely, effective, reasonable mortgage reinvestment services across the entire financial industry.
We could not have achieved these results without you, our employees. Here at Cockland management, we salute your dedication, hard work and passion for mortgage reinvestment services. At Cockland, it is not just about mortgages. It is about people™. Our people are the best. We know you know that, too. And we are thankful that you share our zeal for boundless client satisfaction. Because when great people serve great clients, everyone wins™.
We owe our success to our unique corporate culture. Cockland drives hard and plays hard. When we enter a market, we aim to penetrate and win. But when we relax, we relax with the same fervor we display when servicing an account. Cockland employees know how to please clients. And that is why clients keep coming back for more. Cockland delivers solid performance: Any time, anywhere--and for the best price™.
Nonetheless, not everyone can be a Cockland employee. We expect the best and we demand a lot. Sometimes it is difficult to overcome stiff competition in the mortgage client service market. We do not tolerate droopers or flaccid account service. Only the firmest survive at Cockland. Our employees don't back down. They stay on top of accounts until they are closed. Cockland employees are not timid. When we service accounts, we never pull out. We do not stop until our clients are completely satisfied™.
We also demand complete devotion to The Cockland Mission (TCM)™ (see employee manual, Chapter 2 for details). Being part of a winning team means the ability to play your position and to cheerfully receive instructions. Knowing your job is only half the battle; the other half is knowing how you fit on the ball club.
Attire is an important part of Cockland's success. Since our founding, we have insisted that every team member in the Cockland family wear either a white or blue button-down shirt at work. Button-down shirts show good taste and respect for client expectations. Clients in the mortgage industry wear button-down shirts. Typically, those shirts are white or blue. It only makes sense that we--as dedicated client service professionals--mirror their expectations. That is why we have always required our employees to wear white or blue button-down shirts. Sometimes conventions are essential. And this is one such instance.
Button-down shirts are vital to Cockland's special place in the mortgage service market. Yet the company has never endorsed an official policy expressing unconditional support for button-down shirts. We believe we have a duty as a company to reverse that trend. It is time for Cockland to recognize button-down shirts. And it is time for Cockland to make button-down shirts mandatory for all employees at the company. It is time to formalize.
From this day forward, every Cockland employee will be required to wear only blue or white button-down shirts while on company business. We refuse to acknowledge any exceptions to this policy. Every Cockland employee must certify that he or she will comply with this policy. He or she must further certify that failure to comply will result in immediate disciplinary action, up to and including docked pay and termination. Cockland must preserve its team spirit. And it must also maintain its winning attire-related traditions. That is why we hereby officially make blue and white button-down shirts a core element of Cockland culture. If Cockland employees cannot accept this, they can find employment elsewhere.
But this does not end Cockland's determination to inculcate attire discipline. In addition to requiring all Cockland employees to wear white or blue button-down shirts, all employees must also appropriately tuck their shirts into their pants.
Without appropriate tucking, blue and white button-down shirts mean nothing. Only a tucked-in button-down shirt can accomplish the goals Cockland expects. A tucked-in button-down shirt is absolutely vital to continued employment at Cockland. Inappropriately tucked and untucked button-down shirts reveal an inattention to personal excellence that is fundamentally inconsistent with Cockland's overriding commitment to unparalleled mortgage service. Our clients tuck in their shirts. All people worth anything in the world tuck in their shirts, too.
It would contravene our most basic company values to tolerate anything less than fully tucked-in shirts among our employees. For that reason, Cockland hereby requires all employees to certify not only that they will wear a blue or white button-down shirt every day at work, but that they will also appropriately tuck in their shirts. Failure to tuck in a shirt will result in immediate disciplinary action, up to and including docked pay and termination. Additionally, inappropriately tucked-in shirts will lead to the same consequences. Cockland simply cannot risk disappointing its clients by allowing employees to appear without immaculately tucked-in blue or white button-down shirts.
We recognize that these policy changes may appear harsh. We also recognize that employees may be confused about what it means to "tuck in" a button-down shirt or to "appropriately" tuck in a button-down shirt. In fairness to our employees, we wish to clarify these matters.
First, a "tucked-in button down shirt" means any button-down shirt the shirttails of which rest against the upper thighs, yet which are concealed and circumscribed at the top by a belt and trousers. As such, if a shirttail at any time appears outside the pants, the shirt is considered "not tucked-in" and will accordingly subject the offending employee to discipline.
Second, an "inappropriately tucked-in button down shirt" means a tucked-in button down shirt the tucking of which is not appropriate. "Appropriate tucking," in turn, means a tuck that does not result in ruffles, creases or otherwise slovenly shirt characteristics above the beltline. A tuck is only appropriate when the shirttails remain at all times below the beltline without bulging out, creasing or otherwise creating an unsavory appearance. The mere fact that an employee experiences "inappropriate tucking" because he or she sat down at a desk for too long does not cure the offense. An inappropriate tuck is an inappropriate tuck. Our clients expect the best from Cockland; and they do not forgive inappropriate tucking.
Neither do we. Inappropriately tucked-in button-down shirts will immediately subject the offending employee to discipline, up to an including docked pay and termination. We realize that compliance with appropriate tucking requirements may at times prove difficult. For that reason, management has decided to allow employees to cure inappropriate tucking by expeditiously removing all inappropriateness from their tucking within 30 seconds after discovering that their button-down shirts are inappropriately tucked. We believe that this rule both fairly allows for conscientious compliance at the same time it justly punishes flagrantly inappropriate tucking.
Cockland management is determined to realize excellence in all employee endeavors. That is why it has decided to implement these new rules concerning mandatory button-down shirt wearing and appropriate tucking effective immediately. Details may be found in the employee manual, Chapter 45, subsection 7(b).
Anyone who is anyone wears a blue or white button-down shirt every day. And anyone who is anyone appropriately tucks that shirt in; or at least corrects inappropriate tucking the moment it appears. At Cockland, we are committed to bringing maximal satisfaction to everyone who is anyone. That is why we must lead by example. That is why we must tuck in our shirts--appropriately.
If you don't like the rule, you shouldn't be on this team. So tuck in your shirt and start penetrating those accounts like a real Cocklander.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
DOMINIC CARTER, CRIME AND CHANGING PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
AN ESSAY
A few months ago, I wrote a short article about Dominic Carter, the former New York 1 anchorman who allegedly beat his wife. I used Mr. Carter's story to illustrate how difficult it is to "prove" things in our empirically-based evidence system. Now, a State court in New York has sentenced Mr. Carter to an unusual punishment for attempted assault. This presents compelling new issues.
Just as Mr. Carter's case provided an excellent vehicle to discuss evidence law, his sentence now provides an excellent vehicle to discuss criminal penalties in modern America. Put simply, criminal penalties are changing in America. And they are drifting far from their traditional purposes. In my view, this is not a good thing.
According to the New York Post, Mr. Carter was convicted of attempted assault for pervasively abusing his wife since 1997. See N.Y. Post, Crying shame of jailed NY1 journo, Jan. 15, 2010 at 5. Although his wife denied that Mr. Carter beat her, the trial judge--Arnold Etelson--referenced police reports detailing marital strife in the Carter home for over a decade. Id. He sentenced Mr. Carter to 30 days' imprisonment. Id. He also ordered Mr. Carter to "stay away" from his wife for two years unless "he is prescribed medication by a psychiatrist able to assure the judge that [he] is well enough to see her." Id. Additionally, the judge gave Mr. Carter an article from New York Magazine detailing Matt Damon's views about "honesty and humility." Id. During sentencing, he told Mr. Carter: "Try some humility and honesty--it goes a long way." Id. Finally, the judge gave Mr. Carter's wife a sticker with the words "Attitude Makes the Difference. " Id. He instructed her to affix the sticker to her bathroom mirror so that Mr. Carter can see it when he visits. Id.
This is highly irregular judicial work. As a general rule, the criminal law forbids specifically defined conduct. The criminal justice system decides whether the defendant engaged in that conduct, then neutrally decrees the legal consequences. While morality animates all criminal codes, it is not for judges in the criminal justice system to pontificate about it, let alone publicly scold criminals for sport. This New York judge transformed his courtroom into an entertainment circus. And the spotlight was not on Mr. Carter--it was on the judge.
To start, it is strange that Judge Etelson characterized these facts as "attempted" assault. At common law--and under New York State law--an assault means an intentionally harmful or offensive touching. See, e.g. NYPL § 120.00, et seq. Any intentional crime can be "attempted" if the defendant intends to achieve the bad result envisioned in the criminal code, then takes some action corroborating that intent. But it is no longer "attempt" when the defendant achieves exactly what the law forbids. Here, the judge relied on police reports that detailed Mr. Carter's abuse. They all but verified that he had routinely hit his wife since 1997. If the judge believed those reports, then he should have convicted Mr. Carter of assault, not attempted assault. If Mr. Carter succeeded in harmfully or offensively touching his wife, it was no longer attempted assault. It was just plain old assault--and it's a worse crime than attempted assault.
But Judge Etelson's legal errors pale in comparison with his bizarre approach to criminal penalties. Traditionally, criminal penalties in America--as in all Western countries--target the body and property. The law assumes that people do not want to suffer bodily pain or lose their property, so penalties targeting those things ostensibly dissuade potential criminals from making "bad choices." The death penalty, imprisonment, fines and corporal punishment encompass everything a State can realistically do to penalize crime.
In modern America, imprisonment is the preferred penalty. Fines follow in second place. Most consider corporal punishment an archaic penalty; it really never happens anymore. The death penalty is more common. Still, State-ordered death is quite a rare punishment, too.
Judge Etelson did not give Mr. Carter a traditional punishment. Rather, he theatrically used Mr. Carter as an instrument. The only traditional part about Mr. Carter's sentence was his imprisonment. To some, thirty days in prison for attempted assault might appear harsh. But no one would call it bizarre. People expect either fines or imprisonment for crimes in America. The criminal justice system works in part because the public knows what to expect for certain transgressions. They trust judges to declare penalties that everyone expects. At the same time, they understand that even a convicted criminal is entitled to some dignity before the law. He need not be publicly humiliated, ridiculed or belittled in the courtroom. His prison term and social ostracism accomplish that on their own. It is not the judge's role to morally grandstand or scold. He simply must pronounce sentence. Legislators moralize when they write the laws. Judges should not.
What does a New York Magazine article or a sticker have to do with the law? When did Matt Damon become a legal authority? True, "honesty, humility and a good attitude" are virtues. But it is not the law's role to chastise people for failing to be virtuous. The law's only role is to decree whether a person acted in a defined way. It does not matter whether he was virtuous or not when he did. A defendant suffers enough when a judge declares the penalty for violating the law; he does not need to "rub it in" by acting the moralist. In fact, I argue that judges overstep their bounds when they do.
I understand that people like to see criminals squirm. But their convictions should make them squirm, not a judge's moralizing antics. If every judge took it upon himself to act like Judge Etelson, our criminal justice system would look more like a Catholic school than a neutral forum for just laws. In a word, it is not a judge's job to castigate a convict's moral failings. Moral failings are irrelevant to the law. And the law is the only thing that judges are constitutionally empowered to decide. Anything else they say is unauthorized fluff.
Judge Etelson-style grandstanding is not the only abomination that occurs in our criminal justice system. Now, criminal penalties also increasingly intertwine with psychiatry. Mr. Carter's case is no exception. In his sentence, Judge Etelson conditioned Mr. Carter's future with his wife on his agreement to take psychiatric medications. He also retained discretion whether to permit Mr. Carter to see her, depending on whether a psychiatrist could assure him that he was "well enough."
Are these judicial inquiries? If they are, do they not negate the State's moral outrage against Mr. Carter? After all, if the court believes that Mr. Carter needs psychiatric medication, that means he is mentally ill. If he was mentally ill at the time he struck his wife, that makes him far less morally blameworthy. After all, the criminal law depends upon free, rational choice for its moral strength. It is easy to condemn someone who knowingly makes a bad choice. But it is not easy to condemn someone who lacked the mental composure to make choices, let alone recognize they were wrong.
In this case, Judge Etelson tried to wear too many hats. He wanted to punish Mr. Carter for doing something that violated the law. But then he stepped back and ordered Mr. Carter to take psychiatric medications for his "mental problems." Put simply, judges are not psychiatrists. They are not social workers. It is not their job to monitor people's behavior once they serve their sentences. Nor is it their job to declare whether people are "normal." Rather, they are mere judicial officers, and it's not a complicated job. It is not about management; it is about judgment: Did the defendant do this or not? If he did, he goes to jail. If he didn't, he goes free.
There is undoubtedly a relationship between law and psychiatry. But a judge's only concern with psychiatry is to determine whether a defendant is mentally well enough to be criminally responsible. If he is, that ends the inquiry. In fact, judges must be extremely wary when dealing with psychiatry in criminal cases. After all, the entire rationale for criminal punishment collapses as soon as psychiatry shows that the defendant cannot make rational choices. In that light, judges should tread lightly when tampering with psychiatric issues. They might just discover that the "evil defendant" is really no ogre at all. He might just be "sick." And it is not proper to morally condemn sick people, let alone jail them for choices they could not make. For better or worse, the law only works on sane people.
I doubt that Judge Etelson understood all these issues when he entertained the news media during Dominic Carter's sentencing last week. From his perspective, he was in the spotlight and he was going to relish the moment. He was not content to play the neutral magistrate who calmly decrees the legal consequences of statutory violations. No, he had to play the scolding father, too, as well as the psychiatrist and the actor.
I do not like this. While it may be impossible to separate law from popular morality, judges should consciously try to do so. True, laws enshrine popular morality. But they are not moral weapons. They are technical guidelines. It does not matter whether a law-abiding citizen is moral; he must merely not violate the technical guidelines. Morality is about character. Law is about conduct. It is much easier to control conduct than character. And a judge simply declares whether the individual in question violated the conduct guideline.
Well, at least that's what a judge is supposed to do. American criminal law is changing for the worse because the distinction between morality and law is eroding every day. Just look at the Carter case. It's all right there to see.
A few months ago, I wrote a short article about Dominic Carter, the former New York 1 anchorman who allegedly beat his wife. I used Mr. Carter's story to illustrate how difficult it is to "prove" things in our empirically-based evidence system. Now, a State court in New York has sentenced Mr. Carter to an unusual punishment for attempted assault. This presents compelling new issues.
Just as Mr. Carter's case provided an excellent vehicle to discuss evidence law, his sentence now provides an excellent vehicle to discuss criminal penalties in modern America. Put simply, criminal penalties are changing in America. And they are drifting far from their traditional purposes. In my view, this is not a good thing.
According to the New York Post, Mr. Carter was convicted of attempted assault for pervasively abusing his wife since 1997. See N.Y. Post, Crying shame of jailed NY1 journo, Jan. 15, 2010 at 5. Although his wife denied that Mr. Carter beat her, the trial judge--Arnold Etelson--referenced police reports detailing marital strife in the Carter home for over a decade. Id. He sentenced Mr. Carter to 30 days' imprisonment. Id. He also ordered Mr. Carter to "stay away" from his wife for two years unless "he is prescribed medication by a psychiatrist able to assure the judge that [he] is well enough to see her." Id. Additionally, the judge gave Mr. Carter an article from New York Magazine detailing Matt Damon's views about "honesty and humility." Id. During sentencing, he told Mr. Carter: "Try some humility and honesty--it goes a long way." Id. Finally, the judge gave Mr. Carter's wife a sticker with the words "Attitude Makes the Difference. " Id. He instructed her to affix the sticker to her bathroom mirror so that Mr. Carter can see it when he visits. Id.
This is highly irregular judicial work. As a general rule, the criminal law forbids specifically defined conduct. The criminal justice system decides whether the defendant engaged in that conduct, then neutrally decrees the legal consequences. While morality animates all criminal codes, it is not for judges in the criminal justice system to pontificate about it, let alone publicly scold criminals for sport. This New York judge transformed his courtroom into an entertainment circus. And the spotlight was not on Mr. Carter--it was on the judge.
To start, it is strange that Judge Etelson characterized these facts as "attempted" assault. At common law--and under New York State law--an assault means an intentionally harmful or offensive touching. See, e.g. NYPL § 120.00, et seq. Any intentional crime can be "attempted" if the defendant intends to achieve the bad result envisioned in the criminal code, then takes some action corroborating that intent. But it is no longer "attempt" when the defendant achieves exactly what the law forbids. Here, the judge relied on police reports that detailed Mr. Carter's abuse. They all but verified that he had routinely hit his wife since 1997. If the judge believed those reports, then he should have convicted Mr. Carter of assault, not attempted assault. If Mr. Carter succeeded in harmfully or offensively touching his wife, it was no longer attempted assault. It was just plain old assault--and it's a worse crime than attempted assault.
But Judge Etelson's legal errors pale in comparison with his bizarre approach to criminal penalties. Traditionally, criminal penalties in America--as in all Western countries--target the body and property. The law assumes that people do not want to suffer bodily pain or lose their property, so penalties targeting those things ostensibly dissuade potential criminals from making "bad choices." The death penalty, imprisonment, fines and corporal punishment encompass everything a State can realistically do to penalize crime.
In modern America, imprisonment is the preferred penalty. Fines follow in second place. Most consider corporal punishment an archaic penalty; it really never happens anymore. The death penalty is more common. Still, State-ordered death is quite a rare punishment, too.
Judge Etelson did not give Mr. Carter a traditional punishment. Rather, he theatrically used Mr. Carter as an instrument. The only traditional part about Mr. Carter's sentence was his imprisonment. To some, thirty days in prison for attempted assault might appear harsh. But no one would call it bizarre. People expect either fines or imprisonment for crimes in America. The criminal justice system works in part because the public knows what to expect for certain transgressions. They trust judges to declare penalties that everyone expects. At the same time, they understand that even a convicted criminal is entitled to some dignity before the law. He need not be publicly humiliated, ridiculed or belittled in the courtroom. His prison term and social ostracism accomplish that on their own. It is not the judge's role to morally grandstand or scold. He simply must pronounce sentence. Legislators moralize when they write the laws. Judges should not.
What does a New York Magazine article or a sticker have to do with the law? When did Matt Damon become a legal authority? True, "honesty, humility and a good attitude" are virtues. But it is not the law's role to chastise people for failing to be virtuous. The law's only role is to decree whether a person acted in a defined way. It does not matter whether he was virtuous or not when he did. A defendant suffers enough when a judge declares the penalty for violating the law; he does not need to "rub it in" by acting the moralist. In fact, I argue that judges overstep their bounds when they do.
I understand that people like to see criminals squirm. But their convictions should make them squirm, not a judge's moralizing antics. If every judge took it upon himself to act like Judge Etelson, our criminal justice system would look more like a Catholic school than a neutral forum for just laws. In a word, it is not a judge's job to castigate a convict's moral failings. Moral failings are irrelevant to the law. And the law is the only thing that judges are constitutionally empowered to decide. Anything else they say is unauthorized fluff.
Judge Etelson-style grandstanding is not the only abomination that occurs in our criminal justice system. Now, criminal penalties also increasingly intertwine with psychiatry. Mr. Carter's case is no exception. In his sentence, Judge Etelson conditioned Mr. Carter's future with his wife on his agreement to take psychiatric medications. He also retained discretion whether to permit Mr. Carter to see her, depending on whether a psychiatrist could assure him that he was "well enough."
Are these judicial inquiries? If they are, do they not negate the State's moral outrage against Mr. Carter? After all, if the court believes that Mr. Carter needs psychiatric medication, that means he is mentally ill. If he was mentally ill at the time he struck his wife, that makes him far less morally blameworthy. After all, the criminal law depends upon free, rational choice for its moral strength. It is easy to condemn someone who knowingly makes a bad choice. But it is not easy to condemn someone who lacked the mental composure to make choices, let alone recognize they were wrong.
In this case, Judge Etelson tried to wear too many hats. He wanted to punish Mr. Carter for doing something that violated the law. But then he stepped back and ordered Mr. Carter to take psychiatric medications for his "mental problems." Put simply, judges are not psychiatrists. They are not social workers. It is not their job to monitor people's behavior once they serve their sentences. Nor is it their job to declare whether people are "normal." Rather, they are mere judicial officers, and it's not a complicated job. It is not about management; it is about judgment: Did the defendant do this or not? If he did, he goes to jail. If he didn't, he goes free.
There is undoubtedly a relationship between law and psychiatry. But a judge's only concern with psychiatry is to determine whether a defendant is mentally well enough to be criminally responsible. If he is, that ends the inquiry. In fact, judges must be extremely wary when dealing with psychiatry in criminal cases. After all, the entire rationale for criminal punishment collapses as soon as psychiatry shows that the defendant cannot make rational choices. In that light, judges should tread lightly when tampering with psychiatric issues. They might just discover that the "evil defendant" is really no ogre at all. He might just be "sick." And it is not proper to morally condemn sick people, let alone jail them for choices they could not make. For better or worse, the law only works on sane people.
I doubt that Judge Etelson understood all these issues when he entertained the news media during Dominic Carter's sentencing last week. From his perspective, he was in the spotlight and he was going to relish the moment. He was not content to play the neutral magistrate who calmly decrees the legal consequences of statutory violations. No, he had to play the scolding father, too, as well as the psychiatrist and the actor.
I do not like this. While it may be impossible to separate law from popular morality, judges should consciously try to do so. True, laws enshrine popular morality. But they are not moral weapons. They are technical guidelines. It does not matter whether a law-abiding citizen is moral; he must merely not violate the technical guidelines. Morality is about character. Law is about conduct. It is much easier to control conduct than character. And a judge simply declares whether the individual in question violated the conduct guideline.
Well, at least that's what a judge is supposed to do. American criminal law is changing for the worse because the distinction between morality and law is eroding every day. Just look at the Carter case. It's all right there to see.
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Tuesday, March 24, 2009
A LAWYER'S WEEKEND PLANS (PURSUANT TO NOTICE AND SUBJECT TO LAW)
By : Mr. Ferguson A. Coxwell, Esq., Managing Partner & Senior Litigation Fellow, Tittley, Jiggelmann, Nippler & Rackenbacker, LLP, Attorneys at Law Specializing in Class Action Litigation (Named “Best Hands-On Client Service Firm” in 2005 by the American Breast Health Institute, A Medical Trade Association)
Inquiry is made concerning the weekend plans of aforenamed attorney and counselor at law and equity, Mr. Ferguson A. Coxwell, Esquire, Order of the Coif, Attorney No. 45612, propounded this 24th Day of March, in the Year of our Lord 2009, subject to all qualifications, express and implied, under law, in the City, County and State of New York, all other States notwithstanding.
COMES NOW MR. FERGUSON A. COXWELL, ESQUIRE, resident in and for the City of New York, County of New York, State of New York, Country of the United States of America, Hemisphere of the West, Christendom, Republican Party, et. seq., being desirous of a speedy and expeditious answer to aforemade Inquiry concerning Weekend Plans (hereinafter “The Inquiry,”) propounded, constituted, authorized, formulated and presented under law, notwithstanding and pursuant to any qualifications thereon, applicable thereto or terminable wherethrough, by and through himself as attorney in fact, implied in law or rendered in equity, speaking under any and all reservations as conditionally provided in the Master Subordinate Attorney Retention Contract (hereinafter “The Contract”), Definitions Section, § 12A(2), and hereby maketh the following disclosures, subject to law and without waiving any legal defense whereto aforesaid attorney may be, is, will be, was, has ever been, should be, of right should be, and by deduction must be entitled, notwithstanding any applicable evidentiary exceptions, qualifications, limitations, exclusions or inclusions (except as otherwise provided):
I, as attorney for, of, to the benefit of, on behalf of, as agent of, by whose authority I by action I do so ever make, do, say and maintain, pursuant to any and all contractual, fiduciary, moral, ethical, quasi-contractual, equitable or quasi-equitable duties, be they known, unknown, constructive, active or transitory, the American Breast Health Institute (A Medical Trade Association), hereby intend to go, by conveyance later to be determined under law, exception to which is hereby taken in cases in which contrary law be referenced in contradistinction hereto, unless such contrary law be nugatory as hereinafter provided or pursuant to Consent Decree as such term is defined in the Subordinate Master Second Amended Management Order Concerning Construction (“The Management Order”), to the beach this Saturday, March 28, 2009 at 9:15 AM, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, unless, until, and on the lesser condition that supervening Firm Business doth appear render such intention void ab initio, sub legis, contra bonos mores or malum fides, in which case no intention shall be honored pursuant to any and all Discovery Orders applicable hereto; it being expressly provided that such intention in all events shall be valid notwithstanding aforesaid Firm Business, be it supervening or not, if such Discovery Orders, having been done, signed, ordered and ordained by and through that certain Judge, the Honorable Martin A. Dingler, sitting in and for the County of Cuyahoga, in the State of Ohio, Country of the United States, Hemisphere of the West, Christendom, appear in law to have committed, conspired to commit or attempted to have committed Mutual Mistake, as reported in the case of Mulberry v. Johansen Dairy Consulting Group Ltd., 354 S.W.2d 412, 423 (Ark. 1962)(obiter dictum), whereby, such lesser provision having been fulfilled, aforesaid intention shall remain in full force and effect, notwithstanding and pursuant to any and all foregoing provisions made herein. In the event that aforesaid Attorney, Counselor, Advisor in Law and Notary doth realize above-named intention, aforesaid Attorney, Counselor, Advisor in Law and Notary shall, subject to any and all statutory limitations, qualifications, reservations or gesticulations applicable hereto, be such limitations constitutional, extralegal, odious, obnoxious or fetid (as such term be defined in the Model Olfactory Code, (MOC) Title IV, Subchapter A (Foule & Rancidde Odours Offensive to the Palatte), as amended, but not superceded), place down a beach towel upon above-described beach, there being no legal, moral or ethical barrier obstructing the same, notwithstanding any contrary mandate of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) concerning the laying of beach towels by attorneys (including supplementary rulings, unless such rulings have been declared invalid on appeal; but invalid rulings shall apply with full force and effect if made on Wednesdays), counselors and gesticulators at law, membership wherein this Author doth hereby admit and declare, subject to all privileges and evidentiary exclusions permitted by law, exception to any contrary contention is hereby interposed, the Author therethrough disclaiming any prohibited purpose or legal intent to defraud; it being expressly declared, averred and admitted that said towel be placed for no reason other than Relaxation, as such term be defined in the Model Attorney’s Guide for Responsible Weekend Behavior, reference whereto is hereby and for all time made, this Author having averred, stated, claimed and sworn, pursuant to oath and under penalty of perjury, so help him God, that he adhere to such Guide, unless such Guide be contrary to law, in which case this Author, having sworn pursuant to oath and under penalty of perjury that he be for all time a responsible, ethical, moral and respectable Officer of the Courts of the State of New York, shall not adhere to such Guide, to the extent and to the degree that such guide espouseth any claim, belief, opinion, rumination or intimation that any Behaviour be moral, when it be in fact immoral; or ethical, when it be in fact unethical; or good, when it in fact be bad; or normal, when it in fact be abnormal et &c; when such claims be herewith and forevermore held contrary to law, this Author expressly disavoweth any and all intent to adhere to same, notwithstanding he hath already adhered, it being recognized that this Author followeth the Law, even if such Law be contrary to Right. Now, therefore, this Author, having spread aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach, and having averred that such conduct, intent, plan and Behaviour be in no Wise contrary to Law or Regulation, hereby expresses his further plan and design to remain upon aforesaid Beach until such time as Firm Business doth require the termination of aforesaid Remainder upon aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach; but in no event shall such Termination occur until at least 11 AM upon the forenoon of that certain Saturday, March 28, 2009, it being declared, understood and recognized in both law and fact that this Author requireth Relaxation at least between the hours of 9:15 AM and no earlier than 11 AM upon that certain Saturday, March 28, 2009, claim whereto is hereby made subject to all solemnities, ceremonies and forms provided by law. Such plans having been made, and full disclosure thereof having been given subject to all applicable privileges, evidentiary exclusions and authorities as cognizable legally, judicially and culinarily, except in such cases wherein such privileges, evidentiary exclusions and authorities be declared inapplicable pursuant to notice and argument, there being no contrary consideration on prudential grounds, claim to which is hereby made in any and all cases in which such considerations, if any, be found and/or asserted, notwithstanding the inassertability thereof, waiver whereof is hereby expressly controverted, this Author shall be accessible by telephonic, electronic and tele-electronic means upon aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach at aforesaid times, provided that any and all communications involveth only Firm Business; but in no event shall communications be initiated and/or accepted when Author be engaged in Inebriation Activities as such term be defined in the Model Alcoholic Consumption Act, as amended (see generally, §§ 34-39, et seq., “Inability to Telephonically Respond on Grounds of Being Statutorily Shitfaced”).
It is so ordered.
Inquiry is made concerning the weekend plans of aforenamed attorney and counselor at law and equity, Mr. Ferguson A. Coxwell, Esquire, Order of the Coif, Attorney No. 45612, propounded this 24th Day of March, in the Year of our Lord 2009, subject to all qualifications, express and implied, under law, in the City, County and State of New York, all other States notwithstanding.
COMES NOW MR. FERGUSON A. COXWELL, ESQUIRE, resident in and for the City of New York, County of New York, State of New York, Country of the United States of America, Hemisphere of the West, Christendom, Republican Party, et. seq., being desirous of a speedy and expeditious answer to aforemade Inquiry concerning Weekend Plans (hereinafter “The Inquiry,”) propounded, constituted, authorized, formulated and presented under law, notwithstanding and pursuant to any qualifications thereon, applicable thereto or terminable wherethrough, by and through himself as attorney in fact, implied in law or rendered in equity, speaking under any and all reservations as conditionally provided in the Master Subordinate Attorney Retention Contract (hereinafter “The Contract”), Definitions Section, § 12A(2), and hereby maketh the following disclosures, subject to law and without waiving any legal defense whereto aforesaid attorney may be, is, will be, was, has ever been, should be, of right should be, and by deduction must be entitled, notwithstanding any applicable evidentiary exceptions, qualifications, limitations, exclusions or inclusions (except as otherwise provided):
I, as attorney for, of, to the benefit of, on behalf of, as agent of, by whose authority I by action I do so ever make, do, say and maintain, pursuant to any and all contractual, fiduciary, moral, ethical, quasi-contractual, equitable or quasi-equitable duties, be they known, unknown, constructive, active or transitory, the American Breast Health Institute (A Medical Trade Association), hereby intend to go, by conveyance later to be determined under law, exception to which is hereby taken in cases in which contrary law be referenced in contradistinction hereto, unless such contrary law be nugatory as hereinafter provided or pursuant to Consent Decree as such term is defined in the Subordinate Master Second Amended Management Order Concerning Construction (“The Management Order”), to the beach this Saturday, March 28, 2009 at 9:15 AM, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, unless, until, and on the lesser condition that supervening Firm Business doth appear render such intention void ab initio, sub legis, contra bonos mores or malum fides, in which case no intention shall be honored pursuant to any and all Discovery Orders applicable hereto; it being expressly provided that such intention in all events shall be valid notwithstanding aforesaid Firm Business, be it supervening or not, if such Discovery Orders, having been done, signed, ordered and ordained by and through that certain Judge, the Honorable Martin A. Dingler, sitting in and for the County of Cuyahoga, in the State of Ohio, Country of the United States, Hemisphere of the West, Christendom, appear in law to have committed, conspired to commit or attempted to have committed Mutual Mistake, as reported in the case of Mulberry v. Johansen Dairy Consulting Group Ltd., 354 S.W.2d 412, 423 (Ark. 1962)(obiter dictum), whereby, such lesser provision having been fulfilled, aforesaid intention shall remain in full force and effect, notwithstanding and pursuant to any and all foregoing provisions made herein. In the event that aforesaid Attorney, Counselor, Advisor in Law and Notary doth realize above-named intention, aforesaid Attorney, Counselor, Advisor in Law and Notary shall, subject to any and all statutory limitations, qualifications, reservations or gesticulations applicable hereto, be such limitations constitutional, extralegal, odious, obnoxious or fetid (as such term be defined in the Model Olfactory Code, (MOC) Title IV, Subchapter A (Foule & Rancidde Odours Offensive to the Palatte), as amended, but not superceded), place down a beach towel upon above-described beach, there being no legal, moral or ethical barrier obstructing the same, notwithstanding any contrary mandate of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) concerning the laying of beach towels by attorneys (including supplementary rulings, unless such rulings have been declared invalid on appeal; but invalid rulings shall apply with full force and effect if made on Wednesdays), counselors and gesticulators at law, membership wherein this Author doth hereby admit and declare, subject to all privileges and evidentiary exclusions permitted by law, exception to any contrary contention is hereby interposed, the Author therethrough disclaiming any prohibited purpose or legal intent to defraud; it being expressly declared, averred and admitted that said towel be placed for no reason other than Relaxation, as such term be defined in the Model Attorney’s Guide for Responsible Weekend Behavior, reference whereto is hereby and for all time made, this Author having averred, stated, claimed and sworn, pursuant to oath and under penalty of perjury, so help him God, that he adhere to such Guide, unless such Guide be contrary to law, in which case this Author, having sworn pursuant to oath and under penalty of perjury that he be for all time a responsible, ethical, moral and respectable Officer of the Courts of the State of New York, shall not adhere to such Guide, to the extent and to the degree that such guide espouseth any claim, belief, opinion, rumination or intimation that any Behaviour be moral, when it be in fact immoral; or ethical, when it be in fact unethical; or good, when it in fact be bad; or normal, when it in fact be abnormal et &c; when such claims be herewith and forevermore held contrary to law, this Author expressly disavoweth any and all intent to adhere to same, notwithstanding he hath already adhered, it being recognized that this Author followeth the Law, even if such Law be contrary to Right. Now, therefore, this Author, having spread aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach, and having averred that such conduct, intent, plan and Behaviour be in no Wise contrary to Law or Regulation, hereby expresses his further plan and design to remain upon aforesaid Beach until such time as Firm Business doth require the termination of aforesaid Remainder upon aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach; but in no event shall such Termination occur until at least 11 AM upon the forenoon of that certain Saturday, March 28, 2009, it being declared, understood and recognized in both law and fact that this Author requireth Relaxation at least between the hours of 9:15 AM and no earlier than 11 AM upon that certain Saturday, March 28, 2009, claim whereto is hereby made subject to all solemnities, ceremonies and forms provided by law. Such plans having been made, and full disclosure thereof having been given subject to all applicable privileges, evidentiary exclusions and authorities as cognizable legally, judicially and culinarily, except in such cases wherein such privileges, evidentiary exclusions and authorities be declared inapplicable pursuant to notice and argument, there being no contrary consideration on prudential grounds, claim to which is hereby made in any and all cases in which such considerations, if any, be found and/or asserted, notwithstanding the inassertability thereof, waiver whereof is hereby expressly controverted, this Author shall be accessible by telephonic, electronic and tele-electronic means upon aforesaid Towel upon aforesaid Beach at aforesaid times, provided that any and all communications involveth only Firm Business; but in no event shall communications be initiated and/or accepted when Author be engaged in Inebriation Activities as such term be defined in the Model Alcoholic Consumption Act, as amended (see generally, §§ 34-39, et seq., “Inability to Telephonically Respond on Grounds of Being Statutorily Shitfaced”).
It is so ordered.
Labels:
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Friday, December 19, 2008
THE MANDATORY CHICAGO SPORTS FAN REPORTING ACT

THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, STATE OF ILLINOIS IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Chicago, Illinois
RICHARD M. DALEY, MAYOR
PREAMBLE : We, the elected representatives of the People of the City of Chicago in the State of Illinois, authorized by the City Charter to act for the general welfare and moral edification of all City residents, and acting in defense of children everywhere, do hereby pass this ACT intended to protect the health, safety and community spirit of this Great City.
§ 1 – SHORT TITLE : This Act shall be known as the “MANDATORY CHICAGO SPORTS FAN REPORTING ACT” (hereinafter, the “Act”).
§ 2 - PURPOSES : The People of the City of Chicago intend to memorialize their understanding that sports team devotion is a citizen’s single most important civic duty. Allegiance to a Chicago city sports team is necessary to sustain robust public pride. The City Council desires to reinforce city pride and cohesion by requiring all city residents—no matter the duration of their residency—to declare allegiance to a Chicago city sports team every calendar year, beginning January 1, 2009. The Council believes that compulsion is necessary to ensure that every Chicago resident keeps his or her priorities straight in life. Sports are a priority in Chicago. Every Chicago citizen must be a sports fan. Law is the only way to ensure proper dedication to an eligible Chicago city sports team. The Council believes that the Act will improve civic and community life by creating a city esprit de corps revolving around eligible sports teams. The General Assembly further believes that enforcement of the Act will create jobs and raise revenue for the city.
§ 3 – DEFINITIONS : The following definitions apply throughout this Act:
(a) Resident : A “resident” is any living person within the city limits of the city of Chicago. This term includes everyone, even those merely passing through the city, also known as “Transitory Residents” (see below at § 5).
(b) Eligible Chicago City Sports Team : An “Eligible Chicago City Sports Team” includes and is strictly limited to the following professional sports franchises headquartered within the city of Chicago: (i) The Chicago Cubs; (ii) The Chicago White Sox; (iii) The Chicago Bears; (iv) The Chicago Blackhawks; (v) The Chicago Bulls; (vi) Chicago Fire.
(c) Reporting Period: “Reporting Period” means January 1 through December 31 in any calendar year beginning in 2009.
(d) Allegiance Form: An “Allegiance Form” means a paper or electronic affirmation that a Resident is a Fan of an Eligible Chicago City Sports Team.
(e) Fan : A “Fan” means a Resident who believes strongly in the success of any Eligible Chicago City Sports team. “Fans” must attend at least 10 home games played by the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team indicated in such “Fan’s” Allegiance Form during any Reporting Period.
(f) Enforcement Bureau : “Enforcement Bureau” means any office, institution, patrol, group or individual constituted by city Charter to enforce the provisions of this Act.
§ 4 – OBLIGATIONS OF RESIDENTS : During every Reporting Period, Residents must:
(a) Obtain an Allegiance Form from any duly-authorized city agency;
(b) Submit said Allegiance From in a manner consistent with all applicable local laws;
(c) State under oath that such Resident is a Fan of an Eligible Chicago City Sports Team;
(d) Attend at least ten (10) home games played by the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team identified in said Resident’s Allegiance Form;
(e) Retain receipts as proof of attendance at all home games described in § 4(d);
(f) Mail all receipts described in § (4)(e) to a duly-authorized city agency prior to the end of the Reporting Period;
(g) Publicly display devotion to the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team identified in such Resident’s Allegiance Form for the applicable Reporting Period;
(h) Maintain a regular cable television subscription for coverage of all regular and postseason games played by the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team identified in such Resident's Allegiance Form for the applicable Reporting Period;
(i) Pay an annual Submission Fee of $150.00 for each Allegiance Form submitted, payable within 30 days of said submission.
§ 5 – OBLIGATIONS OF TRANSITORY RESIDENTS : Transitory residents have the same obligations as all other Residents under this Act. To ensure compliance with this Act, Enforcement Bureaus are hereby authorized to construct compliance checkpoints at all roadways and railways leading in or out of the city of Chicago. Enforcement Bureaus are hereby authorized to stop all motorists or rail travelers at such checkpoints to verify their Allegiance Form status for the applicable Reporting Period. Additionally, Enforcement Bureaus are hereby authorized to question all national and international travelers arriving at or departing from Chicago city airports to verify Allegiance Form status for the applicable Reporting Period. Any Transitory Resident found not to have duly submitted an Allegiance Form for the applicable Reporting Period shall be required to make a declaration consistent with this Act, and to pay a penalty of $1,000 U.S. Currency, plus the usual $150.00 Submission Fee (see § 4(i)).
§ 6 – PUBLIC DISPLAY OF DEVOTION : Consistent with § 4(g), all Residents are obligated to publicly display devotion to the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team identified in such Residents’ Allegiance Form for the applicable Reporting Period. Such displays must consist of:
(a) Wearing Eligible Chicago City Sports Team-marked clothing at least twice per week;
(b) Discussing Eligible Chicago City Sports Team events at least once per day; but on Mondays, Residents must discuss such events at least three times (3) per day;
(c) Placing Eligible Chicago City Sports Team bumper stickers on their automobiles;
(d) Possessing at least one (1) photograph of: (i) Michael Ditka; (ii) Michael Jordan; or (iii) Harry Caray. Photographs of Brian Urlacher will not be considered;
(e) Drinking at least two (2) toasts to Eligible Chicago City Sports Team players each weekend day during the applicable Reporting Period;
(f) Painting one’s face with the colors of the Eligible Chicago City Sports Team identified in such Resident’s Allegiance Form at least once during the applicable Reporting Period;
(g) Sending a verified photograph of each Resident’s compliance with § 6(f) to a duly-authorized city agency within 30 days of the taking of such photograph.
§ 7 – ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES :
(i) The Chicago Police Department;
(ii) The Chicago Department of Jails;
(iii) The Chicago Airport Authority;
(iv) The Mayor’s Office;
(v) The Department of Sewers;
(vi) The Department of Parking Enforcement;
(vii) The Department of Streets and Sanitation;
and
(viii) The Department of Revenue.
(b) Authorized Executive Branch officers are hereby empowered to conduct random stops to verify any Resident’s compliance with the Act. Upon such stops, officers shall ask the following questions: “Are you a Resident of the City of Chicago? Are you a sports fan? Are you a Cubs fan? Are you a Sox fan? Are you a Bears fan? Are you Blackhawks fan? Are you a Bulls fan? Are you a Fire fan?” If such resident responds that he is not a fan of any of the aforementioned teams, the officer shall state: “I am going to have to take you in for violating the Mandatory Chicago Sports Fan Reporting Act.”
§ 8 - SPECIFIC OFFENSES AGAINST THE ACT :
(2) Willful Failure to Report Fan status for more than two (2) Reporting Periods is a Class A Felony punishable by up to 20 years in prison and a $100,000 fine.
(3) Negligent Failure to Properly Complete an Allegiance Form is a Class A Misdemeanor punishable by up to 6 months in prison and a $1,500 fine.
(4) Intentionally Supporting a Rival Team is a Class A-1 Felony punishable by death or life in prison, notwithstanding compliance with this Act in all other respects.
(5) Ignorance of the law shall not be a defense to any crime enumerated in this Section, consistent with principles of Illinois criminal law, and any provision of the State or United States Constitution notwithstanding.
(6) Conviction under any offense enumerated in this Section shall never be judicially determined to be a deprivation of life, liberty or property without Due Process under the State or United States Constitutions.
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